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ABSTRACT: 
Despite the vast amount of scholarship completed on the First World War, relatively 
little work has focused on the British Left and the conflict. The aim of this thesis is to 
rectify this, by examining left-wing support for the war effort, and the implications of 
this for the labour movement. 
This study aims to ascertain the extent and nature of support for the war effort amongst 
the Left. It will survey the relationship between patriotism and the Left in the years 
before 1914, in order to give context for the events of the war years. It will then 
examine the reactions of the men and women of the Left – at both an elite and subaltern 
level – to the First World War. 
Furthermore, it will investigate how left-wing patriotism in this period impacted on the 
fortunes of the labour movement after the Armistice. The war also saw a great increase 
in the size and scope of the state, and the significance and implications of this will be 
examined. Finally, this thesis will aim to enhance our understanding as to why and how 
the labour movement was able to remain united and purposeful in the war years and 
immediately after 1918. 
Overall, this thesis will contribute to our understanding of the nature and extent of 
support for the war on the Left, the impact of the war on Labour’s electoral fortunes, the 
relationship between the Left and the state, and labour movement cohesion in this 
period. 
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STYLE, PUNCTUATION AND GRAMMAR 
Capitalisation 
Labour party, not Labour Party. 
The Left, but left-wing, leftist, etc. 
South Wales, but southern counties, etc. 
Acronyms and Abbreviations 
Full titles used in the first instance and then acronyms used subsequently. 
E.g.: the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) 
No full-stops after the letters of acronyms; full-stops are used for the initials of 
individuals, but with no further spaces in between the letters. 
E.g.: G.H. Roberts and E.D. Morel; but not R. H. Tawney, J. A. Hobson, etc. 
Numbers 
Numbers are spelt out up to 100, after which numerals are used. 
E.g.: seventy-two, ninety-eight; 137, 201, etc. 
However round numbers are spelt out. 
E.g.: two hundred, five thousand, eight million, etc. 
A similar rule is used for money.  
So, for example, one pound, two million pounds, etc; but £750,000, £2.5 million, etc. 
Dates 
All dates are given in the format Date, Month, Year. 
E.g.: 28 August 1914. 
‘S’ rather than ‘z’ is used throughout, so: recognise, organise, mobilise, etc. 
Quotations in excess of five lines are indented. 
Please note that all quotations have the original spelling, punctuation and 
grammar unaltered. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If the First World War has generally suffered from comparison to the Second in terms 
of both public interest and the significance ascribed to it by scholars in the shaping of 
modern Britain, this is especially so for the relationship between the Left and these two 
wars. For the Left, the Second World War can be seen as a time of triumph: a united 
stand against fascism followed by a landslide election win and a radical, reforming 
Labour government. The First World War is more complex. Given the gratuitous costs 
in lives, the failure of a ‘fit country for heroes to live in’ to materialise, the deep 
recessions and unemployment of the inter-war years and botched peace settlements 
which served only to precipitate another war, the Left has tended to view the conflict as 
an unmitigated disaster and unpardonable waste. There is also the fact that Kaiser 
Wilhelm and Imperial Germany were far less odious villains than Adolf Hitler and the 
Third Reich. This has led to a tendency on the Left to see the later conflict as the ‘good’ 
war, fought against an obvious evil, and the earlier conflict as an imperialist blunder; 
the result of backroom scheming, secret pacts and a thirst for colonies. This ahistorical 
view fails to take into account that the labour movement of 1914 lacked the paradigm of 
Nazi Germany as a reference point; for them, the First World War was the great struggle 
of their day, ‘the war to end all wars’, a zero-sum conflict between British liberal 
democracy, however imperfect, and an authoritarian, autocratic regime commanding a 
highly industrialised economy and a vast military. This is not to say that the belief 
Germany should be defeated translated into hatred of Germans, much less a love of the 
British government. In this centenary year, the purpose of this thesis is to look at the 
relationship between the Left and the war, and the Left and patriotism in general, in the 
context of 1914-1918.  
There are several interlocking research questions which this thesis will seek to 
address. Firstly, what was the extent and nature of support for the war amongst the 
British labour movement, at both an elite and subaltern level? Was there a continuity 
between the patriotism of the war years and the decades before 1914, or did the war 
feature a break with the traditions and attitudes of the past? The first three chapters will 
address this question. Chapter 1 surveys the relationship between the Left and 
patriotism in the decades prior to the First World War, in order to provide context for 
the developments of the war years. Chapter 2 is concerned with patriotic labour in the 
years 1914-1918, and focuses on support given to the war effort from across the British 
Left. Finally, while this thesis concentrates on labour patriotism, it would be insufficient 
9 
for a treatment of the Left in this period to exclude strikes, opposition to conscription 
and the anti-war movement. Chapter 3 addresses these issues, to ascertain the extent to 
which the anti-war agitation was characteristic of the labour movement as a whole.  
Chapter 4 examines the implications of Labour’s support for and involvement 
with the war on the electoral prospects of the party after 1918 via the following research 
questions: Did Labour’s record secure its patriot credentials and help to win broader 
working-class support? Was there a ‘reconciliation’ – if one was needed – between the 
Left and patriotic, working-class values? This chapter discusses specifically the impact 
of the war on support for Labour, in terms of both former Liberal and Conservative 
recruits, ex-servicemen and their families, and working-class individuals hitherto 
unsympathetic to the Left. Chapter 5 explores the relationship between labour and the 
state: to what extent did the scope and apparatus of the state extend in wartime, and how 
much of this receded after 1918? How far was Labour drawn into the British state 
during the war, and what did Labour do to protect working-class interests? If the pre-
war labour movement had an ambiguous relationship with the state, how did the war 
affect this? What were the implications of Labour’s experiences with the wartime state 
on the type of Labour party which emerged in 1918? This question is the subject of 
Chapter 5, which analyses the growth of the wartime state, the role of labour outside of 
government in protecting the interests of the most vulnerable, and the importance of 
wartime experiences in engendering a statist labour movement after 1918. Chapter 6 
addresses the troublesome issue of labour cohesion during this period: why, if the war 
fatally split the Liberals, and European labour movements suffered schisms and the 
emergence of competitors, was British labour – and the British Labour party in 
particular – able to survive the war, not just intact, but stronger and more purposeful?  
A great deal of work on left-wing attitudes towards the First World War has 
been undermined by one or two preconceptions. The first of these is a presumption that 
holding ‘left-wing’ views is inimical to patriotism. According to Geoffrey Field, 
‘patriotic loyalties for good reason have generally been viewed as a counterweight to 
class consciousness’,1 and for Paul Ward, ‘ultimately, in 1914, the choice between 
socialism and patriotism had to be made’.2 Yet most of the trade unionists, socialists, 
and Labour supporters who went to war, took up munitions production, or waved to 
1 G. Field, ‘Social Patriotism and the British Working Class’, International Labour and Working Class 
History 41 (1992): 21. 
2 P. Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack: Englishness, Patriotism and the British Left, 1881-1924, London: 
Boydell, 2011, 5. 
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their husbands and sons as they boarded the troop trains, did not agonise over whether 
their loyalties lay with their country or their politics.  
 This should not surprise us – during this period the pull of nationalism was 
powerful indeed. Historians such as David Silbey have sought to understand why men 
would leave their homes to fight in foreign fields with unpronounceable place names, 
but the men themselves felt it was only natural.
3
 Nations may well be artificial 
concepts, and countries such as ‘England’ and ‘Britain’ may well be imagined 
communities, but their citizens – then and now – did not see them that way. For most 
Britons in the 1910s their country was a very real, tangible community, delineated by 
biology as much as culture, and with genuine claims on their lives and labour. 
Chairman of the Parliamentary Labour party Ramsay MacDonald concurred with this 
sentiment, believing that nations were not abstractions but real communities.
4
 This 
patriotism, furthermore, need not be seen as anathema to ‘class’ solidarity and leftist 
politics; on the contrary, as Gerard DeGroot has argued, ‘love for Britain and a 
willingness to defend her’ was often ‘a profound, but often discounted, element of, 
British working-class consciousness’.5 Rather than limit class consciousness, national 
and local patriotism was often a real boon to the labour movement, and 
correspondingly, socialist convictions could bolster patriotic sentiment. 
The second factor which has obscured left-wing attitudes to the war is the 
conflation of ‘working-class’, ‘trade unionist’ and ‘Labour’. Let us be clear: in 1914 the 
majority of the labour force was not unionised, and since the ‘working-class’, according 
to Duncan Tanner’s figures, comprised seventy-five per cent of the Edwardian 
electorate, most of their votes must have gone to Liberal or Conservative candidates. In 
much the same way as the Edwardian working class did not appreciate the contradiction 
between class awareness and patriotism which later historians would describe, most 
Labour leaders of the time – unlike some contemporary Continental theorists and many 
later historians – did not assume that the votes and union subscriptions of the workers 
would inevitably flow towards them given enough time. They fought hard for every 
member and every vote, and where they fought successfully they often used a language 
rooted in the local culture and coupled with pragmatic, practical, tangible aims and 
achievements. Discussing the ‘labour patriots’ of the war period, J.O. Stubbs argued 
that ‘they were well to the right of the mainstream of political thought in the Labour 
3 D. Silbey, The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, 1914-1916, London: Frank Cass, 2005. 
4 Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack, 9. 
5 G.J. DeGroot, Blighty: British Society in the Era of the Great War, London: Longman, 1996, 49. 
Emphasis added. 
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world’.6 This may well have been the case, but crucially, mainstream Labour thought 
was well to the left of most working-class people at this time. It is a contention of this 
thesis that labour patriotism during the First World War had the effect of bringing the 
mass of the working classes towards the Labour movement, but irrespective of the 
validity of this proposition, care must be taken to avoid the assumption that the Labour 
party or the trade unions spoke for, or represented, the working class as a whole. 
It is also important to avoid easy generalisations about the British working class 
during this period. Originally, due to the variety of factors and sources relating to class, 
politics, nationhood and rhetoric in the home nations of Ireland, Scotland and Wales, 
this study was intended to restrict itself to the English experience. The source base, 
however, led to the broadening of the investigation to incorporate Britain, but not 
Ireland. Not only was there a tremendous amount of heterogeneity between – and within 
– the constitute nations of Britain; this also applied to the different counties and regions 
of England. For example, Jeremy Seabrook has noted how many Labour and working-
men’s clubs in East Lancashire did not possess an alcohol license, as labourism was so 
closely intertwined with Methodism in that part of the county, whereas elsewhere in 
Lancashire it was essential for Labour to adapt to the pub-based popular culture.
7
 The 
danger of applying generalisations to particular areas also applies to individuals. For 
example, even Robert Blatchford – former soldier and labour patriot, editor of The 
Clarion and thoroughly grounded in working-class culture – was a teetotaller and 
vegetarian. It would be a mistake therefore to see the Edwardian Labour movement as 
polarised between hard-drinking, patriotic trade unionists and abstemious, 
Nonconformist, middle-class pacifists; the ‘creeping Jesuses’ of Orwell’s derogatory 
phrase. Although there were many fissures in the labour movement during this period, 
patriotism was not a major fault line. 
This thesis will make frequent use of terms which are somewhat contentious. 
For example, ‘nationalism’ here is taken to simply mean the belief that nations are real, 
tangible concepts and that there are differences between people of different 
nationalities. It does not necessarily have any chauvinistic connotations in this context. 
‘Patriotism’ will be used here in a more active sense, to denote pride – not necessarily 
in nation – but in community, city, or country. ‘Militarism’ will be used to signify the 
lauding of military values and the desirability of military conquest. ‘Socialism’, when it 
is used, is used in a vague sense to mean socio-economic ‘Leftism’; perhaps too much 
                                               
6 J.O. Stubbs, ‘Lord Milner and Patriotic Labour’, The English Historical Review 87 (1972): 729. 
7 J. Seabrook, City Close-Up, London: Penguin, 1973. 
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attention has been paid by historians of this period as to whether or not labour leaders or 
the labour movement generally was ‘socialist’ or not; it is doubtful that the ordinary 
men and women of the labour movement cared much as to whether they were 
‘socialists’, ‘labourists’ or just trade unionists. John Holford has said of the Edinburgh 
labour movement at the end of the war: ‘The apparent unimportance of Clause 4 in 
discussion of the new constitution is remarkable. There is no record of its having even 
been mentioned, let alone discussed, in Labour’s Edinburgh branch meetings in late 
1917 and early 1918. The ILP did not consider it; neither did the Trades Council’.8 It 
could well be that the division between ‘socialism’ and ‘labourism’ was not as defined, 
and far less important, than historians have assumed it to be. ‘Labour’ when capitalised 
refers to the Labour party; ‘labour’ and ‘labour movement’ are used as terms to 
encompass the whole of the British Left. 
There has been fairly little scholarly attention paid to the Left and the First 
World War. Jay Winter’s Socialism and the Challenge of War examined the impact of 
the war on the intellectual currents of the labour movement, and made some use of the 
War Emergency: Workers National Committee files, but concentrated on the elites of 
the movement, and did not convey the relationship between the war and ordinary men 
and women of the Left.
9
 Similarly, John Horne’s Labour at War, whilst offering a 
comparative perspective on the British and French labour movements, is again biased 
towards the elites of the Left.
10
 In Red Flag and Union Jack, Paul Ward highlighted 
how pre-war Labour leaders had long utilised the language of nationalism to argue for 
Parliamentarism. MacDonald, for instance, branded syndicalism as ‘foreign’, and Keir 
Hardie argued that the earlier anti-Parliamentarism of the movement had meant that 
‘Socialism, in those days, was treated as a plant of continental growth which could 
never find lodgement in Great Britain’.11 In this effort it seems that they were 
reasonably successful. For Ward, the post-war years saw radical, oppositional patriotism 
supplanted by social patriotism, and a general belief that reform would come through 
the state, not in opposition to it.
12
 
Most of the literature concerned with the war and labour has focussed on the 
anti-war movement. Andrew Rothstein’s The Soldiers’ Strikes of 1919 and Gloden 
                                               
8 J. Holford, Reshaping Labour: Organisation, Work and Politics – Edinburgh in the Great War and 
After, London: Croom Helm, 1988, 172. 
9 J.M. Winter, Socialism and the Challenge of War: Ideas and Politics in Britain, 1912-1918, London: 
Routledge Kegan Paul, 1974. 
10 J.N. Horne, Labour at War. France and Britain 1914-1918, Oxford: OUP, 1992. 
11 Ward, Red Flag and Union Jack, 87. 
12 ibid., 197. 
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Dallas and David Gill’s The Unknown Army both examine mutinies and soldiers strikes 
in the final two years of the war and after demobilisation. A more recent contribution to 
the literature concentrating on anti-war agitation is Cyril Pearce’s Comrade of 
Conscience.
13
 Pearce argued that there was a significant pacifist movement in 
Huddersfield and that other towns and cities may well have experienced similar anti-war 
movements. Given that Pearce largely attributed the Huddersfield situation to specific 
socio-economic, religious and cultural factors prevalent in that town, however, it is 
doubtful how far spread pacifist inclinations were across the country as a whole. There 
are also lesser-known radical contributions to the debate on labour patriotism, such 
Julian Putkowski’s The Kinmel Park Camp Riots 1919, Ken Weller’s ‘Don’t be a 
Soldier!’, and the journal Gun Fire, edited by A. J. Peacock.14 Again, these studies 
tended to focus on specific localities and individuals, and it is difficult to argue that they 
are representative of working-class attitudes towards the war, given the continued 
support for the war effort, the pronounced anti-Germanism and the general 
determination for a ‘fight to the finish’ prevalent until November 1918.  
Martin Pugh has focused on the issue of Labour adapting to working-class 
conservatism, first in a 2002 article, ‘The Rise of Labour and the Political Culture of 
Conservatism, 1890-1945’, and as a major theme in his 2011 book, Speak for Britain!15 
In the latter he claimed that early disputes between J.H. Thomas and Philip Snowden 
‘signified the extent to which attitudes towards drink, religion and morality reflected the 
cultural divide within working-class communities – with which a Labour Party had 
somehow to come to terms’.16 Pugh argued that the ideological links and overlaps 
between Labour and Conservatism, and the recruitment of politicians and voters from 
the Tories to the Left, had been largely neglected by historians.
17
 He described the 
patriotic, often culturally conservative views of men such as John Clynes and Thomas, 
and claimed that they would ‘scarcely have achieved lasting power in their unions and 
in the Labour Party had they not reflected rank-and-file sentiment’.18 For Pugh the 
success of Labour in the inter-war years, culminating in the 1945 election victory, were 
                                               
13 Cyril Pearce, Comrades in Conscience: The Story of an English Community’s Opposition to the Great 
War, London: Francis Boutle, 2001. 
14 J. Putkowski, The Kinmel Park Riots 1919, Harwarden: Flintshire Historical Society, 1989; K. Weller, 
‘Don’t be a Soldier!’ The Radical Anti-War Movement in North London 1914-1918, London: Journeyman 
Press, 1985. 
15 M. Pugh, ‘The Rise of Labour and the Political Culture of Conservatism, 1890-1945’, History 87 
(2002): 514-537 and Speak for Britain! A New History of the Labour Party, London: Vintage, 2011. 
16 Pugh, Speak for Britain!, 19. 
17 Pugh, ‘Rise of Labour’, 516. 
18 ibid., 520. 
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down to ‘the synthesis of Toryism and socialism’, and the adaption to a ‘conservative 
working class that, in certain circumstances, was prepared to vote Labour’.19 
In terms of soldiers moving towards Labour, Nick Mansfield has described how 
the Army was a conduit for people towards labour organisations such as the National 
Union of Agricultural Workers, the National Union of Railwaymen, and the Workers’ 
Union, particularly in rural areas where the labour movement had been weak.
20
 After 
the war, members of the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Soldiers 
and Sailors would physically break up right-wing meetings in Norfolk and South 
Wales.
21
 At a local level, labour activists took a prominent role in the war effort: 
Mansfield drew attention to the schoolmaster socialist Tom Higdon, the central figure in 
the Burston school strike, who chaired recruiting meetings, to the surprise of those who 
expected him to be anti-war. Similarly, the Workers’ Union journal, the Record, was 
full of war news from August 1914 onwards, and leading Workers’ Union figures such 
as John Beard and Charles Duncan became prominent in the British Workers League.
22
 
Mansfield argued that this military involvement made the unions seem more acceptable: 
‘In the absence of a lead from farmers, the farmworkers’ unions, confident that their 
members had done their duty, assumed the mantle of patriotism, thereby legitimising 
their own activities, which had previously been regarded as unacceptable.’23 
Correspondingly, the war drew workers closer to the unions, through teaching them the 
value of organisation.
24
 
Another contentious issue amongst the labour movement was the state provision 
of welfare.
25
 Unions were suspicious of any attempt to control labour supply, and felt 
that state welfare would undermine their status and leave them worse off financially, as 
claimed in Noelle Whiteside’s article, ‘Welfare legislation and the Unions during the 
First World War’.26 Although unions before the war were willing to use state welfare as 
a means of guaranteeing recognition, according to Whiteside, unions and employers 
would occasionally unite ‘in opposition to the growth of state controls’.27 While the war 
19 ibid., 536 and 518. 
20 N. Mansfield, ‘The National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Soldiers and Sailors, 1917-
1921: A View From the Marches’, Family and Community History 7 (2004): 25. 
21 ibid., 21. 
22 N. Mansfield, English Farmworkers and Local Patriotism, 1900-1930, Aldershot: Ashgate 2001, 107-8 
and 134. 
23 ibid., 114. 
24
 ibid., 135. 
25 See P. Thane, ‘The Working-Class and State Welfare in Britain’, Historical Journal 27 (1984): 877-
900 and Foundations of the Welfare State, London: Longman, 1996. 
26 N. Whiteside, ‘Welfare Legislation and the Unions during the First World War’, The Historical Journal 
23 (1980): 857-874. 
27 ibid., 866. 
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and its aftermath did see the extension of National Insurance coverage and 
unemployment relief, for Whiteside union hostility towards institutions of state control, 
such as labour exchanges, remained ‘intense’.28 The extent of labour patriotism on 
assuaging union suspicion of state welfare and intervention into the supply of labour 
remains an issue worthy of attention. 
It could well be that the war undermined barriers between skilled and unskilled, 
as Eric Hobsbawm and B. A. Waites, amongst others, have argued. According to 
Waites, ‘the “one nation psychology” which was a pre-requisite of the national war 
effort had encouraged notions of classlessness’, and blurred the distinctions between 
skilled and unskilled.
29
 Furthermore, unions gained increased strength and significance 
during the war, and were brought into co-operation with the running of the state through 
recruitment, military tribunals, and pension administration. Indeed, whilst many trade 
union officials volunteered for the services, they were made exempt from conscription, 
a status reflecting their new-found importance. Waites’ assertion that between 1910 and 
1920, ‘English society changed from a complex hierarchy in which stratification by 
status overlay the basic three-tier class structure to a more simple form’ is an 
overstatement, yet overall the war did feature increasing working-class (and national) 
homogeneity, an expansion in trade unionism, and new-found working-class 
confidence.
30
 Alistair Reid has argued against the idea of increasing working-class 
homogenisation, claiming that while ‘real changes did take place during the war, [this 
was] largely because organised labour was strong enough to demand them and, since 
this strength itself depended heavily on the peculiarities of wartime political and 
economic conditions, most of the changes were temporary’.31 For Reid the experience 
of war was more significant than changes in socio-economic conditions:  
 
There was a general tendency for organised labour to drop its pre-war separation of “economic” 
and “political” issues. Thus the unions most centrally involved in the war effort began very rapidly 
to raise non-industrial issues when they made demands on the government (perhaps most marked 
in the case of house rents), there was a slowly growing acceptance among all trade unionists that 
the election of Members of Parliament could have a direct effect on industrial conditions, and there 
                                               
28
 ibid., 871. 
29 B.A. Waites, ‘The Effect of the First World War on Class and Status in England, 1910-20’, Journal of 
Contemporary History 11 (1976): 34-5. 
30 ibid., 45. 
31 A. Reid, ‘The Impact of the First World War on British Workers’, in R. Wall and J. Winter (eds.), The 
Upheaval of War, Cambridge: CUP, 1988, 222. 
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was a marked increase in trade union support for the permanent nationalisation of key industries, 
above all coal mining and railways.32 
 
This thesis hopes to move away from a concentration on machinations at the 
elite levels of the labour movement, on events inside Parliament and the intellectual 
developments of men such as Sidney Webb and G.D.H. Cole , and this is reflected in 
the methodology and source base. Whilst official documents such as Labour party 
Annual Reports and Trade Union Congress Annual Reports have been utilised, there is 
a focus on less well-visited material. For example, extensive use has been made of the 
Labour History Archive and Study Centre at the People’s History Museum, Manchester. 
In particular, the papers of the War Emergency: Workers’ National Committee, 
numbering some sixteenth thousand documents, have been thoroughly utilised. This 
resource, although used sparingly by Jay Winter and Royden Harrison, amongst others, 
has been used systematically here, resulting in the uncovering of previously unknown 
material. Significantly, these papers are full of very local complaints and tensions, and 
give an important understanding of grassroots concerns. This provides a counter-
balance to the relative rarity of local Labour party and trade union records from the war 
period. Also at the LHASC are the personal papers of several important figures amongst 
the trade unions and Labour party of this period, such as Ben Tillett and John Ward, and 
First World War combatants who were to become significant figures on the Left, such 
as Douglas Houghton. The published reminiscences of key figures from this period, 
such as George Edwards of the farmworkers’ union and Clement Attlee have provided 
further qualitative evidence. 
The Modern Records Centre at the University of Warwick contains the papers of 
several diverse trade unions, ranging from broad-based professional groups such as the 
National Union of Teachers, to more specific unions such as the Amalgamated Society 
of Papermakers and the Amalgamated Society of Watermen, Lightermen and Bargemen 
of the River Thames. Similarly, the Working Class Movement Library in Salford has 
provided the monthly journal and reports of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers; the 
monthly reports of the Boilermakers’ Union; the minutes of the Miners’ Federation of 
Great Britain; and the minutes of the Shipconstructers and Shipwrights Union. 
Furthermore, newspapers of trade unions such as the National Union of Railwaymen, 
the Fawcett Association (postal sorters), the National Union of Clerks and the South 
London Gasworkers have been utilised for this thesis. This has provided a great deal of 
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interesting qualitative evidence - the correspondence columns of these journals are 
particularly revealing of rank and file views -  and, crucially, reflected the positions of 
different types of trade union: craft and unskilled; local and national; those generally 
supportive and those more sceptical of the war.  
Aside from union journals, various types of newspapers have been used: the 
strongly patriotic Justice and The Clarion; those sceptical of the war such as Plebs, the 
Bradford Pioneer and the Glasgow Forward; The Co-operative News and two 
magazines attached to the Co-operative movement, Wheatsheaf and the Millgate 
Monthly. One may question why a thesis on the British labour movement does not make 
substantial use of the Daily Herald and the Labour Leader. In this case given the 
attempts to more away from a London-centric, elite-focused analysis, and the focus on 
labour patriotism, systematic and extensive use has not been made of these publications. 
The newspapers and trade union journals have also furnished the thesis with many 
photographs and cartoons, which will be analysed within. Finally, the Imperial War 
Museum has an audio archive of interviews conducted with ex-servicemen from the 
First World War. Several of these were also labour or trade union activists, and the 
recordings of their interviews have provided further valuable insights into the minds of 
individuals alive at the time.  
The idea of an ideological ‘choice’ between patriotism and socialism is a major 
theme of Paul Ward’s book, but to claim as he did that ‘ultimately, in 1914, the choice 
between socialism and patriotism had to be made’ advances a false dichotomy.33 In fact, 
major figures on the Left – MacDonald, Snowden and Hardie as much as the labour 
patriots – had been expounding the very British nature of their socialism for decades, as 
Ward himself noted. Indeed, Ward later argued that labour patriotism during 1914-1918 
was not an aberration, but rather a logical conclusion of pre-war views.
34
 It seems then 
that the First World War did not force the labour movement to make a choice between 
‘patriotism’ and ‘socialism’, for Labour leaders stressed the intertwined nature of the 
two concepts. Perhaps the real significance of the war was that it managed to convince 
the electorate of this. This thesis is not a general vista of the Left and patriotism over a 
long period, but rather concentrates specifically on the war years and the early 1920s.  
 This thesis argues that the Left in 1914 had two types of objections to overcome 
in order to broaden its appeal. The first were economic, material concerns: were the 
socio-economic claims of labour valid? Could British society and the economy become 
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more effectively organised for the betterment of all? Was there room for greater state 
interference and regulation, or would this strangle the free enterprise upon which the 
success of Britain had been built? The second objections were cultural and symbolic: 
was the ‘socialism’ posited by Labour after 1918 a Continental import, tainted by 
French, German, and Jewish influences, or was it fundamentally British, built upon 
centuries of mutualism and co-operation? Was it a creed for those who abstained from 
the bottle, who spent their meagre disposable incomes on books and self-improvement, 
who agitated for temperance reform, Home Rule, and votes for women? Or was it a 
movement buttressed by, rather than contrary to, a culture built around the family, the 
pub, football and patriotism? It will be argued here that the war allowed Labour to 
successfully overcome both of these objections. To be sure, a great deal of work 
remained to be done, and the Labour party of the early 1920s – much less that of the 
early 1930s – was never merely one election away from a convincing majority. 
However the critical early obstacles – that their political economy was fundamentally 
mistaken and their principles alien to British values – had been successfully overcome. 
Another, less significant dilemma was also overcome by the war. The labour 
movement before 1914 had a slightly paradoxical relationship with industrialisation, 
urbanisation and modernity. Karl Marx was very much the modernist, not only in his 
belief in communism as the ultimate stage of development, but also in terms of cultural 
chauvinism: he regarded colonial conquest by the West as desirable and despised 
peasant life.
35
 While Marxist thought did inform a strand of Edwardian socialism – 
notably the Social Democratic Federation and the Plebs’ League – the mainstream of 
labour thought owed more to either the ‘advanced Liberalism’ of the early Independent 
Labour party and Fabian Society, or the more nostalgic, anti-industrial, and ultimately 
vague socialism of William Morris. Popularised by Morris’ News from Nowhere and 
Robert Blatchford’s Merrie England, a reactionary, culturally sensitive socialism was 
appealing to many thousands of ordinary men and women, yet had little influence upon 
the elites of the labour movement. A year before his death, Morris remarked to the 
leading Fabian Sidney Webb in 1896: ‘the world is going your way, Webb, but it is not 
the right way in the end’. Blatchford was more of a modernist, and certainly more of a 
populist; he deplored the effects of industrialisation on the lives of British workers, yet 
wanted them to seize control of their country and share the benefits of the modern world 
more efficiently and effectively.
36
 Furthermore, he understood that there were many 
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aspects of modern life the working-classes rather enjoyed, and he and his newspaper, 
The Clarion, were strident advocates of sport and leisure pursuits. Blatchford’s 
encouragement of sport and music hall culture sat ill with the more austere socialism 
proffered by Hardie, who Alastair Bonnett believed ‘surely had the Clarion movement 
in mind when he noted, in 1903, that “For a time in England, the fibre of the Socialist 
movement was almost destroyed by a spirit of irresponsible levity”’.37 This tension 
between modernism and nostalgia was resolved by the war, and ultimately this thesis 
will argue that the war brought about the triumph of a very particular kind of leftism in 
Britain: reformist, statist, patriotic, thoroughly modern and comfortable with the Britain 
which emerged after 1918.
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CHAPTER 1: LABOUR PATRIOTISM BEFORE 1914 
 
This chapter is intended as a brief discussion of the ideological and practical 
relationship between nationalism, patriotism and the labour movement before 1914. It 
introduces some of the principle concepts and personalities that would dominate the 
Left during the years of the First World War, surveys the debate surrounding the Boer 
War, examines the history of ‘radical patriotism’ on the British Left, and notes the 
theoretical and actual commitments of the British Left to internationalism and pacifism. 
Outside of the British labour movement reference is made to the contemporary pacifism 
of the period and one of its most noted advocates, Norman Angell. It aims to contribute 
towards the first of the research questions with which this thesis is concerned, that of 
the extent and nature of labour patriotism during the war, by examining the continuity 
or otherwise between the decades immediately preceding 1914 and the war years. The 
argument outlined here is two-fold. Firstly, across the labour movement as a whole 
there was an ambiguous attitude toward nationalism and patriotism. An uncertainty and 
contradiction resulted from abstract commitments to peace and camaraderie coupled 
with the realities of the European situation, popular nationalism and broader British 
culture, and this could sometimes be a problem for the Left. Nonetheless, for many 
across labour movement their commitments to internationalism and pacifism were 
superficial at best. Very often their left-wing views were based around an idea of 
community and nationhood that belied any internationalism. The fight for national 
survival against Imperial Germany allowed the façade of internationalism to slip, and 
confirmed the compatibility of left-wing and nationalist sentiment. 
In terms of both his own personality and the principles and approach to politics 
he represented, Robert Blatchford was a profound influence on many working-class 
socialists in this period. Born in Maidstone in 1851, the son of a comedian and an 
actress, Blatchford began performing on stage himself from a young age; it may be no 
coincidence that both he and Ben Tillett, two men who had such an acute understanding 
of the mind of working-class Britain, came from the music hall background that 
dominated mass culture at the time. An avid reader of the Bible and John Bunyan’s 
Pilgrim’s Progress as a young man, he joined the Army and eventually rose to become 
a sergeant major, before leaving to take up work as an office clerk and aspiring 
journalist. He was soon able to secure articles with provincial newspapers, and struck up 
a friendship with Alex M. Thompson, later to become his deputy editor at The Clarion. 
In 1891, a year after establishing the Manchester branch of the Fabian Society, 
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Blatchford set up this newspaper which rose to a circulation of at least seventy-four 
thousand by 1906.
1
  
His increasingly patriotic and irreligious stance alienated him from some of the 
pacifistic Nonconformists in the Independent Labour party (ILP), and he was to further 
antagonise that party when he gave funds to Victor Grayson’s campaign for the Colne 
Valley by-election of 1907. A series of articles on socialism in The Clarion were 
published in book form in 1893 as Merrie England; the first edition selling over thirty 
thousand copies. A penny edition was published in 1894, with one quarter of a million 
copies being ordered before publication, and within a year 750,000 copies had been sold 
worldwide. In Britain and the United States the book was to eventually sell over two 
million copies. In addition to this best-selling tract, the success of Clarion cycling 
groups, choirs, and sundry social clubs brought a populist socialism to a mass audience.  
Blatchford and the staff of The Clarion had long combined a proud patriotism 
with a radical, dissenting voice. Although in January 1901 it paid extensive tribute to 
the recently deceased Queen Victoria, four years earlier the newspaper had savaged the 
expense and frivolity of the Jubilee celebrations.
2
 This was a common theme in The 
Clarion: a vigorous pride in Britain and the British coupled with a withering disregard 
for the class of people empowered to run the country. During the Boer War, Blatchford 
claimed that the cause of socialism could receive no greater blow than the fall of the 
British Empire, yet accused the government of gross incompetence in its prosecution of 
the conflict. He criticised the lack of funding for the families of soldiers when money 
was being ‘squandered on royalty’, called for proper equipment and provisions to be 
sent to the troops, deplored Cecil Rhodes and poured scorn on ‘jingoes...never seen at 
the Front’.3 Responding to claims from the right-wing press that he wanted to ‘turn 
people against their country’, he retorted that he wanted ‘to make people so fond of their 
country that they shall desire to possess it’.4 This reflects another theme common 
through much of Blatchford’s writing: that despite the restricted pre-1918 franchise, 
there was no great conspiracy to suppress the political power of labour; it was simply 
that millions of working-class men continued to vote Liberal or Conservative. He felt 
that the purpose of his newspaper, and its associated cultural movement, was to 
undermine this state of affairs and bring socialism to ordinary working people.  
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A debate concerning nationalism, militarism, and the desirability and efficacy of 
conscription unfolded in the pages of The Clarion throughout the spring and early 
summer of 1900. Blatchford (writing under his pen-name ‘Nunquam’) asserted that 
militarism was abhorrent, and conscription its most detestable element, so that the 
British ‘variety’ of militarism - a relatively small army of professional volunteers - was 
infinitely preferable to Continental variations.
5
 In response A.E. Fletcher argued that in 
reality European-style conscription was preferable to British voluntarism in avoiding 
militarism, in that every section of the population was forced to serve, thus making the 
military reflect the society. In this he was supported by the German Marxist intellectual 
Wilhelm Liebknecht, who pointed out that his own son, Karl Liebknecht (future 
Spartacist and co-conspirator of Rosa Luxembourg) was in the German army, along 
with thousands of other committed socialists. ‘If the troops employed in shooting down 
miners at Featherstone had been mainly composed of Socialists’, argued Fletcher, ‘I 
doubt whether any damage would have been done.’6 In response Blatchford reiterated 
his stark warning that militarism was coming and a choice had to be made between 
‘German’ and ‘our kind’.7  
At this point the Fabian playwright George Bernard Shaw entered the debate. 
Although a critic of British government policy in Africa, he attacked socialist supporters 
of the Boer republics, arguing that the Boer’s cruel and racist attitudes towards black 
South Africans precluded them from support of people on the Left. For Shaw, 
instinctive anti-militarism was indicative of a wider problem amongst some on the Left. 
He explained how his fellow members of the Fabian Society were opposed to ‘the 
familiar, seventeenth century views of the Social Democratic Federation’, and looked to 
capture industry, rather than to reverse economic and social change.
8
 Shaw’s 
interjection shows how the debate surrounding militarism was a component of a much 
larger and more profound deliberation: were the changes of the past few hundred years 
inherently wrong, or was it merely that the fruits of industrialisation had fallen to far too 
few people? Was the modern world inherently objectionable, or did advances in 
capitalism and technology increase the salience, plausibility and appeal of the Left’s 
political and economic theories? In this respect Blatchford, once the advocate of a pre-
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industrial ‘Merrie England’, had begun to change his views, and many on the Left 
seemed to be following suit. There was a great deal of scepticism and trepidation of 
modern Britain, but a belief that the British people would have the sense to seize the 
benefits of modernity for themselves. 
The Clarion group was by no means alone in positing a ‘radical patriotism’ in 
this manner: Will Thorne, Labour MP and only member of the Social Democratic 
Federation  in the Commons, continued to press for the introduction of compulsory 
military service designed on the Swiss system.
9
 For Thorne this would ensure the 
permanent defeat of militarism, as every man would be trained and equipped to defend 
himself against both external aggression and internal oppression. Thorne felt that his 
‘citizen’s army’ would have a democratising affect on society as a whole, and awaken 
working people to their true power.
10
 Similarly, in 1906 seven Labour MPs - including 
future prominent patriots John Hodge and Charles Duncan - signed a petition calling for 
the introduction of compulsory military training in schools.
11
 By no means, therefore, 
were leftist politics and a concern for national defence incompatible; much less leftist 
politics and a more general patriotism; indeed there was a longer tradition of radical 
patriotism and citizen army on the Left stretching back through the Chartists to Major 
John Cartwright and Thomas Paine. 
For Justice, the newspaper of the SDF, as with The Clarion, the enemy was not 
nationalism, patriotism, or militarism per se, but rather the control of British foreign 
policy by particular interests and the domination of the British military by a particular 
class. There was a particularly ugly incident at Portsmouth in 1906 after stokers, judged 
to have been insufficiently quick to obey the orders of a young Lieutenant at an 
inspection, were ordered to kneel down in front of him. This order sparked rioting, for 
which the alleged leader, a stoker named Moody, was given five years penal servitude. 
In an article entitled ‘Class Rule in the Services’ Justice railed against the humiliation 
resultant from a system that would put young and naive boys in positions of superiority 
to tried and experienced men, and claimed that while theoretically the Army and Navy 
existed to defend the people, ‘in reality, both exist for the defence of class privilege’.12 
There was an “On the Knee” demonstration (named after the drill order which had 
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sparked the trouble) later that month at which Harry Quelch, Pete Curran,
13
 and Will 
Thorne all spoke. As with The Clarion’s criticism of the prosecution of the Boer War, 
the objection was not against the military as such but rather with the incompetence, 
inefficiency and arbitrary decisions which resulted when appointments were made on 
the basis of birth rather than talent. 
At the turn of the century many figures who would become prominent labour 
patriots during the 1914-1918 conflict were staunch critics of British foreign policy. In 
1901 H.M. Hyndman of the SDF composed the pamphlet The Greatness of India and 
Her Ruin by England – a furious denunciation of the British Empire and the motivations 
behind imperialism in general.
14
 Similarly, while navvy’s union leader John Ward was 
later to become an outspoken defender of Empire, at the 1900 Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) he vigorously condemned the suppression of the two Boer Republics and 
proposed a resolution – eventually passed by a small minority – which deplored the 
timidity of the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC in failing to challenge the 
government over the South African conflict.
15
 The British National Committee, set up 
in 1905 to represent the labour movement at the Second International, consisted of 
Arthur Henderson, John Hodge, Will Thorne and Ben Tillett, all of whom would fall 
into the ‘patriots’ camp during the First World War.16 The British labour movement was 
therefore at least theoretically committed to internationalism and anti-militarism: all 
sections of the British delegation to the 1907 Stuttgart International Congress supported 
the anti-war resolution, although this also reaffirmed the policy of national defence.
17
  
Yet this tenuous and abstract internationalist stance was not supported by a 
pragmatic scheme of co-operation between the labour movements of different European 
nations, nor did it preclude a certain chauvinism on behalf of British trade unions. For 
example, it was only in 1913 that the representatives of the French and German trade 
unions were invited to the TUC’s annual meeting, while American delegates had been 
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invited since 1894.
18
 Although there would have been practical concerns with language 
difficulties, assumptions of greater cultural connections and kinship with Americans 
vis-à-vis French and Germans may have been a factor in this.
19
 Regardless, the fact that 
representatives from the two leading Continental economies did not attend the British 
TUC until the year immediately before the war gives an idea of the limited extent of 
actual co-operation between different European labour movements. Furthermore it 
seems that the elites of the labour movement were rather ahead of their membership; as 
Douglas Newton has argued, ‘most trade unionists were undoubtedly quite unaware 
that, through their affiliation to the [Labour Representation Committee], they had 
become enrolled in something called the Second International’.20 
 There were qualifications even to the fairly ambiguous internationalism of the 
Edwardian years. Although a motion (sponsored again by John Ward) describing the 
Boer War as ‘unjust’ was passed at the 1902 TUC with 591,000 votes in support, there 
were still 314,000 votes cast against, suggesting that a considerable proportion of the 
trade union movement found little objectionable with the conflict.
21
Although it was 
fairly straightforward for the Parliamentary Labour party to stand against the 
government in the debate over the naval estimates in 1909, Members representing 
constituencies which stood to gain from increased naval funding felt this took 
precedence over any pacifistic or internationalist sentiment. John Jenkins and Alexander 
Wilkie of the Shipwrights’ Union (MP for Chatham and Dundee respectively) and 
Charles Duncan of the Engineers (MP for Barrow-in-Furness) rebelled against the party 
line and voted with the government.
22
 
It is perhaps not surprising that the British Left was only fitfully and 
temperamentally committed to proletarian solidarity in the years before the First World 
War, given that opposition to conflict was usually motivated not by Marxist concerns of 
international working-class unity, but rather by old radical, Nonconformist views. This 
is the argument put forward by Paul Ward, who noted that the anti-Alien Act agitation 
was based ‘less on socialist internationalism than on traditional ideas of English 
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tolerance and liberty’.23 One should not necessarily be surprised by the continuity of the 
rhetoric expressed by Labour MPs; after all, twenty-four out of the twenty-nine returned 
in 1906 owed their successes to the absence of Liberal opposition, and seventy-nine per 
cent of Labour candidates mentioned free trade, Home Rule and reform of the 
Education Act in their campaign literature, with a further seventy-five per cent 
mentioning licensing reform.
24
 With this liberal heritage still dominating the 
Parliamentary Labour party, it naturally followed that Labour opposition to militarism 
owed far less to socialist internationalism than to radical liberalism. 
Norman Angell was probably the most influential pacifist of the period, and 
Labour leader Keir Hardie was a keen supporter, praising him during a Commons’ 
debate on armaments and offering to pay for the printing of half a million copies of his 
influential work, The Great Illusion. Angell considered the idea but did not take up 
Hardie’s proposal, apparently because he did not want to be linked ‘with any one party 
and an extreme one at that’.25 There is a certain irony that in 1918, with Europe in ruins, 
it was Angell and his prophesies of permanent peace which seemed outlandish and 
extreme, not to mention utterly naive and ill-founded, while Hardie’s party had emerged 
stronger than ever and was only a few years away from government. Nevertheless, it is 
highly significant that Angell was a free trader and a liberal; he believed that war was 
impossible because the economic interests of nations were inexorably intertwined and 
the exigencies of international finance took precedence over the will of individual 
governments. His views could well be described in modern parlance as ‘neoliberal’ – he 
was, therefore, emphatically not a socialist. Howard Weinroth has drawn attention to the 
paradox of the Left elevating a man who quite openly cared very little about the 
working classes, and who had very little support amongst ordinary people. Angell’s 
audience was narrow and confined to businessmen, professionals, and intellectuals: 
‘The working man…with rare exceptions, did not fill the ranks of Norman 
Angellism.’26 
This highlights a central dilemma for the Labour party in the years preceding the 
First World War: whether due to its radical, dissenting heritage or Marxist economic 
influence, it felt compelled to at least maintain a facade of pacifistic internationalism at 
the same time as campaigning for the votes of working people who, more often than 
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not, felt no such compulsion. While the trade union movement - by its very nature - and 
the Clarion group did have a mass working-class support, the same could not truly be 
said of the SDF or the ILP, which tended to draw most of their membership from 
specific areas and be absent in others, or rely unduly on middle-class supporters.
27
 The 
membership of the unions and the Clarion group, though regionalised and fragmented, 
thus better reflected the mass of working people all over Britain.  
Douglas Newton has drawn attention to a remarkable incident involving Keir 
Hardie at Preston train station in 1898. Waiting for his train, Hardie claimed that he was 
so surprised to see a working man reading the Labour Leader (the organ of the ILP) he 
presumed that he must have been one of the local activists for the party. He recounted in 
a letter how he had walked along the platform trying to guess the identity of the man, 
but ultimately could not decide whether or not he knew him.
28
 The image of Keir 
Hardie passing up and down a station platform, straining to ascertain whether or not he 
recognised someone whilst at the same time studiously avoiding making eye contact, is 
not merely amusing but also quite illuminating. Firstly it is revealing that even a former 
coal miner like Hardie did not consider simply approaching the man and introducing 
himself, but more significant is his surprise to see a working man reading his own 
paper, and his presumption that he must therefore be involved with the Preston ILP.
29
 
This is reflected in the ultimate resignation over war and foreign policy which 
characterised the private beliefs, if not the public utterances, of many labour leaders 
during this period. Hardie, MacDonald, and other ILP chiefs could make bold speeches 
about the power of the workers to stop the impending cataclysm and call for general 
strikes to stop the war, but they knew full well that they could barely call on enough 
working-class support to elect a few dozen MPs. In the words of Newton: ‘Hardie and 
the other leaders of the International were well aware of the numerical weakness of their 
own parties and had no illusions about the true dimensions of the power at their 
disposal...when their guards were down, they made candid admissions of their limited 
influence amongst the working class’. Indeed, Hardie apparently told a suffragette in 
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Manchester that ‘you have not the women of the nation behind you any more than we 
have the workman behind us. Shout less and work more’.30 
 In terms of domestic changes, Hardie need not have been so pessimistic: high 
unemployment and intolerable living standards led to mounting pressure for social 
reform, and there had been some successes in pushing municipal socialism at a local 
level. What the party needed to do was to offer pragmatic, practical solutions to the 
problems faced by working people in a language they understood and based on values 
they accepted. In the words of Paul Ward: ‘Hardie argued that the earlier anti-
Parliamentarism of the movement had meant that “Socialism, in those days, was treated 
as a plant of continental growth which could never find lodgment [sic] in Great 
Britain.”’31 In this respect the Edwardian Labour party went to great lengths to stress the 
very British nature of their movement. For example Victor Fisher (who was not then the 
decided jingo he was to become) refused to debate with the pacifist E. Belfort Bax of 
the SDF as he feared that ‘the very worst thing the Socialist movement could do is 
convince the great mass of the people, who must be converted to Socialism if Socialism 
is to be realised, that Socialism entails anti-patriotism’.32 
Overall, the relationship between the British Left and patriotism in the fourteen 
years immediately preceding the First World War was rather confused. For some 
elements such as the Clarion group and specific trade unions – usually those connected 
to the defence industry such as boilermakers and shipwrights or else in competition for 
jobs with foreign workers, such as sailors and dockers - patriotism was not only 
perfectly compatible with their political beliefs, it was an integral part of their ideology. 
For the Marxist SDF the picture was more complex. Originally decidedly anti-
nationalist, its position evolved in the years before the War. As early as 1903, Justice 
welcomed the entente cordiale, and claimed that it and the SDF had never been ‘peace 
at any price’.33 Although for most on the Left Russia remained a paradigm of despotism 
– as evidenced by the outrage over the visit of the Tsar in 1906 - by 1907 Justice was 
warning that the Kaiser was the real menace to Europe, and that only the German Social 
Democratic Party could act as a restraining influence.
34
 Ben Tillett, also writing in 
1907, claimed that the Boer War had been fought ‘for a rich gang of thieves and a khaki 
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mad crowd’, yet the attitude expressed towards Germany in its pages suggested that war 
with that country would be a different matter altogether.
35
 By 1910 Hyndman wrote of: 
‘the right and duty of this nationality to maintain its independence, even under 
capitalism ... There is no mistake about that. If this is to be a jingo, then I am a jingo; if 
this is to be a bourgeois, then I am a bourgeois, if this is to be an opponent of organized 
Socialist opinion, then I am an opponent of organized Socialist opinion’.36 
This chapter would take issue with Miles Taylor’s claim that radical patriotism 
ended around the time of the Boer War; many patriotic labour groups continued to 
maintain this tradition. They were vehement enemies of the British state, but not of the 
British people, and saw the nation and nationalism as mechanisms through which 
change could be brought about.
37
 While some on the Left had an awkward, ambiguous 
relationship with patriotism, feeling obliged to espouse internationalist, pacifistic 
rhetoric whilst privately aware that these values were not common amongst the working 
class, for others this was not a problem. On the contrary, for many on the Left the years 
before 1914 were characterised by a perfectly compatible combination of left-wing and 
nationalist sentiment. There was no hypocrisy for men such as Blatchford, Tillett and 
Hyndman becoming decided jingos, nor in moderates such as Henderson, George 
Edwards and the Webbs giving cautious support to the war effort. For the mainstream of 
the labour movement the First World War did not represent a clean break with the past. 
Even so, the events of August 1914 were to confuse the attitudes of some towards 
nationalism, patriotism, and militarism: the most ardent pacifists became raging 
militarists, circumspect nationalists became committed jingoes, and men such as 
Blatchford sank into despair as they saw their sad prophecies realised. Describing the 
latest weaponry produced by modern industrial nations, he warned in The Clarion in 
February 1900, that ‘These terrible weapons have never yet been used on a large scale. 
When they are, things will happen.’38 
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CHAPTER 2: LABOUR PATRIOTISM 1914-1918 
  
If the Left’s position on international conflict was confused before the summer of 1914, 
it might be assumed that the rapid mobilisation of European militaries and the 
declarations of hostilities would have further divided and confounded the movement. 
The purpose of this chapter is to further address the primary research question of the 
thesis: what was the extent and nature of support for the war amongst the British labour 
movement? It will examine events in August 1914, including the Left’s acquiescence to 
the war, and how it managed to co-ordinate its response. It will discuss the principal 
characters in the ‘patriotic labour’ camp, and survey specific unions and ordinary 
workers who gave their support – and their lives – to the war effort. The progress of the 
war inevitably gave rise to anti-German hostility, and the motivations and implications 
of this will also be analysed. Finally, there will be a survey of ordinary trade unionists 
and labour activists who distinguished themselves during the conflict. In terms of both 
an elite and subaltern level, it will be argued that there was a decidedly united response 
from labour. Although enthusiasm for the war amongst the labour movement was rare, 
there was a general consensus that, once begun, it had to be seen through. Ultimately, 
this chapter argues that labour patriotism, rather than anti-war agitation, characterised 
the Left’s response to the war, and that the history of these labour patriots has been 
unjustly neglected by historians.  
  
August 1914: 
 
Most leading individuals on the British Left remained firmly against the war in the days 
preceding the start of the conflict. The future ultra-patriot Ben Tillett condemned the 
war as ‘absolutely wanton and brutal in every feature’, while Will Thorne lamented the 
‘utterly shattered’ hopes of internationalism.1 H.M. Hyndman was one of many leading 
leftists to have addressed a large peace meeting on 2 August, and Labour made plans to 
form a Peace Emergency Workers’ National Committee to co-ordinate the anti-war 
effort.
2
 Yet the invasion of Belgium and subsequent declaration of war instigated an 
abrupt about turn. The Lib-Lab MP John Ward was billed to appear at a further peace 
meeting in Trafalgar Square on 4 August, yet upon hearing of the invasion he told his 
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friends it would be time to talk about peace when the Germans withdrew.
3
 For much of 
the leadership of the British Left - as with ordinary trade unionists, Labour supporters 
and the British population at large - the invasion of Belgium and the subsequent 
ultimatum to withdraw served as a turning-point, and gave a stamp of morality to the 
conflict. The thoughts of George Edwards, leader of the National Agricultural 
Labourers and Rural Workers Union, doubtless chimed with the experience of many 
British men and women on that day: 
 
On August 4, 1914, the Great War commenced and, as stated, I came to the conclusion, like most 
of the other Labour leaders, that according to the information I had at my disposal, we had no 
other alternative but to enter the war. I felt that it was a struggle for our very existence, further, 
that we were fighting to overcome one of the greatest curses to humanity, namely the wicked spirit 
of militarism. I therefore decided to put what appeared to me at the time the nation’s interest 
before any other consideration. I spoke at a good many recruiting meetings in the early stages of 
the war. So far did I carry my patriotism that some of my friends began to be rather nervous about 
me for fear I should carry it too far, but they need not have been.4 
 
Given that Edwards was from a rural, Liberal, Methodist background, his belief in the 
morality of the war is even more significant. Even the fiercely anti-war Marxists of the 
Plebs’ League recognised that, whether or not the British government was utilising the 
invasion of Belgium as a means of securing public support for the war, the invasion 
itself remained an outrage:  
 
Whatever were the pretexts made by the British Government concerning the German invasion of 
Belgium, they in no way discount some good reasons why Socialists should support Belgium 
against this violation. And these reasons are quite consistent with international Socialism. If 
world-peace be an essential need of the proletariat, then the latter is certainly concerned with 
preserving the integrity of a state like Belgium. Otherwise the door is left wide open to invasion, to 
the opposite of world-peace.5 
 
For the bulk of the labour leadership, the declaration of war ended weeks of 
tension. The awkward position of having to espouse international solidarity whilst 
remaining aware that this language was anathema to the majority of working-class 
people had become ever more acutely uncomfortable in the weeks following the 
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assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand. The average Briton may not 
have grasped the multifarious combination of political, economic and diplomatic 
interests which led to the First World War, but while there was a general will to fight if 
necessary, there was by no means anything approaching a widespread desire for war in 
July 1914. As Adrian Gregory has argued, pro-interventionist sentiment was a minority 
opinion at late as 2
 
August, and possibly until the actual declaration on 4 August.
6
 
However once Britain had entered the conflict, it was imperative that it must not lose. In 
this respect Britons fully understood the seriousness and long-term commitments 
entailed by the declaration on 4
 
August, and such a decision could only be morally 
vindicated had all other options seen to have been exhausted.  
The German invasion of Belgium confirmed that Britain had no honourable 
option other than to fight. The quick end to equivocation and the solidification behind 
the war effort - and the role of Belgium in this conversion - has been well-summarised 
by Gerard DeGroot: ‘For the British [in reality], this was  a conflict about empires, 
capitalism, trade and food, democracy, honour, civilization or the defence of the trusted 
friends. But when Germany attacked poor little Belgium, a war of markets became a 
war of morality.’7 Since the war was pitched as a question of morality, public opinion 
quickly painted complex issues in stark, contrasting colours. Whereas only months 
previously British attitudes towards Germans had been rather ambiguous, soon - aided 
by tales of atrocities committed in Belgium - Germany became the symbol of 
everything immoral, and everything un-British. In the words of Gregory, ‘it was the war 
that massively increased anti-Germanism’ and popular militarism - rather than these 
sentiments pushing the country into the conflict.
8
 The Co-operative News, like most 
left-leaning newspapers, had counselled against war in the months leading up to 4 
August, but German aggression and reports of atrocities visited upon Belgian civilians 
convinced the editors that the war had to be fought; in a September 1914 editorial 
entitled ‘Our Attitude to the War’, the paper confessed: ‘Late in the day we have 
realised what dream has possessed the Prussian mind.’9 
One suspects that many at the elite level of the movement were looking for 
something which would validate the inevitable war and allow themselves to give their 
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assent to the conflict without being accused of warmongering. In the words of Arthur 
Marwick, there was a great sense of ‘relief’ when the Germans ignored the ultimatum to 
withdraw (as, of course, everyone knew they would), and while ‘the opposition to the 
war was striking, [it was] no more striking than the speed with which the bulk of it 
dissolved’.10 Raynor Taylor, born in Oldham 1898, concurred with this view: ‘Strangely 
enough I think before war broke out we sensed it, everybody sensed it, that war would 
break out because the newspapers…were full of it…As I remember it there was a sense 
of…relief…it sounds strange to say, but it’s true’.11 
In his 1992 book Labour at War, John Horne spoke of the ‘choice of 1914’; the 
idea that the British labour movement ultimately judged its country and its society 
preferable to that of Germany, and so committed itself for the duration of the conflict.
12
 
Yet Professor Horne underestimated the extent to which this choice was made for the 
labour elites by working-class opinion. The mainstream of the labour movement were 
well-aware that they could not afford to oppose the war once British entry was a reality; 
at the first Labour party conference held since the outbreak, in January 1916, James 
Sexton put forward a resolution, passed by 1,502,000 votes to 602,000: 
 
That this Conference, whilst expressing its opposition (in accordance with previously expressed 
opinions) to all systems of permanent militarism as a danger to human progress, considers the 
present action of Great Britain and its Government fully justified in the present war, expresses its 
horror at the atrocities committed by Germany and her ally by the callous and brutal murder of 
non-combatants, including women and children, and hereby pledges the Conference to assist the 
Government as far as possible in the successful prosecution of the War.13 
 
J. Stokes of the London Trades Council, supporting the motion, argued that ‘If…the 
resolution was turned down what would be the position of the Labour Movement so far 
as the great mass of the British people were concerned…they would say that the 
Conference was against the country. That was a point the Conference must remember if 
they desired unity when the War was over’.14 
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The Workers’ National Committee and Labour Support for the War 
 
Once British participation in the European conflict was a concrete reality rather than a 
distasteful abstraction, the Labour party was able to transform itself, from awkward 
Jeremiahs wringing their hands on the sidelines into practical men and women of action, 
ensuring that the interests of British workers were protected. Immediately the Peace 
Committee transformed into the War Emergency Workers’ National Committee (WNC) 
– a body that was to ensure Labour party cohesion, relevance, and achievement 
throughout the long and draining years of the war. Significantly for its survival and 
success, the WNC was an honest reflection of the eclectic nature of the Edwardian 
Labour movement. The TUC sent Charles Bowerman, Harry Gosling, and James 
Seddon; the General Federation of Trade Unions William Appleton, Ben Cooper, and 
the ultra-patriot Ben Tillett. The Labour party was represented by William Anderson, 
John Hodge and Arthur Henderson. The Fabian Sidney Webb was to have considerable 
intellectual influence on the committee; Susan Lawrence represented the Women’s 
Labour League, John Hodge served as President, and J.S. Middleton worked tirelessly 
as Secretary. By no means were these people all of one mind, in terms of both the war 
and the direction of the labour movement. Representatives included those known for 
their continued opposition to the conflict such as Anderson and later Robert Smillie; 
those who initially opposed the conflict but put aside ideological objections for 
pragmatic contribution such as Henderson and Middleton; and outspoken labour patriots 
such as Tillett and Hodge. This led Royden Harrison to ponder ‘How was any practical 
collaboration possible between, say, W.C. Anderson or Fred Jowett, on the one hand, 
and Henderson, Bowerman and Appleton on the other?’15 Crucially then, the inclusive 
nature of the WNC served to unite, rather than divide, the disparate strands of the labour 
movement. 
After MacDonald’s resignation from the chairmanship of the Parliamentary 
Labour party over its support for the government’s prosecution of the war, an electoral 
truce was agreed between all parties on 29 August 1914, and new Labour leader Arthur 
Henderson joined the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee. The patriotism of the labour 
movement was echoed by the women’s suffrage movement; Emmeline and Christabel 
Pankhurst joined the war effort, as did Millicent Garrett Fawcett. In the words of J.M. 
Byles: ‘Mrs Fawcett’s attitude towards the pre-war militants and war-time pacifists is 
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contradictory, but she clearly believed patriotism and militarism took precedence over 
the emancipation issue for the duration of the war.’16 There was no hypocrisy in the 
exhortations of senior Labour figures for young men to enlist: although their age and 
their role in the war effort at home prevented the likes of Henderson and George Barnes 
from fighting, they respectively had three and two sons with the colours, and both of 
them were to lose a son during the course of the war.
17
 Similarly the Socialist 
intellectual R.H. Tawney enlisted – as a sergeant – in November 1914, and was 
involved in the Battle of the Somme on 1 July, an experience recounted in his essay 
‘The Attack’.18  Following - and in many cases, moving well ahead of - their leaders’ 
example, several high profile Labour figures threw themselves into the recruiting effort. 
The Navvy’s Union leader John Ward acted as a self-appointed recruiting sergeant up 
and down the country, collecting 1,400 navvies within three weeks.
19
  
With the formation of Asquith’s first coalition government in May 1915, three 
Labour leaders were invited to join the government (an idea which would have seemed 
absurd only a few years earlier), with the former iron worker Henderson appointed 
President of the Board of Education, William Brace, a Scottish miner, appointed under-
secretary at the Home Office, and printworker and Norwich MP G.H. Roberts becoming 
a government whip.
20
 Although the Parliamentary Labour party did originally oppose 
entry into the government, the National Executive Committee (NEC) and Henderson 
himself believed that for strategic and moral reasons it was proper for the party to join 
the coalition. While the unions were important to this decision, there was no clear 
division between them and the PLP on this issue, with several Labour MPs supporting 
the decision to join the government. Henderson was later included in the War Cabinet 
formed in December 1916, a decision later ratified by the NEC, while Hodge became 
Minister of Labour and Barnes was appointed Minister of Pensions; three other Labour 
MPs, (Brace, Roberts and James Parker), all received minor posts.
21
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Who Were the Labour Patriots? 
 
The background of labour patriots in this period leaves us in no doubt as to the sincerity 
of their commitment to leftist politics. Ben Tillett, for example, may well have gone on 
to espouse extreme xenophobia, and was always an anti-Semite, but from the 1889 dock 
strike onwards he was a giant of the British labour movement. Born in Bristol and 
starting work at a brickyard at the age of eight, he became apprenticed to a bootmaker at 
twelve years old, before soon after joining the Royal Navy. He left the Navy due to 
disablement and served with the merchant marine for a number of years, before settling 
in East London. In 1889 Tillett and the union he helped to found - the Dock, Wharf, 
Riverside and General Labourers’ Union – rose to prominence during the East End dock 
strike: a crucial moment in the history of the labour movement, it witnessed 
unprecedented co-ordinated action by unskilled workers and co-operation between 
craftmen and labourers. He then later played a prominent role in the dock strikes of 
1911 and 1912, before forming the National Transport Workers' Federation in 1910 
with the ultra-patriot Havelock Wilson of the Seamen's Union. A Fabian and a founding 
member of the Independent Labour party, Tillett subsequently joined the SDF and was 
eventually elected to Parliament for Salford North in a by-election in 1917. 
Amongst the Tillett papers at the Modern Records Centre, a letter from E.A. 
Rogers recalled how no sooner would Tillett stand up to speak on the parapet of Tower 
Hill then policemen would march him off to Seetham Lane police station.
22
 A further 
letter claimed that: ‘Ben Tillett had the indefinable gift; in common with the greatest of 
the old time music hall performers and actors generally of being able to do anything 
with an audience with a look or a gesture.’23 An anecdote from S.F. Whitlock neatly 
encapsulates the differences between the rambunctious, demagogic Tillett and the sober 
and abstemious gentlemen more typical of the Labour leadership: ‘At a Labour 
Conference the headquarters was in a large hotel. In the lounge sat Ramsay MacDonald, 
Arthur Henderson, Philip Snowden + other self righteous leaders, when in comes Ben 
Tillett, with one of the gayest birds in town, + went upstairs with her.’24 Tillett’s ultra-
patriotism during the war and concern for self-enrichment – it was reckoned he was 
earning up to twenty pounds a week for his music hall recruitment performances - led to 
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a fall from grace after 1922, and towards the end of his career he may have received 
donations from Conservative Central Office.
25
 Certainly there was a fundraising 
campaign in John Bull in the 1920s to pay for his retirement to a healthier, tropical 
climate in order to assuage his health concerns.
26
 Yet his history in the decades before 
the war mean that he, like other labour patriots here, simply cannot be dismissed as 
‘socialists of circumstance’ whose real convictions were revealed by the war. 
Victimised at work, attacked by the police and prosecuted by the state, Tillett had both 
literally and metaphorically fought for his beliefs for decades and did not adopt 
socialism as a convenient cover for his jingoism.
27
 Like most of the men and women of 
the Left - in the Parliamentary Labour party, the trade unions, the affiliated societies, the 
Co-operative movement and the labour press - labour patriots such as Tillett combined a 
genuine zeal for social and economic change with a natural patriotism that often served 
as an important component of their left-wing political beliefs.  
That patriotism need not act as a restraint on radical leftism is perhaps best 
encapsulated by Victor Grayson. Grayson (christened Albert Victor Grayson after the 
eldest son of Edward, Prince of Wales), was claimed by his biographer, the hard-Left 
historian Reg Groves as the ‘first, and last’ socialist elected to sit as a Member of 
Parliament for the Labour party, and was something of an Edwardian maverick. 
Selected in 1907 to stand for election in the Colne Valley against the odds, the local 
Independent Labour party refused to publically endorse him.
28
 A bombastic and 
demagogic speaker, he did not look to secure votes through promises of incremental 
reforms, but rather through emotive appeals to a future promised land: ‘One thing is for 
sure’, wrote Groves, ‘Grayson won no support by promises of immediate benefits. On 
the contrary he told them that socialism was something they’d probably never see: “It 
won’t be in your time, not even perhaps in your children’s time”.’29 In the year after his 
election he became the most popular speaker on the British Left, touring the country to 
perform before great crowds and espouse the virtues of ‘pure revolutionary socialism’:30 
 
I am looking forward to the time when the British soldier will emulate his brother of the National 
Guard of France and, when asked to fire on the people who are fighting for their rights, will turn 
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his rifle in the other direction. We are making a socialist now of Tommy Atkins by propaganda 
work in the Army…We are making Socialists there by the dozen.31  
 
After repeated breaches of Parliamentary procedure and refusals to give way during a 
debate, he was forcibly removed from the Chamber of the Commons by the Sergeant-at-
Arms and expelled from the House. He then declared that ‘the Parliamentary game is 
played out....We need something unconstitutional to agitate the ponderous brains of 
modern legislators’.32 He moved closer towards Hyndman of Justice and the SDF and 
Blatchford of The Clarion; two men who offered a different approach to that of Keir 
Hardie and the ILP, and who were also, by now, pronounced anti-Germans. Soon 
Grayson was declaring that he believed ‘the maintenance of the British Empire offers 
the best conditions for the world’s march towards socialism’, and came over to labour 
patriotism.
33
   
 Groves explained the patriotism of Grayson and others thus: The war had 
donned the armour of a righteous war, a guise made credible by the invasion of Belgium 
by a powerful, predatory and arrogant Prussian militarism. This it was that moved 
multitudes to volunteer, including many who had seen in this war the same opportunity 
for service and self-sacrifice to high aims that they had hitherto found in the rebel 
causes.
34
 He was undoubtedly correct in identifying the invasion of Belgium as a key 
motivator for many on the British Left, both high and low, in addition to the attraction 
of subsuming one’s own desires and identity for a broader cause. Yet for many there 
was a vague idea that, whatever the flaws of British society, it was infinitely preferable 
to that of Germany, and British culture inherently superior to German ‘kultur’. In 
Grayson’s own words: ‘I am a hard-shelled socialist, but I must confess that our peers 
and privates are fighting for something more elusive than beer and skittles. Some folk 
call it patriotism...religion...God. Whatever they may call it, they are at present weaving 
out of the world’s tangled skein, the warp and woof of a new era.’35 According to 
Blatchford, ‘Nobody was more in favour of prosecuting the war than Victor. In 1918, he 
was as great a patriot as any.’36 He ended the war in khaki, fighting with a New Zealand 
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unit, and apparently hero-worshipped the aristocratic officers he met when deployed 
overseas.
37
  
 Critics of Grayson might suggest, improbably, that he was always a ‘Tory 
stooge’, whose true colours were revealed by the war. Less kindly but more feasibly, 
they may suggest that the sort of juvenile demagoguery and hyperbole utilised by 
Grayson transferred easily from the far-Left to ultra-patriotism. Both of these 
interpretations are wide of the mark. For a brief period after his election in 1907, 
Grayson was the most dynamic and inspiring individual on the British Left; there was 
no insincerity in him – on the contrary, he was rather too earnest, too easily driven by 
the poverty and deprivation he saw to hysterics in the House. His patriotism during the 
war does not suggest a change of viewpoints, but rather highlights how comfortably 
compatible hard-Left politics and pronounced patriotism were at the time of the First 
World War.
38
  
This compatibility was present not only amongst those on the extremes of the 
labour movement, but also with many moderates. Clement Attlee, writing in his war 
memoirs, revealed the intellectual process by which he dismissed his initial objection to 
the war: 
 
I could not persuade myself that there were no circumstances in which I would not possibly feel 
bound to fight and therefore I had to consider whether or not the present occasion was one where it 
was my duty to take up arms…On the one hand my whole instincts as a socialist were against war 
and I had no illusions. I could not accept the ordinary cry of “Your King and Your Country Need 
You”, nor was I convinced of Germany’s sole guilt. On the other hand it appeared wrong to me to 
let others make a sacrifice while I stood by, especially as I was unmarried and had no obligations. 
 
He finally concluded: ‘I attended sundry …conferences where the self righteous 
pacifism of some of the members rather strengthened my intentions already half formed 
of joining. I think that I was finally persuaded by the wanton invasion of Belgium and 
by the German actions therein’.39 If a Haileybury and Oxford socialist like Attlee could 
have found the exhortations of the peace camp to be self-righteous, then how much 
harder for working class men and women – whether on the Left or Right – to be 
impressed by the language and manner of middle-class radicals, even if they agreed 
with the substance of their arguments. 
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Workers and Trade Unions 
There has been a certain contradiction in the British attitude towards conflict and 
imperialism. On the one hand there was a belief that militarism was inherently un-
British and that warfare should be avoided at all costs, yet this co-existed with an 
Empire built on conquest and military campaigns. Indeed this common belief that the 
British were singularly un-warlike, especially in comparison to some of the autocratic 
regimes of the Continent, had served as a tenet of the belief in British exceptionalism 
and superiority. As Adrian Gregory has put it, British ‘heritage says that war is totally 
wrong, yet that heritage and its values must be defended to the death’.40 Perhaps the 
main failing of historians when considering the attitudes of British workers – and 
British trade unionists and left-wingers in particular – to the First World War is a failure 
to grasp just how prevalent and pervasive patriotism was in Edwardian society. The 
British not only believed themselves to be culturally and ‘racially’ separate to others, 
they considered themselves to be markedly superior, and this attitude was to be found 
among those on the Left just as on the Right. An October 1914 edition of the 
Wheatsheaf, a cultural periodical attached to the Co-operative movement, featured a 
‘Map of Racial Europe’ (see Fig 2.1). The map is notable for its specificity; it delineates 
between not only ‘French’ and ‘German’ peoples, but also ‘Western Slaves’, ‘Eastern 
Slavs’, ‘Anglo-Irish’ and ‘Irish’.41 This attitude was organic and self-replicating and not 
the result of top-down propaganda from the government; in fact, E.H. Reisner, an 
American historian of nationalism and education, claimed in the 1910s that the English 
hardly used schools at all as a means of incubating nationalist sentiment.
42
  
Outside of the school system, organised youth movements have been accused of 
stoking nationalist and militarist sentiments among the Edwardian working class, 
however the extent of this – and the reach of such groups – may have been overstated. 
In his discussion of youth organisations M.D. Blanch concluded that the Boys’ Brigade 
and the Scouts were ultimately for the ‘better sort’ of youth – Boy Scouts were required 
to be teetotallers and non-smokers - and not massively patronised by working-class 
children.
43
 John Springhall concurred with this, claiming that class, cost, and church or 
chapel attendance were the most important variables in determining membership of an 
40 Gregory, The Last Great War, 4-5. 
41 Wheatsheaf, October 1914. 
42 According to E.H. Grainger, Patriotisms. Britain 1900-1939. London: Routledge Kegan Paul, 1986, 
30-1. 
43 M.D. Blanch, ‘Imperialism, Nationalism and Organized Youth’, In J. Clarke, C. Chritcher and R. 
Johnson (eds.), Working-Class Culture, London: Hutchinson, 1979, 105-9. 
41 
organised youth group. A survey of 1911 found that only a fifth of working-class 
children attended Sunday School and only one percent remained after age 14.
44
 At least 
two of the labour activist ex-servicemen of the Imperial War Museum’s archive were 
members of youth groups: Frederick Orton was born in Nottingham in June 1892, the 
youngest of ten children, and would later go on to become a leading trade unionist. He 
was in the Boy’s Brigade from age twelve, trained with wooden rifles and lances, and 
noted it was very religious and ‘definitely militaristic’.45 Contrastingly, Jack Dorgan, 
born in Ashington in 1893, joined the Church Lad’s Brigade aged fourteen, mainly 
because his friends had joined. He recalled that there was no religious instruction, just 
constant drilling, with very few overtly militaristic aspects.
46
  
Whether or not it was incubated through education or youth groups, in many 
areas of the country ‘imperialist and nationalist sentiment obtained real roots in 
working-class opinion’.47 Even where troops had been used in industrial disputes, there 
does not seem to have been the same resentment generated towards soldiers as to 
policemen: at Tonypandy in 1910, for example, Edward Spiers has argued that it was 
the police, especially from forces drafted in from outside the area, such as the 
Metropolitan Police, who bore the brunt of the strikers’ animus.48 Indeed, Gervase 
Phillips has noted how some Glamorgan soldiers, billeted in an English town during the 
war, recognised some of the constables used to keep order during the strikes of 1910-1 
and were delivered of an unexpected and delayed revenge.
49
 That a great mass of the 
population were willing to fight was demonstrated by the hundreds of thousands of men 
who came forward, both during the opening weeks and months of the conflict, and in a 
more or less steady stream throughout, until the introduction of conscription. As Anne 
Summers has argued, if 1.5 million volunteers could be found in a period of little over a 
year, there must have been a deep-seated comfort with militarism and warfare, even if it 
was not of the Continental variety.
50
 While some men enlisted to escape unemployment 
and absolute poverty, this cannot be said of any more than a minority, and volunteers 
came from buoyant industries as much as from depressed trades, including many from 
44 J.O. Springhall, ‘The Boy Scouts, Class and Militarism in Relation to British Youth Movements 1908-
1930’, International Review of Social History 16 (1971): 139-143. 
45 Imperial War Museum, Catalogue No. 10411, Frederick James Orton, interviewed 1988. 
46 Imperial War Museum, Catalogue No. 9253, Jack Dorgan, interviewed 1986. 
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103. 
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protected occupations where demand for labour was high, jobs secure and wages 
competitive.
51
 
A great deal of literature has concentrated on possible motivations for men 
enlisting in the autumn of 1914, but it has perhaps been undermined by an assumption 
that it took a great weight of motivation for a man to join the Army. Certainly, they 
realised they were signing up to fight and possibly die, and the extent to which people 
genuinely did believe it would be ‘over before Christmas’ is doubtful. Yet for many 
British men, serving with the armed forces would not represent a great departure from 
their ordinary life, even in terms of the risk of death, disease and disablement. For 
example, a notice in the Railway Review, the newspaper of the National Union of 
Railwaymen, claimed that seventy NUR members had been killed in the war by 
November 1914, but a notice on the facing page informed readers that 108 railway staff 
and customers had died in accidents on the tracks in the three months leading to June 
1914.
52
 Ordinary life could be just as risky as war, whether the threat came from 
childhood illnesses or workplace accidents. As Ian Beckett has commented: 
‘Subordination and tedium were commonplace in British industrial society, while 
popular culture made light of hardship and enabled men to normalize their emotions 
under stress. In effect it comes down to the characteristics of the British working-class 
civilian soldier – perhaps a phlegmatic acceptance of fate or sheer bloodymindedness 
but always with a sardonic humour.’53 The reaction of most Britons to the hardships and 
inequalities that characterised most of their lives was a sort of ironic acceptance and a 
determination to muddle through – an attitude which transferred well into life under 
military discipline. Gervase Phillips has argued of Welsh soldiers at this time that 
‘industrial workers who displayed a tendency to view their service in the Army as an 
extension of their peace-time situation, only now instead of iron-masters and pit-bosses 
there were Captains and Colonels’.54  
 In his study on working-class enlistment, David Silbey argued that a broad 
spectrum of motivations caused men to volunteer, but one cannot help notice that many 
of the reasons given – ‘I got patriotic’, or ‘We were being patriotic. Or young and silly’, 
are very similar to the motivations for marriage revealed in Dan Leno’s book Young 
Men Taken in and Done For. For example, one man woke after a night of drinking to 
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find that he had pledged himself to a woman, although he did not have any memory of 
this: ‘She said, “Yes you do, you spoke about it last night, when you’d had a little 
drink.” Well, I thought, if I did say so, I suppose I did, so I came downstairs half asleep 
(in fact I think every man’s asleep when he going to be married).’55 In the Imperial War 
Museum’s audio archive of interviews with war veterans collected in the 1980s, 
William Gillman – who would later go on the be a prominent Labour and trade union 
activist in West Ham - recalled how he ‘thought it was great’ when war broke out, as he 
‘wanted to fight the Germans’, ‘like we all did, us youngsters’. He did not realise at the 
time how long the war would last, nor the number of casualties; he ‘look[ed] at it in a 
different way’, when he was eighteen, and saw only the possibility for adventure and 
heroism.
56
 
Frederick Orton recalled that his friends’ joining up was important to his 
decision to enlist, but the most attractive factor was a week’s holiday once a year. He 
also noted that the medical examination was very ‘sketchy’ and not particularly 
thorough; Orton’s parents owned a sweet shop and were none too strict on young 
Frederick sampling their wares – by the time he enlisted he had lost all his teeth, yet 
was still passed as fit to serve.
57
 Jack Dorgan was a particularly militant worker; as a 
teenager he earned a reputation for standing up to pit bosses when older men were 
afraid to do so, yet he joined the Territorials three years before the war: ‘We were 
intensely loyal, you know, nationalistic…the union Jack was something to be treasured 
in those days.’ He recalled that he and his friends ‘never knew or cared about 
Germany…didn’t really know or care [about] anything outside of Northumberland’. 
They understood and accepted that ‘the people in charge of the country’ had declared 
war on Germany; there were no celebrations or outbursts of patriotic fervour, ‘it was 
just accepted’. 
Describing the English working class, E.P. Thompson has written that ‘what 
mattered to people was, not whether it was capitalism but whether it was a ruthless or a 
tolerable capitalism – whether men were hurled into wars, subject to inquisitions and 
arbitrary arrests, or allowed some freedom of person and of organization’, and clearly 
most Britons felt that British capitalism, while uncomfortable, was tolerable, that 
Britons were amongst the freest people in Europe, and that this tolerable standing of 
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living and degree of personal freedom was worth fighting for.
58
 The everyday aspects of 
British working-class life – boredom and tedium only interrupted by the occasional 
tragedy of a child miscarried or still born, an infant death, a workplace accident, with 
the occasional exhilaration of a win on the horses or in the football pools, all made 
bearable by constant cups of tea and the odd Woodbine  – were not too different from 
everyday aspects of warfare, and just as men were determined to muddle through their 
lives as best they could, so too they determined to fight through the war to its grim 
conclusion.  
In the words of John Bourne, ‘The British working-class was well adapted to the 
challenge of war. Working-class culture provided the Army with a bedrock of social 
cohesion and community on which its capacity for endurance rested. The existential 
realities from which this culture evolved were remarkably similar to those of military 
life’.59 Martin Middlebrook recounted the tale of an officer who claimed that a recruit 
informed him: ‘I don’t think my trade union would permit me to work the number of 
hours we are working now’.60 Gervase Phillips has argued: ‘Here is the continuity, the 
strikers of 1911, the grumbling citizen-soldiers of 1916 and the strikers of 1926 were 
often the same men.’61 People joined the Army for much the same range of reasons that 
led to marriage: an initial burst of excitement; a courage and sense of purpose born of 
alcohol; a vague sense of duty; peer pressure; financial pressures; a desire for adventure. 
Whatever their original motivations – and these soon faded into irrelevance – men were 
resolved to see through their obligations until the end, and knew full well that they were 
involved ‘for the duration’.  
One of the most telling signs of the priority accorded to patriotism by the 
ordinary worker vis-à-vis the struggle to advance their own lives and working 
conditions was the immediate industrial truce which came into effect on 25 August 
1914, and was formalised in the Treasury Agreement of March 1915.
62
 The years 
preceding the war had been amongst the most tumultuous in British industrial history, 
yet the great Triple Industrial Alliance of railwaymen, miners and transport workers – 
representing some of the most militant groups of the three decades leading up to the war 
– had no sooner been formed than voluntarily shackled itself for the duration of the 
conflict. As DeGroot has rightly observed: ‘The trade unions immediately surrendered 
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their most effective weapon - the strike – without extracting anything significant in 
return. The only conceivable explanation for this cooperation is simple patriotism, 
strengthened by a conviction that a thankful government would reward the workers 
when peace returned.’63 The majority of trade unionists saw absolutely nothing 
incompatible between their political beliefs and their patriotism; indeed, very often the 
two worked together. An example of the intersection of patriotism and self-interest can 
be found in the formation in March 1915 of the Liverpool Dock Battalion. This 
formation consisted of trade unionists willing to submit themselves to organisation 
along military lines in exchange for a guaranteed minimum of 35s. per week and the 
promise from Lord Derby that ‘the force will adhere strictly to Trade Union rules and 
under no circumstances will be used as a strike breaking battalion’.64 While this may not 
have been possible in more militant areas such as the Clyde or the Tyne, it does show 
how many workers were willing to make temporary sacrifices in respect of their power 
to strike for reasons of patriotism and material gains, and the battalion was vastly 
oversubscribed.  
By 14 August 1914 it was estimated that fifteen thousand postmen had left for 
the services,
65
 and by January 1915 The Post calculated that fifteen thousand 
gasworkers and general labourers, thirty thousand Durham miners and 1,434 postal 
sorters of the Fawcett Association had enlisted.
66
 By mid-1915 around 230,000 miners 
had volunteered nationwide.
67
 In addition to organised workers in regular employment, 
casual labour also streamed forward to enlist, with John Ward of the Navvies’ Union 
raising four battalions; in Birmingham alone it was thought that one thousand navies 
had joined up: ‘I often feel proud to know that I am an old navvy’s son’, claimed one, 
‘because I know that there is not another class who have answered the call to the flag 
for home and beauty as our navies have done.’68 Similarly, in Merseyside, as many as 
eight thousand dockers, the majority of whom were members of the Dockers’ Union, 
joined the Army between August 1914 and March 1915. Given that so many of their 
members joined-up, some trade unions immediately decided that they would not be 
eligible to pay subscriptions during their time with the colours.
69
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 Alan Howkins has discussed the relatively low number of recruits from 
agriculture, for many of whom it was ‘business as usual’, and reckoned that only a tenth 
of farmworkers – still around 123,000 – had enlisted by 1916.70 Howkins argued that 
paternalism was important in rural recruitment, that economic motives were clearly very 
important for some, and that enlistment rates fell when trade picked up. Yet he 
ultimately concluded that ‘for most countrymen who joined the New Armies it is clear 
that a vague sense of patriotism, personal or collective, was the overwhelming reason 
for taking the shilling’.71 Nick Mansfield has recalled how a parochial language specific 
to each locality was utilised to encourage rural farmworkers to enlist: Newmarket men 
were warned of the spectre of ‘Uhlans riding down the High Street’, and soon enough 
Rolls of Honour detailing the patriotism of each village were compiled.
72
 Labour 
pacifism was virtually unknown in the countryside, and in Norfolk the recruits consisted 
mainly of the labouring poor, many of whom had been involved with NALRU.
73
 
Although there was a neutralist minority within the NALRU it, like the Workers’ 
Union, which also organised agricultural workers, ‘behaved splendidly’ in terms of 
recruitment.
74
 ‘In the absence of a lead from farmers’, wrote Mansfield, the union 
‘assumed the mantle of patriotism, thereby legitimising their own activities, which had 
previously been regarded as unacceptable’.75 Mansfield concurred with J.G. Fuller in 
arguing that while local and county loyalty was an important aid to recruitment – many 
men were more moved by exhortations to fight for their family, their village, or for 
Norfolk than more abstract appeals to King and country – military service was to have a 
‘nationalising’ effect on men who served with the forces, broadening their horizons and 
bringing new issues to their attention.
76
 
The Engineers, later to acquire a reputation for using their position to avoid 
conscription and workshop fractiousness, were at first no less committed to the conflict 
than the rest of the union movement. A letter in the ASE Monthly Journal from 
February 1915 attempted to surmise the moral justifications for the war: ‘Let us stand to 
our guns, my brothers, without flinching, and then we will retain our glorious freedom, 
relieve hundreds of millions from a vile military despotism, and our Sunday dinner of 
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English beef, instead of German polony’.77 The substitution of ‘English’ for British – 
particularly careless given the number of ASE men in Scotland, Wales and Ireland – 
was commonplace at this time. If it usually elicited an angry response from members 
from elsewhere in the British Isles, it was not reflected in the correspondence pages. 
Later in the war the editor of the ASE journal, eager to dispel rumours of engineers 
dodging military service, noted that since later 1916 large numbers of ASE men had 
voluntarily enlisted, and that the union leadership had come to an agreement with the 
government for combing out skilled men for the mechanical corps of the Army.
78
 In 
Armies of Freeman, Tom Wintringham paid tribute to the ASE men who piloted the 
tanks in the last years of the war:  
 
A high proportion of the officers were rankers, but not just any sort of ranker. Skilled engineers to 
the last finger-nail, men who had come out of the shipyards and fitting-shops in the middle years 
of the war, they had taken to the new mechanical soldiering the minute it offered. With the mate-
hood of the lathe and bench and the union branch in them, regarding a man as worthy or unworthy 
according as he turned out his job of work, watching for weakness or inefficiency with eyes 
trained to the micrometer, riding to death-tests with their men in their early “suicide-club” 
machines. 
 
Other soldiers often thought they were Australians, such was their egalitarianism. ‘They 
came from Birmingham and Liverpool and Sheffield’, wrote Wintringham, ‘from the 
big centres of the engineering industry and the engineering unions, and they didn’t care 
a damn for anyone.’79 
One of the more nuanced analyses of the war came from the editor of the 
Boilermakers’ Reports. The Boilermakers combined a loyalty to the country that did not 
extend to the elites who ran the country; nor was there any animus towards ordinary 
German troops. Sounding an optimistic note due to near-full employment and the rude 
health of the union, the editorial of December 1914 proclaimed:  
 
Our strength is in the loyalty of our members. When the call came for volunteers our members 
responded in such numbers that special posters had to be printed by the Admiralty to persuade our 
members on warship construction and other munitions of war that their duty lay at home…in 
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volunteering for the front most of our members have exchanged good paying work for a soldier’s 
pittance, and have thus given the best of all proofs that the getting of money is not their first 
consideration.  
 
Further extolling his union’s patriotic credentials at the beginning of 1915: ‘With the 
present demand for labour there should come, according to the economists, a demand 
for higher wages, but our members’ loyalty is such that, having the means of a very 
moderate subsistence, they devote their attention to the creation of records in putting 
warships quickly into commission. If there is any such loyalty amongst employers or 
financiers it has not so far been in evidence.’80 With most on the Left the war confirmed 
and deepened their suspicions and resentments of the ruling elite, and made them all the 
more determined to change the existing order once the guns fell silent. 
 Even Robert Smillie, the Scottish miners’ leader and pacifist, called in July 1915 
for ‘every effort [to be made] by the owners and workmen alike, to secure the greatest 
possible output of coal in the interest of the nation during the period of the war’. After 
criticising exaggerated reports of workers’ ‘shirking’ in the right-wing press, Smillie 
admitted: ‘And yet it is clearly proved, and admitted to on our side, that there is a 
considerable amount of absenteeism which is not caused by illness or accident, but 
might be prevented, and ought to be prevented in the present crisis’. After noting that 
mining was not only dangerous but also labourious and uncomfortable, he continued:  
 
But I believe it is my duty as President of the Miners’ Federation, as a miner myself, and as a man 
who has done some work in connection with the organizing of our people – organizing them to 
fight the employers, mark you; do not let there be any mistake about it, and if necessary to fight 
the Government under certain conditions – I say it is my duty to appeal to our people that in this 
national crisis every miner should be at the pit every day that the pit is open, if he physically able 
to be there at all.  
 
Miners’ leader and MP for Wigan Stephen Walsh concurred:  
 
I think there never was a meeting in the whole history of trade unionism such as the meeting that 
has taken place in this hall to-day…I am convinced that it is not possible to find in the whole 
length and breadth of the United Kingdom a body of people more imbued with a sense of their 
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high responsibility in this great national emergency than are the Miners’ Federation of Great 
Britain.81 
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Fig. 2.1 ‘Racial Europe’, The Wheatsheaf, October 1914. 
Fig. 2.2 ‘East Coast Raid: Scarborough Stores Damaged’, The Co-operative News, 26 December 1914. 
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Fig. 2.4 ‘Maxim Gun Section – 8th City of London’, The Post, 16 July 1915. 
Fig. 2.3 ‘With the Colours: Metropolitan District Railwaymen with the 6th Battalion Essex 
Regiment, Railway Review, 6 November 1914. 
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Fig. 2.5 ‘Advert for Masters’ Maxim Boot’, Railway 
Review, 8 October 1915. 
Fig. 2.6 ‘Patriotic Songs’, Railway Review, 9 October 
1914. 
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Anti-Germanism 
 
On 11 October 1914 a manifesto was issued which placed the blame for the war 
squarely at the feet of the German Junkers; this was signed by most labour leaders, but 
Ramsay MacDonald remained conspicuous in his refusal to sign.
82
 After the atrocities 
and military setbacks of the initial months of the conflict, anti-Germanism overpowered 
any pre-war internationalism; The Co-operative News, which had initially opposed the 
conflict, argued in February 1915 in favour of starving Germany into submission: ‘We 
have to remember that we are fighting a nation of armed assassins, and all these things 
should be taken into consideration when we are discussing the question of the humbling 
of Germany by the process of economic starvation.’83 Speaking at the Co-Partnership 
Committee of London Gas and Electric Light Company in December 1915, Will Crooks 
gave an impassioned plea for British perseverance in the conflict: ‘I do not call this a 
capitalists’ war: I do not call it a Government war. By the living God that created me I 
believe it is a people’s war for the liberty and virtue of our own homes.’84 As the 
intractable nature of the conflict and the huge amount of men and money that would be 
required to prosecute it became more apparent, spirits became bleaker but resolves 
hardened. Writing in April 1915, Blatchford was unequivocal about the weight of the 
issues at stake and the place of the conflict in history:  
 
This is not a political war. It is not a war caused inadvertently by the blunders of secret diplomacy. 
It is not a financiers’ war, a war preventable by soft words or delicate expostulations. It is not a 
war comparable to any other war of which we have knowledge. It is a vast and frightful racial 
earthquake. It has shaken civilisation to its foundations...These Huns are not only the enemies of 
France, of Britain, of Russia, of Belgium; they are the enemies of humanity.85 
 
The sentiments of Havelock Wilson will have been shared by many on the 
British Left. Although he ended the war as fearsome and committed a jingo as any, 
Wilson had not always been so inclined. Although incorrigibly racist – he had led a 
campaign against Lascar sailors serving on British merchant ships - he, like many on the 
British Left, had interacted with German Socialists before the war in a context of 
friendship and solidarity. He thus felt somewhat disillusioned by the apparent 
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connivance of the German Left in atrocities committed by that country, specifically the 
U-Boat campaign against merchant shipping which resulted in the deaths of non-
combatants from neutral countries. In a letter to Hermann Jochade, the Secretary of the 
International Transport Workers Federation in Berlin, he claimed that:  
 
My object in writing is to call to the attention of the Central Committee of the International 
Transport Workers in Berlin to the ruthless murders that have occurred on the high seas to 
peaceful British merchant seamen, who are members of the National Sailors’ and Firemen’s 
Union, and incidentally members of the International Transport Workers Federation...For over 18 
months British merchant seamen have been done to death in the most cruel and wicked manner. 
 
Although he conceded that German workers did not have the same freedom to 
influence their government as their British equivalents, he noted that the German Social 
Democratic Party was able to secure some four million votes, held a majority in the 
Reichstag, and therefore must have had some influence over the German government: 
‘It is, therefore, difficult for me to come to any other conclusion than that some 
responsibility for what has happened rests with the Central Committee of the 
International Federation.’ While his union had provided for interned German seamen 
who were members during the war, the ‘treatment of the British seamen interned in 
German camps has been disgraceful’. ‘As a result of the deliberate murders that have 
been committed at sea on merchant seamen and the scandalous treatment accorded to 
our prisoners in Germany a very bitter feeling has been created in this country against 
the German workmen, which, if I may judge aright, will remain for many years.’ This 
bitterness had been further exacerbated by the execution in July 1916 of Captain 
Charles Fryatt. Fryatt was a Merchant Navy captain who was alleged to have attempted 
to ram a German U-Boat the previous year. After his capture he was court-martialled 
and sentenced to death despite being a civilian non-combatant, which caused 
widespread outrage. Wilson concluded that while the German working men may have 
had no influence, it would be very difficult to convince the British working man of this, 
especially the British seaman.
86
  
 An indication of the extent to which the British working class – and the 
working-class Left – quickly became staunchly patriotic and anti-German is the 
vilification of supposed pacifists. While their words may have fallen on sympathetic 
ears in the days leading up to the war, as soon as Britain entered the conflict their 
viewpoints became treasonable and intolerable. Keir Hardie was ‘howled down’ at 
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Aberdare on 6 August 1914, and this was in his own constituency of Merthyr Tydfil, 
emphatically not a working-class Tory stronghold.
87
 Further, on 20 October 1914 
miners at Lewis Merthyr Lodge walked out, and stayed out, until a Mr Sholback – a 
German head electrician – was dismissed.88 Perhaps the most vivid example of the anti-
pacifism which gripped the British working-class and much of the British Left during 
the early years of the war were the results of the by-election in Merthyr triggered by the 
sudden death of Hardie in September 1915. The official Labour candidate, James 
Winstone, a Baptist lay minister, was no pacifist: he had presided over recruiting 
meetings and his own son was at the Front. Yet he was so damaged by the support of 
well-known (and temporarily despised) anti-war figures such as Ramsay MacDonald 
and Fred Jowett that Charles Stanton, the ‘patriotic labour’ candidate, was able to take 
the seat. Stanton was no Tory stooge – he has been described by Gwyn Williams as 
‘literally a pistol-packing syndicalist’ at one point.89 In an article entitled ‘Keir Hardie’s 
Successor’ in the Bradford Pioneer, T. Russell Williams argued that Stanton owed his 
victory to being a local man, whereas Winstone was from Monmouthshire, and praised 
Stanton as ‘one of the greatest fighters that ever went onto a political or industrial 
battlefield’, noting that he had taken the side of his own Aberdare men against the 
SWMF over unofficial strike actions, and could have been the candidate for Merthyr in 
1900, but chose to stand aside for Hardie.
90
 
This victory of the ‘patriotic’ candidate over the official nominee perfectly 
encapsulates the strength of nationalistic sentiment amongst the grassroots of the British 
Left at this time, and this was in Merthyr, in the famously militant industrial heartlands 
of South Wales.
91
 Similarly, at a by-election held in North Ayrshire in October 1916, 
only two candidates stood: the Reverend Chelmers, a pacifist and opponent of the war, 
and Lieutenant-General Hunter-Watson, leader of VIII Corps on the Somme. The 
General received 7,419 votes; the Reverend only 1,300.
92
 In the same year Noel 
Pemberton Billing won Hereford on an air defence programme and patriotic labour 
stalwart Ben Tillett was finally elected to the Commons for North Salford in 1917 on a 
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decidedly pro-war campaign.
93
 This electoral trend was to continue into the ‘khaki 
election’ at the end of the war, when all the notable anti-war figures on the Left such as 
MacDonald and Philip Snowden - in addition to men who had been instrumental to the 
war effort such as Arthur Henderson – lost their seats. While MacDonald and Snowden 
were deliberately targeted by labour patriots and Conservatives, Henderson had only 
resigned from the war cabinet a year earlier, and so his defeat by National Democratic 
Party member Clem Edwards in East Ham South was particularly surprising, yet labour 
leaders who failed to retain the ‘Coupon’ fared poorly across the board.  
Almost immediately the ILP – associated fairly or otherwise with pro-
Germanism – came under attack from editorials in patriotic journals such as the Railway 
Review. The anti-war Left were painted as people blinded by abstract thinking to the 
realities of the world: ‘We differ from the doctrinaire Socialists now’, wrote Alex 
Thompson in The Clarion: 
 
As we have always done, in insisting that peace cannot be established on the pretentious 
multiloquence, Pleasant Sunday Afternoon fuddles, and ready-made reach-me-down comradeship, 
whose canting unreality and manifest incompetence have done so much to discredit and ridicule 
the virile creed of Socialism. Where we have differed from the lollipop Socialist is not in loving 
peace less than they, but in loving it more practically; not in hating war less than they, but in 
realizing its approach and striving to prevent it.94  
 
This hostility towards ‘pacifism’ lasted sometime: at the 1915 TUC only two delegates 
voted against the Labour party’s continued involvement in recruitment, and merely 
seventeen voted for a settled peace with Germany. Furthermore, ‘the [pacifistic] Union 
for Democratic Control resolutions in respect to peace terms were laughed out of 
court’.95 Nor was this sentiment confined to the elites of the unions. Trevor Wilson has 
recounted how, at a munitions factory in June 1917, fifty toolsetters and labourers 
threatened to strike after a conscientious objector was promoted to foreman – the matter 
was only resolved when the offending workman was sacked.
96
  
 If the invasion of Belgium had provided the catalyst for British left-wing 
opinion (and indeed the opinion of the country as a whole) to move behind intervention, 
the development of a visceral hatred towards Germany and all things German helped to 
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mobilise opinion for the continuance of the war and a fight-to-the-finish. David Silbey 
has recounted how one individual wanted to enlist simply to ‘hammer the Kaiser’; he 
did not express any positive reasons for wanting to fight for his own country, he merely 
wanted to fight against Germany, and in particular against the personage of Wilhelm II, 
who had come to represent everything he despised in the world.
97
 Similarly Ruth 
Armstrong of Tilshead recalled after the war how ‘My mother used to say that if he, the 
Kaiser, was to come over here and take England, “I would kill you all and kill myself. I 
won’t live under Germany”.’98 Arthur Henderson captured this spirit in a speech at 
Easter 1918, when he claimed that ‘by their offensive, the Kaiser and the war lords had 
drawn the British people together in a consecrated and determined effort to secure the 
destruction of militarism’.99 Similarly, attacks from the sea and air on the British 
mainland were to relegate any thoughts of peace and internationalist sentiment in the 
minds of Britons. As Gregory has argued: ‘Destroying architectural treasures, burning 
homes and killing civilians in Belgium was clearly reprehensible, but destroying homes 
and killing men, women and children in Britain was far worse for readers to 
contemplate.’ A Co-operative warehouse in Scarborough was hit by a German shell and 
The Co-operative News displayed a picture of the damaged building in the aftermath 
(see Fig 2.2).The sinking of the Lusitania and attacks on Scarborough, Hartlepool and 
London were to cement the Germans as malevolent foes in the minds of British workers 
far more vividly than the crude and hysterical propaganda in John Bull and the Daily 
Mail. 
  
Labour Heroes 
 
Labour movement activists fighting in the trenches were keen that their patriotism and 
sacrifice were not misused and that the men and women who remained at home 
continued to uphold the cause. Said one co-operator serving on the Western Front: ‘I’m 
proud to be serving under the British flag, and I hope that dad is keeping the co-
operative flag flying till I come back.’100 The Post of July 1915 carried a photograph of 
a Post Office Maxim Gun section, 8
th
 (Post Office Rifles) Battalion, City of London 
                                               
97 D. Silbey, The British Working Class and Enthusiasm for War, 1914-1916, London: Frank Cass, 2005, 
8. William Gillman, in his IWM interview, noted that for him and his friends the Kaiser was very much 
‘the villain of the piece’. See Imperial War Museum Interviews, Catalogue No. 9420, William Gillman, 
interviewed 1986. 
98 Quoted in R. van Emden and S. Humphries, All Quiet on the Home Front, London: Headline, 2003, 
158. 
99 Quoted in Wilson, The Myriad Faces of War, 633. 
100 The Co-operative News, 5 December 1914. 
 58 
 
Regiment (see Fig. 2.4), but the editorial of the same edition reiterated the belief that the 
‘class war’ had merely been postponed, and that the members of the movement must 
remain vigilant and prepared to resume the fight at a moment’s notice.101 
The Clarion of 20 August 1915 contained a letter from John Costello, a soldier 
fighting at the Front: 
 
[Receiving the Clarion] will cheer a few mates with whom I have come into contact, and who are, 
according to themselves, advanced Socialists. Many a rough time they give me as I am only an 
I.L.P, whereas they are S.D.P. men. However, it is war we are on now, so we sink our differences 
till some future time, when we will settle the matter at some street-corner meeting. But we have to 
settle Kaiser Bill first, then we will tackle the economic question.102 
 
While Bernard Stevenson wrote in January 1916: 
 
We are only a small draft, attached to a mixed unit, doing digging and other indispensable work 
behind the growing British fighting force, but I know of two or three convinced Socialists within 
our number. One with whom I have often shared a bed in hutment camps was formerly secretary 
of the junior section of the I.L.P. in Nottingham, and while I mention these initials let me say how 
proud and thankful we all are of the victory of sane Socialism at Merthyr Tydfil. Men and lads of 
all classes, trades, and occupations mix here on terms of perfect equality.103 
 
Another letter of encouragement typified the response from working-class labour 
activists serving with the colours: ‘Good old Clarion staff, - Go on! You are fighting for 
the truth. It is hard, but worth it. Your teaching taught me my duty, and I am fighting in 
my tin pot way for the five kiddies I left behind me. If I go West, I go as a Socialist, not 
as a “Sloshialist”. Good luck! You will never die.’104 Another indication from the 
newspapers themselves as to the views of their readership is the advertisements placed 
in them. It was – and is – even more crucial for advertisers than editors to accurately 
gauge the opinions of the readership, and the adverts placed in labour papers during this 
period give us no doubt that companies felt readers were patriotic and that patriotism 
sold.
105
 Products such as clothes, boots, food and drink all stressed their British origins 
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and were often accompanied by photographs of bulldogs and lions (see Fig. 2.5 and 
2.6). 
We have seen how hundreds of thousands of trade unionists served in the 
military or worked in the munitions factories during the war; some of these served with 
distinction and offer clear examples of how a vigorous commitment to the war effort did 
not involve a compromise of principles. One of the most famous British air aces of the 
war, Edward ‘Mick’ Mannock, was a committed socialist and the secretary of his local 
Labour party, but this did not prevent him from shooting Germans out of the sky in 
record numbers. According to his biographers, he would hold mock Parliaments: ‘When 
the parliament was in full session the words came hot and strong. His speeches were 
based on the platform of Socialism, and so eloquently did he lambaste Tory members 
that the uproar attracted the attention of passing officers.’ Yet ‘it did not take long for 
him to reject the idea of ministering to wounded Germans. The only good one, he told 
himself, was a very dead one. There was no niche for a cosy-minded humanist when it 
came to fighting the Hun.’106  
Soon enough notices of the death or wounding of working-class activists and 
trade unionists began to appear in the press. Private Jones of the Bedford Regiment 
fought in five large engagements in the autumn and winter of 1914, including twelve 
bayonet charges, until being wounded in the head and neck. His comrades said of him: 
‘He was a very active and loyal member of the [Manchester No. 4] branch [of the 
NUR], and if he proves as good a soldier as he was a Trade Unionist the Germans will 
not land in England yet. We are proud of our comrade and wish him God speed and a 
safe and glorious return to his country, wife and children.’107 A letter in The Clarion of 
November 1915 told of the death of another activist with the colours: ‘Clarionettes in 
South London will be grieved to learn that our dear comrade Jack Reed has been killed 
in action. His genial kindness and serenity endeared him to all, and there are some who 
knew him intimately who will learn of his death with a dreadful pang. We loved old 
Jack.’108 A further missive of August 1916 lamented: ‘My only chum is gone: “Alec,” 
as he was affectionately known in the old West London Fellowship, is on the Roll of 
Honour...Once – how incredibly long ago it seems – he stood up manfully against a 
special meeting of the branch and defended his position as a Socialist and a Territorial. 
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To think that in those days some of us considered the two things incompatible!’109 Nor 
was it only working-class men of the Left who volunteered to fight; in March 1916, 
‘For the seventh time on account of the war the flag at Ruskin school is at half-mast’; 
Frank Southgate, the art master, had become the latest of the Ruskin faculty killed in 
action.
110
 
An edition of the Railway Review of June 1917 told the story of Sergeant Harry 
Cator, a member of the Yarmouth branch of the NUR and a Lewis gunner in the East 
Surrey Regiment, who had been awarded the Victoria Cross.
111
 Meanwhile, two NUR 
men had won the Military Medal: W.H. Binge, one time secretary of the South Eastern 
District Council and Hither Green branch, and A. Lodge, member of the Manchester 
No. 5 branch and formerly a carter of the Lancashire and Yorkshire railway.
112
 Sergeant 
H. J. Sheppard, formerly Secretary of the Barry Socialist Society, was awarded the 
DCM in November 1916.
113
 The journal of the ASE reported in January 1917 that 
Sergeant A. Warham of Crewe No. 4 Branch and the Royal Engineers had been given 
the Military Medal; while from the same regiment Lance-Corporal James Coupe of 
Barrow Fifth Branch was mentioned in dispatches and presented with the French 
Medaille Militaire.
114
 In January 1918 the engineer Harry Coverdale – a sergeant in the 
Manchester Regiment who had enlisted in September 1914 – was awarded a Victoria 
Cross to complement his Military Medal won earlier in the war.
115
 A Glaswegian ASE 
member and Lance Corporal in the Royal Scots’ Fusiliers won the DCM; as did 
Sergeant Major John Broderick (of Jarrow No.3 Branch), for carrying a wounded officer 
on his back to safety whilst under heavy fire near Armentieres on 9 December 1915; 
and the following year Joseph Wilson, a riveter of Hebburn No. 2 Branch became 
another ASE man honoured with the DCM. Corporal C. Andrews, a stretcher bearer of 
London No. 11 Branch and the Royal West Kent was also garlanded with the Belgian 
Croix-de-Guerre to complement his DCM.
116
 The Military Medal was awarded to 
Private W.C. Orr of South Shields No. 1, Jack Naden of Sunderland, Joseph Vaughan of 
Gateshead and Joshua Horsley of Hartlepool.
117
 The final year of the war saw Corporal 
Ernest Goulding of the 7
th
 Lincolns and Lincoln No.1 Branch, who had enlisted in 
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August 1914, awarded the Military Medal for conspicuous conduct and gallantry in 
bombing a pill-box.
118
 
A notice in The Co-operative News of April 1915 proudly proclaimed that the 
son of a co-operator had been awarded the Victoria Cross. Lance Corporal Fuller of the 
1
st
 Battalion, Grenadier Guards, captured fifty German soldiers single-handedly at 
Neuve Chapelle. His delighted father, a member of the Mansfield and Sutton society, 
‘was in the central shop yesterday telling us all about it’, according to his father’s 
manager.
119
 By June 1915 fifteen Co-operative Wholesale Society workers had been 
killed, with the latest falling at La Bassée: Lance Corporal M’Conville, of the City of 
Liverpool society, who was a former president of the Liverpool branch of the postmen’s 
federation, a member of the Edge Hill ILP and an unsuccessful candidate in the 1913 
municipal elections.
120
 In November 1916 The Co-operative News boasted of the first 
‘Co-Operative V.C.’. Sergeant William Ewart Boulter – whose very name gives the lie 
to any easy polarity between leftist political beliefs and patriotic conviction – came 
from a family of old co-operators, worked in a shop of the Kettering society, and 
enlisted during the first few weeks of the war. According to a gushing report in the 
News: ‘His response to the call to arms was not so much a headstrong desire for 
adventure as a serious answer to patriotic duty. Once in the Army, the same eager spirit 
which had carried him forward in his work as a co-operative employee very soon 
carried him to the sergeant’s mess.’121  
The issue of war badges serves as another demonstration of the concern of the 
average worker to appear patriotic. For example, one correspondent to the Railway 
Review of May 1915 inquired: ‘In many of the munition factories the men have been 
supplied with these badges; then why have not the railwaymen been supplied with 
them? We have been stopped from enlisting, and told we are doing just as much to help 
our country by sticking to our jobs. If this is so, I think we deserve to have such a small 
form of recognition extended to us.’122 Meanwhile a column in that newspaper from 
October of that year complained:  
 
It has been mentioned in these columns that war badges are indiscriminately distributed to all and 
sundry employed in railway shops, without regard to age or ability to serve in H.M Forces, and it 
certainly does seem unnecessary and incongruous that greybeards should be seen proudly 
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disporting themselves in this decoration, and thus claiming immunity from the blandishments of 
the recruiting sergeants.123  
 
Furthermore, a leaflet circulated in 1915 by the WNC explained how men who had 
attested under the Derby Scheme but not yet called up could ‘show his friends that he is 
a soldier’ through an armlet marked with the Royal Crown.124 Many of these survive to 
this day, and there are several in the collections of the People’s History Museum, 
Manchester.  
Above all, it was felt imperative not to be seen as a ‘shirker’; on 27 August 
George Wardle, Henderson, George Roberts, William Mosses of the Patternmakers, 
James Brownlie of the Engineers and Frank Smith of the Cabinet Makers visited France 
and Belgium, and upon their return assured the workers that: 
 
It is upon them, as well as upon the men at the front, that the responsibility for procuring victory 
rests. The lives of our own kith and kin, the desolated homes, the devastated villages, the ruined 
towns cry aloud for a supreme effort to end quickly this horrible nightmare, and the way to end it 
is to speed up the supply both of guns and ammunition, until the invader has been driven from his 
trenches and chased across the Rhine.125  
 
Writing from the Front to Co-Partner’s Magazine, a correspondent named ‘F.C.B.’ 
claimed:  
 
I would rather risk it all again than be a slacker. I rejoice to think that I am not that. We are at 
present resting in a dear little village; as I write I am sitting in comfortable room, with a full belly 
and a nice cigar; and if it was not for the thoughts of my dear old pals we have left behind I would 
be perfectly happy. I understand some of the boys of East Ham are knocking things about. It 
would be better for everyone if they came out here. If I had a brother, and he was a slacker, I 
would never speak to him again.126  
 
There was a widespread hostility towards those suspected of not pulling their weight: 
discussing the Middlesex Appeals Tribunal, David Langrish has claimed that the 
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tribunal received unsolicited letters from people accusing their neighbours of shirking 
and demanding that they not be exempted.
127
  
 Will Crooks neatly captured this attitude in a speech he gave to the Co-
Partnership Committee on 2 November 1915: 
To begin with I am known as Bill Crooks. I have never risen from the ranks; I remain in the ranks 
still, and I do not intend to get out of them, either. We will get to close quarters, and ask ourselves 
what this war has to do with us. 
After ruminating on the travesties and inequities of Imperial Germany for some time, he 
continued: 
I do not expect men to do something for nothing. You work for all you can get; I am not going to 
deny that. But when I was in the trenches and at the base, where I saw hundreds of thousands – 
literally hundreds of thousands, and I know what I am saying – of your brothers, of your sons, and 
of your nephews, we talked about things at home. Some of the men think about home and how 
they are doing at home, as this little story will illustrate. On the last night I told them: “I attended a 
school where the little children are who give you the greatest anguish given to anyone – the 
physically deficient; and I said: ‘Now I am going to see your daddies and your big brothers; shan’t 
I tell them something from you?’ And one little piping voice said ‘Tell them, Mr Crooks, we can 
sing God Save the King as good as they can’.” Tommy cheered it to the echo; it brought him 
home… 
They are our people. You are working and toiling, sometimes too hard, and you want to lose a 
quarter, and you want to lose half a day. I know you are working for wages, you are working for 
your daily bread – but there is sometimes a little more to be done – another turn for love. 
Crooks then rhetorically asked what he had done so that a wounded soldier, who had 
been left out for four days, should shed blood for him: 
Work too hard? Sugar too dear? Tea too much? Taxes too high?...  
The war is no business of us working folk? I do not want to test it beyond saying that I do not call 
this a capitalists’ war: I do not call it a Government war. By the living God that created me I 
believe it is a people’s war for the liberty and virtue of our own homes.128 
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This chapter has attempted to assess the nature and extent of left-wing support 
for the First World War. It has concurred with Adrian Gregory and others in arguing 
that – as with the British population generally - there was no enthusiasm amongst the 
Left for the war, and the weeks and days before the outbreak saw attempts to prevent 
the conflict. This lack of desire for bloodshed did not, however, preclude left-wing 
patriotism after August 1914, support for the war effort, and occasionally virulent anti-
Germanism. This chapter therefore must declaim recent work that has sought to 
downplay the extent of left-wing support for the First World War. In her 2012 book A 
Kingdom United, Catriona Pennell argued that: ‘Ultimately, socialists did not see 
enemies amongst their fellow men: war itself was the enemy.’ This argument is 
extremely difficult to sustain, especially since, in terms of the labour press, Dr Pennell 
relied entirely upon Forward and the Labour Leader, did not take a single quotation 
from The Clarion or Justice, nor mention them in the bibliography. On George Bernard 
Shaw’s pamphlet Common Sense about the War, Pennell conceded that ‘Significantly, 
opposition to Shaw’s work emerged spontaneously from the grass roots’, yet claimed 
that ‘Even socialist colleagues like Robert Blatchford, editor of The Clarion, were 
angered by [Shaw’s] tract.’129 It could be assumed from this sentence that Dr Pennell 
was entirely ignorant of the character of Robert Blatchford, aside from his editorship of 
The Clarion. Later in the book, Alex M. Thompson was discussed purely in terms of his 
outspoken patriotism – no mention was made that he was one of the most prominent 
Edwardian socialists.
130
 Further, Pennell claimed that ‘Even the Co-Operative Societies 
would not assist enemy aliens’; suggesting a lack of familiarity with some of the bilious 
anti-Germanism often present in The Co-operative News.
131
 Ultimately one cannot 
avoid concluding that Dr Pennell was entirely unaware of the extent of labour patriotism 
in this period. 
As we have seen, the vast majority of the Edwardian Left - trade unions, 
socialist societies, the Parliamentary Labour party, the Co-operative movement and 
many women’s suffrage societies - supported their country’s participation in the First 
World War, conditionally but faithfully, for the duration of the conflict. There was no 
demand for war from the labour movement; quite the opposite. There was a great deal 
of criticism of the institutional and ideological factors which had precipitated the 
conflict, but once Britain was involved there was no question that the war effort should 
be supported. It is a tragedy of all wars that, the more lives are lost and resources 
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squandered, the greater the need for the conflict to be prosecuted to an absolute victory, 
to vindicate the sacrifices made. So it was with the Left and the First World War: the 
deprivations and setbacks only strengthened the resolve that the war must not be lost 
and that Britain after the war must be different. 
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CHAPTER 3: LABOUR AND THE ANTI-WAR AGITATION 
 
Whilst the mainstream of the labour movement supported the war effort throughout the 
four years of the conflict, this narrative is qualified by acute episodes of resistance to the 
state and battles against wartime deprivations. Further, especially in the final two years 
of the war, a radical anti-war movement began to gain momentum and, whilst remaining 
a minority within the Left as a whole, developed an internationalist and pacifistic 
ideology which would largely be adopted by Labour in the 1920s. This chapter aims to 
further address the primary research question – that of the extent and nature of wartime 
patriotism amongst the Left – by examining opposition to the war from the Left. It will 
first discuss the conscription issue of 1915-1916, the periodic strikes that threatened to 
cripple industries during the war, and the soldiers’ strikes and mutinies after the 
Armistice, the anti-war movement and centres of supposed resistance to the patriotism 
of the war years, and finally the Leeds and Stockholm conferences of 1917, which 
seemed to herald a break from the government and a demand for an early peace 
settlement.  
 
Conscription, 1916-1918 
 
Contrary to the qualified and conditional support for the war effort across most of the 
labour movement, on the issue of conscription there was near unanimous opposition. 
This owed as much to traditional British opposition to ‘militarism’ and the constraint of 
individual liberties as it did to a tremendous and genuinely-held fear that conscription 
might be used to curb hard-won trade union rights. In August 1915 the General 
Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU) declared that virtually every trades council in the 
land had issued resolutions against conscription, and a unanimous resolution was passed 
against the measure at the Trade Union Congress annual meeting of the following 
month.
1
 In September 1915, Jimmy Thomas told the House of Commons that the 
railways would strike if conscription were introduced,
2
 and as late as January 1916 - 
when conscription was effectively a fait accompli - delegates representing 2,121,000 
unionists voted against the measure at a special conference in Westminster.
3
 The TUC 
of that year called on the Parliamentary Labour party to ‘lose no opportunity after the 
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war to press for the repeal of all Acts of Parliament imposing economic, industrial, and 
military conscription upon the manhood of the nation’.4 
Nor was opposition confined to the trade union movement. Outspoken Labour 
patriots such as Alex Thompson and Robert Blatchford argued against conscription in 
1915, and editorials in The Co-operative News, though vigorous in their support of the 
war, held that conscription would be a dangerous and unnecessary step.
5
 Labour patriots 
generally felt that although it was imperative for Britain to succeed in the conflict, 
success that came through conscription risked replicating the despised ‘Prussianism’ at 
home, which would negate any victory. An editorial in The Post of February 1916 
claimed that the spectre of Prussianism and militarism at home posed an even greater 
threat than that of military defeat.
6
 In an article entitled ‘The Duty of Labour’, Tom 
Quelch, son of SDF founder Harry Quelch, explicitly compared the struggle against 
conscription in Britain to the conflict in the trenches: 
 
Not only must we – the organised workers – do our duty to our comrades who have gone to the 
front by providing them with everything which is likely to add to their comfort or lessen their 
peril, but we must also do our duty to those who are not in the Army or Navy but are doing equally 
necessary and in many cases, equally hazardous work at home. Take the conscription menace for 
example. We can well understand men, obsessed with the problems and dangers confronting our 
comrades in France and Flanders – especially if they have relatives (and who has not?) amongst 
the those risking their lives in the trenches, being keen on seeing them receive as much support as 
possible, and on that account ready to lend a willing ear to the specious pleas of the 
conscriptionists. But that should not blind them to what conscription really means.7 
 
 Given the absolute and near unanimous nature of the objections to conscription, 
one might wonder how it was introduced without serious upheaval. As with jingoism 
and anti-German sentiment, the progress of the war itself served to change attitudes, as 
this letter to The Co-operative News indicates: 
 
I am an anti-militarist, and, ipso-facto, opposed to war. But many preconceived notions and 
cherished ideas have been shattered by this terrible war, not the least of which was the opinion 
held by hundreds of thousands that a great war was impossible. Now the seemingly impossible has 
happened, peace-lovers are in a quandary…Much as I am opposed to militarism, I would prefer 
honest, straightforward conscription to the insidious private attempts to that end; I mean the 
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prevalent practice of threatening discharge as an alternative to enlistment…If the evil of 
conscription is necessary, then let us have it fairly and squarely, so that the youth of the upper 
classes are forced as much as the youth of the poorer. Let us hold the balance evenly. Finally, if 
conscription come (and it well may), we of the co-operative body, as well as all democrats, will 
have to be very vigilant lest we be enslaved by the militarists…I sincerely hope that conscription 
will not be necessary; but every thoughtful person knows that if our military governors brought it 
forward as essential, it would pass at the present time.8 
 
As with so much else, the war had transformed attitudes and ideas which were once the 
preserve of minorities into articles of faith for much of the population. An editorial in 
The Co-operative News of July 1916 noted: ‘Before war was declared men who 
advocated conscription were almost hated. The tables have now been completely turned: 
the enemies of the country are those who actually oppose conscription, or who even 
calmly and coolly criticize it.’9 Certainly there was a shift in public opinion in favour of 
compulsion; it was not something imposed on an unwilling population by an autocratic 
government. Will Thorne of the SDF (who had been advocating military service from a 
Marxist perspective for some time) noted this point when he argued at a meeting of the 
TUC that ‘as there would have to be an election within six months of the end of the war, 
it would be the workers’ own fault if they returned a Parliament pledged to 
conscription’.10 On the conscription issue the mass of public opinion moved from 
opposition to support, and the British Left was forced to acknowledge this. 
 The main thrust of the conscriptionists’ argument was that it was a military 
necessity. Labour patriots countered by claiming that there was no shortage of willing 
manpower, but rather a lack of efficient organisation and utilisation of resources at the 
highest levels of government. Those in favour of conscription had to persuade a 
reluctant public – and an especially reluctant Left – that compulsion was indeed 
absolutely necessary if Britain were to avoid defeat. In this respect the Derby Scheme 
was presented as a litmus test of the feasibility of voluntarism. In the words of a 
Railway Review editorial, it was ‘the only effective way to defeat conscription’.11 If not 
enough men were willing to attest, then compulsion would have to be introduced. This 
is reflected in the editorial of The Co-operative News concerning the Derby Scheme: 
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9 ibid., 1 July 1916. 
10 ibid., 16 September 1916. 
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We believe that Lord Derby could easily recruit the required men if but the whole of the Press 
would give him their loyal support. Lord Derby himself believes in conscription, but he is a patriot 
first and a conscriptionist afterwards. We warn our conscriptionist friends that if they do not 
follow the lead of Lord Derby, if they do not do all in their power to make this new recruiting 
campaign a success, and if conscription is resorted to as a result, that upon them will rest the 
responsibility of dangerously splitting the country at a time when it is vitally important that it 
should be united. We contemplate that possibility with utmost alarm. Conscription might provoke 
a general strike, it might lead to a social revolution, which would mean that our soldiers would be 
used to suppress riots in our own country, instead of being sent away to fight Germans.12 
 
With the failure of the Derby Scheme to secure enough men, compulsion was proffered 
as the only available course of action; a pragmatic response to a real need which would 
not outlast the war nor represent a sea-change in British culture or ideology. It was this 
argument that Percy Redfern, a correspondent with The Co-operative News and later a 
historian of the Co-operative movement, warned against: ‘There is a belief, too, that this 
is a temporary measure of military necessity destined to end with the 
war…Conscription is not an ordinary political proposal. It is, even in its present limited 
form, a measure which marks a revolution in English political history.’13 By this point 
the more zealous of the labour patriots had been converted. Writing in The Clarion, 
Alex Thompson argued that: ‘We are all against Conscription. But necessity compels 
the temporary sacrifice of dogmas, as of other things. Wise men distinguish between 
that to which they aspire and that which immediate needs compel.’14 
In addition to the argument of necessity, another compelling factor in favour of 
conscription was the idea that it would be a fairer system, resulting in greater equality of 
sacrifice. While the upper- and middle-classes had actually volunteered for the military 
in proportionately greater numbers, there was a widespread feeling that certain sections 
of the population were holding back, and not being asked to sacrifice either their lives or 
their wealth. There is an old cliché regarding the ‘British sense of fair play’, but very 
little attention is paid to the  reverse effect of this ‘sense of fair play’; the idea that 
someone is not pulling their weight or contributing their fair share can send ordinarily 
tranquil people into apoplectic rage. (Adrian Gregory has described how ‘The feeling 
that someone, somewhere, but of course never oneself, was failing to sacrifice 
adequately was becoming widespread by 1917.’)15 Trevor Griffiths has an anecdote 
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relating to the 1921 coal strike which neatly encapsulates this. According to Griffiths, 
‘Poor Law authorities in Wigan and Leigh advanced loans to miners’ families. 
Following the settlement of the dispute, the Leigh guardians received a number of 
anonymous letters naming recipients of relief who were thought to be undeserving.’16 
No doubt community solidarity amongst unionised miners was high, but this mutuality 
could often reinforce the importance of shared commitment. The belief that everyone 
should pull their weight translated to military recruitment. As Bonnie White has noted 
in her analysis of recruitment in Devon, men justified their remaining at home by 
claiming that they would go ‘when the farmers’ sons go’, ‘when the Germans invade’, 
or ‘when compelled’.17 Thus conscription was advanced as a means of ensuring that 
everyone contributed to the war effort. As a letter to The Co-operative News had it: ‘By 
all means, let us introduce conscription; but let us make conscripts of those who have 
something to protect...Let us be done with the current system of volunteering, where we 
have to cajole and threaten our manhood to enlist to fight our battles, while we allow 
those parasites – the landlords, shippers, &c – to stay at home’.18 Similarly, a soldier 
serving at the Front argued in his letter to The Clarion: ‘I think [Blatchford] ought to 
advocate conscription. It would be the fairest way for everyone. There must be a lot of 
men who would be only too willing to join if they did not know that there are others 
who would hang back. When is our Government going to wake up?’19 
Many trade unionists and Labour activists felt that ‘shirking’ from one’s duty 
was comparable to betraying the labour cause; a railwayman writing to The Clarion 
claimed that he ‘would sooner blackleg my union than blackleg my country’.20 These 
sentiments were related by the ‘Special Commissioner’ of The Co-operative News. 
Writing in an article entitled ‘Our National Duty. Can we save ourselves from military 
or industrial conscription? Probably our last chance’, he related how: 
 
I met [a soldier] in Liverpool the other week, who had been wounded in Flanders, and 
was expecting to be sent back in the course of a day or two. “I should go back more 
willingly”, he said, “if I thought everybody else was doing his duty. It hurts us soldiers, 
after what we’ve seen out yon, and what we know is to be done, to see your streets still 
filled with young men who could be doing something!”21 
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After the passage of the first Military Service Act in January 1916, the focus of 
opposition to compulsion shifted: military compulsion may have been conceded as a 
necessity for the survival of the nation, but industrial compulsion could only be 
intended as a means of shackling labour, and must be resisted at all costs. In April 1916 
the Labour party’s Executive announced that: ‘This meeting of the Labour Party, whilst 
anxious to co-operate with the Government in all matters of military necessity, cannot 
with the information at present in its possession agree to any extension of the principle 
of compulsion’. A committee was set up to investigate any instances of industrial 
compulsion, consisting of George Wardle, Charles Duncan and Stephen Walsh.
22
 These 
fears were aptly conveyed by a cartoon in the Railway Review, which depicted a robust-
looking working man, an emaciated businessman with a Union Jack in his lapel, and a 
cross-shaped torture rack marked ‘Industrial Compulsion’. The caption has the worker 
asserting to the businessman: ‘I will willingly put on khaki if necessary to save my 
country, but I’ll never place myself in your power by taking that on’23 (see Fig. 3.1). 
This cartoon highlighted the reluctant acquiescence of the proud, patriotic working class 
to conscription as a means to avert military disaster, coupled with a determination that 
further liberties should not be taken with hard-won trade union freedoms by 
unscrupulous employers utilising patriotism to further their own interests. These fears 
remained for the rest of the war, and were only assuaged a little by the promise of Sir 
Auckland Geddes in October 1917 that there would be no industrial compulsion during 
the war.
24
 
One factor which may have worked to persuade the Left to accept compulsion 
was the very muted response when it became a reality. Writing in The Clarion in 
August 1915, the socialist economist R.B. Suthers predicted great strife if conscription 
was introduced;
25
 after Parliament had decided in favour of conscription by a great 
majority, and the TUC reiterated its opposition by a similar majority, The Co-operative 
News hoped that there would be no revolutionary action by labour.
26
 An editorial of the 
Railway Review carried a similarly apprehensive tone: ‘We venture to say that any 
attempt to fasten conscription of one kind or another to the workers of this country will 
have to reckon with forces which are powerful enough to defeat it, and that any such 
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attempt will be met with a stubbornness born of indomitable will.’27 In the spring of 
1916, as attested men who were married or in starred occupations began to be called up 
ahead of single men who had not attested, the editor of The Post made the usual dire 
predictions of serious discord.
28
 Yet the predicted mass protests against conscription 
never materialised: by January 1916 the bulk of public opinion had become convinced 
of the necessity of compulsion, and although the Non-Conscription Fellowship was 
formed to agitate for the repeal of the Military Service Act, the anti-conscriptionist Left 
was forced to accept this. Even leaders of the Engineers, such as the President Robert 
Young and the General Secretary Robert Brownlie had ‘evolved’ over conscription by 
the end of 1915; perhaps through calculating that sustained opposition would be 
impossible and counter-productive; perhaps through reckoning that the ASE’s protected 
status would spare their men from the Forces. Nonetheless it was the ASE – particularly 
at a shop floor level – which organised the most serious wartime strikes which 
periodically ignited from 1915 onwards, and it is to these disputes that we now turn.  
 
Wartime Strikes, 1915-1918 
 
Although the outbreak of war served to halt the near continuous waves of industrial 
strife that had characterised the years immediately preceding 1914, rapid price increases 
forced many workers to break the official industrial truce and go out on strike. The first 
high-profile strike of the war occurred in South Wales in May 1915, with the South 
Wales Miners Federation looking to force coal owners to concede wage increases 
commensurate with the rise in the cost of living. Predictably, the miners were vilified in 
much of the press, and with the Navy dependent on coal to stave off invasion, thousands 
of soldiers dead, and price increases being felt across the country, there was very little 
sympathy for their cause amongst the public. Yet this strike was not the result of any 
absence of patriotism, but of the impossibility of paying rent and food bills in 1915 on 
pre-war wages. At a crisis conference held in June 1915, Asquith conceded to miners’ 
leader Bob Smillie that ‘the miners are very patriotic men. They are one of the most 
patriotic people in the country’. ‘Yes’, responded Smillie, ‘but they cannot live without 
wages’.29  
One of the most important episodes in community agitation and unrest during 
the war was the Glasgow Rent Strike. Sparked in November 1915 by incessant 
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increases in the cost of living - in Govan and Fairfield rent had increased by between 
twelve and twenty-three per cent from July to October 1915 – up to twenty thousand 
tenants were refusing to pay rent by the end of the month.
30
 Given the mass-support and 
community solidarity evident in the rent strike, in addition to its coincidence with the 
engineers’ strike and the Clyde Workers’ Committee, it has often been cited as an 
example of radical anti-war agitation. Yet banners from the strike bore slogans such as 
‘Government Must Protect Our Homes from Germans & Landlords’, and ‘Our 
Husbands, Sons and Brothers are fighting the Prussians of Germany We are fighting the 
Prussians of Partick only alternative MUNICIPAL HOUSING’, so in Glasgow during 
the rent strike we can still see the synthesis of anti-Germanism and demand for social 
and economic reform that characterised much of the Left in this period.
31
  
The industry subject to the greatest amount of turmoil was civil and military 
engineering. A combination of exemption from conscription, indispensability to the war 
effort, soaring living costs and conflict between union officials and shop-floor workers 
ensured that the engineering sector remained volatile for the majority of the war. Yet the 
nature of engineering strikes varied according to time and location. The Glasgow strikes 
have attracted perhaps the greatest amount of scholarly debate due to the divisions 
between the men on the shop floor and the hierarchy of the ASE, yet it is debatable how 
far these strikers were representative of the wider community. The Glasgow engineers 
first walked out en masse in February 1915, demanding an extra two pence per hour in 
wages. This was expressly against the wishes of the ASE leadership, who promptly cut 
strike pay for the Clydeside men.
32
 The friction between the position of the ASE 
executive – which stressed the primacy of the war effort – and rising militarism on the 
ground produced the Clyde Workers’ Committee in October of 1915. Between then and 
April 1916, two to three hundred delegates – representing minority militant groups 
rather than the established workshop organisation - met every weekend in Glasgow.
33
 
Some have seen in this the seeds of a radical, revolutionary defeatist policy, but leader 
David Kirkwood was, by the winter of 1915-6 at least, a bitter opponent of the 
revolutionary anti-war movement.
34
 Similarly, far from impeding munitions production, 
the Glasgow socialist paper Forward refused to mention the strikes until they were 
concluded - although this was probably to avoid any chance of prosecution.   
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The source of discontent in Glasgow lay in a combination of unbearable 
pressures on the cost of living, a sense of betrayal by the union executives, and a fear of 
being ‘combed out’ into the services. Although this made for a volatile atmosphere in 
the engineering shops of the Clyde, it was isolated from the wider community and did 
not spread across the whole of Glasgow. One of the reasons for this was that dilution 
was specifically a problem of skilled engineers, and given the craft-consciousness of the 
Clydesiders, unskilled men and craft men from other industries were unlikely to 
sympathise with them. Further, Iain McLean has argued that the strikers were inspired 
more by religious than Marxist rhetoric; steeped in the tradition of Protestant 
Covenanters, the sectarianism of the revolutionaries isolated them as much as their craft 
status: one-fifth of Scotland was Catholic at the time, yet apart from Harry McShane 
and John Wheatley, none of the Clydesiders were.
35
 Indeed, David Kirkwood later 
described himself and fellow Clydesiders as ‘Puritans’, noting that ‘We were all 
abstainers. Most of us did not smoke’.36 Finally, the industry, craft, and religious 
isolation were compounded by a hesitancy to follow leaders from industrial to political 
action. This resulted in a fragmented response to dilution, which along with a wave of 
deportations undermined the unity and efficacy of the strikers, and James Hinton’s 
ultimate verdict was that the Committee was a general failure.
37
 Similarly, McLean 
described a diminution of revolutionary fervour through successive meetings of the 
Glasgow Trades Council after March 1916: ‘In 1916, as later in 1919, the government 
and the revolutionaries were united in seeing far more revolutionary potential than 
actually existed.’38 
After the subsidence of the Glasgow agitation, there was a six-day strike of 
seven thousand engineers at Barrow at the end of June 1916 over dilution, but this was 
relatively swiftly resolved, before a major incident in Sheffield threatened once again to 
launch unofficial strikes with the potential of destabilising the war effort.
39
 Leonard 
Hargreaves was a fitter at Vickers who had been conscripted into the Army with the 
connivance of the company, who viewed him as a firebrand and agitator.
40
 In response, 
twelve thousand ASE men came out on 16 November and eventually won reinstatement 
for Hargreaves. Crucially in Sheffield the less-skilled men were better organised, and 
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co-operation and co-ordination across craft and industry lines were possible.
41
 A similar 
strike was threatened at Barrow in February 1917, and on the sixth day of the seven day 
ultimatum the man was released from the Army and returned to work.
42
 During the 
Hargreaves strike the government drew up the Trade Cards Scheme, giving exemption 
from military service to craft union members engaged on munitions work, although it 
excluded workers outside of craft unions no matter how skilled. This came into effect in 
February 1917, but by April of that year the government wanted yet again to revise the 
rules concerning exemption, and introduced a Schedule of Protected Occupations. On 5 
May the unions extracted an agreement that no skilled men would be taken before 
dilutees of military age were called up; and hence they accepted the Schedule.
43
 Yet no 
sooner had agreement been reached in May 1917 then the largest wave of strikes of the 
war began in Manchester: over two hundred thousand engineers were out for over three 
weeks; one and a half million working days were lost, and over forty-eight towns were 
involved at some point.
44
 In many ways the unrest which sporadically gripped 
engineering throughout the war reflected a struggle between the leadership of the union 
and local activists on the ground. During the most serious strikes of May 1917 former 
ASE General Secretary George Barnes – now a cabinet minister – urged the union 
leadership to recognise and work with shop committees, but the executive of the ASE 
refused to do this throughout 1917.
45
 
 The government took steps to win over the more militant workers in skilled, 
protected occupations such as mining and engineering: by 1918, three hundred such 
people were sent on trips to the Front to see how fellow workers lived and suffered and 
thus encourage the men back home to accept their lot. Yet attempts by the government 
to incubate patriotism were largely unnecessary; the speed with which all industrial 
strife ceased during the German advance of the spring of 1918 demonstrated the 
priorities of workers: low pay, dangerous conditions and poor living standards could all 
be tolerated – indeed they represented the only life many had known - but the idea of 
Britain actually being defeated in the conflict was both literally and metaphorically 
unthinkable for most of the working class. As Brock Millman has accurately observed: 
‘If the government feared that domestic enemies would seek to exploit foreign defeats, 
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they profoundly underrated the residual loyalty of even the most intransigent 
dissenters.’46 
The nature of war time strikes were adroitly summarised by an editorial in The Co-
operative News from May 1917, at the height of the nationwide engineers’ strike, which 
also served as a fair representation of the attitude of most of the Left to these disputes:  
 
There was no item of news in last Sunday’s papers that brought a greater feeling of relief all over 
the country than that the Engineers’ Strike was practically settled…On the whole, the workers of 
this country have responded magnificently to the imperative need of unity. They have sacrificed 
hard-earned privileges; they have postponed a settlement of many wrongs. They have given of 
their life’s blood on the field of battle; they have worked early and worked late in supplying those 
munitions of war so necessary for the defeat of the enemy. Before conscription came, they rallied 
to the colours by the million; and since conscription came they have waived their repugnance to 
military compulsion for the good of the common cause. They have patiently borne with rising 
prices in the face of indisputable evidence of profiteering, and have postponed the day of 
settlement with the profiteers. Unfortunately, the record of the governing classes has not been 
nearly so praiseworthy.47 
 
Such labour disputes as occurred during the war were not due to want of patriotism, 
much less deliberate attempts at destabilising the war effort, but rather pragmatic 
attempts to improve pay and conditions. Perhaps the best overall summation of the 
attitudes of the unionised working class towards the war is found in the remarks made to 
literary critic, Walter Raleigh. Looking to ascertain the opinion of people in Lancashire 
and Yorkshire towards the war, he was told that ‘They mean to win it, and they mean to 
make as much money out of it as ever they can.’48 
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Fig. 3.1 ‘Industrial Compulsion’, Railway Review, 5 
May 1916. 
Fig. 3.2 ‘The Guns are Coming to Bradford’, Bradford 
Pioneer, 8 November 1918. 
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Fig. 3.4 ‘St. George’s Flag Day’, Bradford Pioneer, 5 May 
1916. 
Fig. 3.3 ‘City of Bradford Co-operative Society Advertisement’, 
Bradford Pioneer, 3 December 1914. 
Fig. 3.5 ‘Lifeboat Flag Day’, Bradford Pioneer, 4 August 1916. 
Fig. 3.6 ‘Wanted for Royal Garrison Artillery’, 
Bradford Pioneer, 1 October 1915. 
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The Anti-War Movement, 1916-1918 
 
Dissent from the labour patriot viewpoint was rare, especially in the first two years of 
the war, and generally took one of two forms. The minority dissenting tradition was that 
of orthodox Marxists such as the Plebs’ League who, unlike most of the SDF and the 
Justice group, remained bewildered by mass enthusiasm for the war and positioned 
themselves in principled opposition to the conflict. To say that this position did not 
command a mass support is an understatement. Writing on ‘The European Crisis’ in 
Plebs - the organ of the Plebs’ League - a commentator expressed his astonishment that 
‘The arch anti-militarist, Hervé, asked for a gun, and other pacifists of eminence have 
actually shouldered one. In England, the Liberal Cabinet has received the backing of the 
Labour Party. What strange force is at work which thus makes friends of enemies and 
enemies of friends?’49 While the Plebs’ League members were shocked and dispirited 
by the mass support for the war and the upsurge in popular patriotism which followed, 
they made no attempts to deny the strength of patriotic feeling; they felt it was irrational 
and absurd, but nonetheless very real. A letter to Plebs from James Millar – who still 
ran the organisation when in his nineties during the 1970s - in February 1915 elucidated 
this dilemma: ‘If we believe that war, at the bottom, is a struggle between two groups of 
Capitalists for a market that threatens to become too small for both, how can we take 
part in the bloodshed? It has been argued, on the other hand, that if we Socialists do not 
identify ourselves with the working-classes in this war we can hardly hope to win their 
confidence.’50 This newspaper carried occasional messages of support for its dissenting 
stance, sometimes from men serving in the trenches, as in October 1916: ‘Just received 
Plebs – the best yet! It’s like a ray of sunshine to a man out here – only more 
dependable, as it comes more regularly…Enjoyed the jab at the Clarion Royal Family. 
Why don’t they bury themselves – they’ve been dead long enough?’51 Yet these 
exceptions proved the rule of mass support for the war as much amongst the grassroots 
of the labour movement as among the working class more generally.  
 The majority strand of opposition to the war centred on the Union for 
Democratic Control (UDC). Created immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities on 4 
August 1914, Arthur Henderson joined its committee in November 1914, and only 
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resigned his post when included in Asquith’s coalition cabinet in May 1915.52 While the 
Marxists of the Plebs’ League were aware of mass support for the war, even as they 
were confounded by it, the same cannot be said of the intellectuals of the UDC. Writing 
to Arthur Ponsonby in May 1915, Charles Trevelyan – a Liberal MP soon to defect to 
Labour - demonstrated his misjudgement of popular sentiment in Britain and France 
when he claimed that ‘Germany cannot suffer complete defeat, short of a four or five 
years’ war, and…none of the allied peoples will stand that’.53 Nonetheless the Union 
did proceed cautiously in the early years of the war, and tried ‘to demonstrate to the 
working class that they were not trying to hamper the war effort’, despite their 
opposition to the conflict.
54
 Marvin Swartz has claimed that the Union ‘bridged a gap 
between rich Liberal Quakers and the socialist Independent Labour party that on 
domestic issues alone might have remained unbridgeable’.55 While it is fair to see the 
UDC as a vital link between disillusioned Liberals and the Labour party (and this 
connection will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4), the extent to which it acted as 
an ideological connection between pacifist Liberals and ordinary Labour activists is 
highly questionable. For an example, an ex-councillor in West Ham stated that he had 
‘no confidence in the middle-class peace men’, and that they would turn their backs on 
the Labour movement as soon as it had served its purpose. Soon after this the West Ham 
trade council disaffiliated from the UDC, and according to Swartz himself, this 
suspicion was representative of trade union opinion in general.
56
  
A year into the conflict, as opposition to the war lost some of the treasonous 
associations it had earlier held, membership swelled from fifty affiliated organisations 
in June 1915 to 107 in November of that year, with a theoretical membership of over 
three hundred thousand. By the end of the war, the Union could boast of three hundred 
affiliated bodies and a membership of 650,000.
57
 It acted as a link between the anti-war 
sections of the ILP, who were strongest in the towns of West Yorkshire, East 
Lancashire, South Wales and Scotland that had a radical, dissenting culture and a high 
degree of religious Nonconformity, and among the metropolitan radicals and 
intellectuals of London.
58
 As it had more of a broad base and considerably greater 
support than those opposing the war from an orthodox Marxist perspective, it was able 
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to exercise greater influence on the mainstream of the Labour movement. In 1917 
Henderson expressed ‘full sympathy’ with the four main points of the Constitution of 
the Union, and six out of the seventeen members elected to the Labour party’s 
Executive Committee in January 1917 had been members of the UDC at some point.
59
 
Yet the momentum which eventually developed behind organisations such as the UDC 
should not obscure the fact that they were very much minority positions, both within the 
population generally and within the British Left, especially at the grassroots level. 
Perhaps a high-point for the anti-war movement was the ILP conference at Leeds in 
1917. Resolutions were passed calling for an end to the war and for the formation of 
workers’ and soldiers’ councils along Russian lines. Yet Ben Tillett’s assessment that 
the convention ‘did not represent working class opinion and was rigged by a middle 
class element more mischievous than important’ is accurate, if a little parano id.60 The 
fact that the 1918 election swept members of the UDC from the House of Commons 
(although many returned within a few years, with several featuring in the first Labour 
government), suggests that even by the end of the war the Union commanded very little 
mass support.  
 There is a great deal of evidence to support the allegation that the Labour 
movement was merely the means to an end for some of the radical intellectuals of the 
UDC. As Swartz noted: ‘Although he thought it possible within a few years to 
nationalize land, coal mines, and railways, Morel in the summer of 1916 did not 
consider socialism (with which he identified the Labour party) to be a viable political 
force.’61 Furthermore, in July 1917 Morel attacked the ‘fatuous tradition [of British 
Labour] which insists that its political representatives must not be men of education, but 
men who have actually served their time in factory or workshop, mine or mill’.62 One 
cannot avoid the impression that for men like Morel the working class were an 
obstinate, ignorant mass unaware of their own best interests, and who prevented the 
elevation of men of education (such as himself) to their deserved prominence. It is 
notable how few of the Liberals and intellectuals who joined the UDC had a history of 
concern for the well-being of the British working classes, and so it remained during the 
war; the Labour movement was ultimately merely a vehicle through which to pursue 
their pacifistic aims. They were pacifists first, and their interest in social reform was 
only incidental. Whatever one may think of the excessive jingoism of some of the 
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Labour patriots, the same accusation cannot be levelled against them. One may argue – 
and with some justification – that the more extreme Labour patriots provided, in 
embryo, the combination of economic populism, cultural and racial exceptionalism and 
reverence of the state that was to take root in Italy and Germany with such devastating 
consequences, yet their patriotism was always an aspect of their genuine concern for the 
betterment of the British people. Not only were the anti-patriots disingenuous; their 
beliefs relating to the impact of the war were fundamentally mistaken. Morel had 
claimed that ‘the politicians are preparing a worse world for our children than the one 
they were born into’, but the reality was that a child born in the 1920s could expect a 
greater standard of living than a child born in the 1900s (similarly, and even more 
counter-intuitively, a child born in the 1950s would enjoy a more prosperous lifestyle 
than one born in the 1930s).
63
 Not only did labour patriotism ensure that the Labour 
party was not toxified in the eyes of the working class; labour participation in the war 
laid the foundations for a world unimaginable in the 1900s (as discussed in Chapter 5). 
Even on the pacifistic hard-Left, the advent of war precipitated a moral dilemma 
which was to cut through groups such as the ILP. Writing in the Bradford Pioneer – a 
newspaper later to become a staunch opponent of the conflict, based in a city associated 
with anti-war radicalism – shortly after the declaration of hostilities, local activist Jessie 
Cockerline outlined her personal conundrum: ‘Speaking as a Socialist and, more than 
that, as a women, I sincerely and honestly affirm that I hate and detest war. I realize 
only too well that we women will in so many cases have our fathers, husbands, brothers, 
sons and lovers taken away from us.’ After emphasising that she had no prior quarrel 
with Germany, she continued:  
 
But the time for philosophical utterances has gone and it has been decreed by those in whom the 
European nations entrusted the power that was must ensure…We must realize, however much we 
may declaim against our Government, yet it is better than that which a continental despotism 
would inflict upon us as a vanquished nation. 
Germany has too long held the role of an armed bully and we re-echo the words of a leader in a 
great German newspaper, “Better an end with terror than terror without end”. Comrades, the 
German boast is to be put to the test and now that Great Britain, deplorable as we all admit it to be, 
is drawn into the conflict then may we each of us firmly do our duty, great or small, for what is to 
each of us “My country, right or wrong”.64 
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Although he had resigned the Labour party leadership over the war, in August 1914 
even Ramsay MacDonald echoed the sentiment that, once begun, the war had to be seen 
through.
65
 Also in that month Fred Jowett, fellow ILP luminary and later one of the 
leaders of the anti-war movement, told a crowd of five thousand spectators: ‘I want this 
country to win’, and called for the defeat of German militarism and militarism at home; 
the Pioneer reported that both statements were greeted with enthusiastic cheers.
66
 
Writing in the Glasgow ILP paper Forward under the pen name ‘Rob Roy’, Dr Sterling 
Robertson, a long time socialist activist in Scotland, criticised MacDonald and Hardie 
for not taking part in recruitment, despite their assurances that the war must be won and 
German militarism crushed: 
 
I am not going to stand aside and see [labour men taking part in recruitment] traduced because 
they face the facts, and don’t think, talk and act as if the Socialist States of Europe were in 
existence or could be had for the grasping…The working classes generally, even where they had 
the power, left it in the hands of War Lords, Capitalists and Diplomatists, and they are reaping the 
terrible fruits…It doesn’t help me to snipe at the present Government, supplied by the good sense 
of the British people, which I have had a free opportunity to influence and bring round to my point 
of view.67 
 
The military itself felt that the pages of the Bradford Pioneer could be a possible 
recruiting ground, placing an advert in the paper in October 1915 for men for the Royal 
Garrison Artillery. (See Fig. 3.6).
68
 The City of Bradford Co-operative Society also 
advertised that they were taking orders for cigars, cigarettes, tobacco and pipes for 
‘Boys at the Front’. (see Fig. 3.3).69 A large advert told of ‘St George’s Flag Day’ on 
Saturday 6
 
May, in aid of the ‘Lady Mayoress’ War Guild. War Hospital Supply Depot. 
Personal Comforts for Wounded Soldiers. All Proceeds go to the Benefit of our Sailors 
and Soldiers. Give Generously and Wear a Flag.’70 There was a further ‘Lifeboat Flag 
Day’ on 5 August,71 and a two column advertisement just before the Armistice appealed 
for funds for ‘Gun Week’: ‘The Guns are coming to Bradford on Monday. BE ready to 
give them a rousing welcome!...It is to THE GUNS that our advancing armies look, to 
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blast the way to Victory…Millions of pounds are needed to shatter the Hun defences’ 
(see Fig. 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5).
72
  
Even in the last months of the war, the government felt it was appropriate to 
advertise fund-raising drives such as Gun Week in one of the most pacifistic 
newspapers, in one of the most pacifistic towns in England – and these fund-raising 
drives were particularly successful, raising thousands of pounds. Adrian Gregory has 
said that the success of war loans and funding drives such as Tank Week ‘suggest[ed] 
an unseemly rush to secure excess profits rather than patriotism’, but while this may 
have been true for large investors, it is doubtful that working people investing a few 
shillings or pounds were primarily motivated by a return on their investments. John Hill, 
General Secretary of the Boilermakers, certainly felt that higher interest rates motivated 
large subscribers, but that his members had more honourable intentions: 
 
I never had greater pleasure than we had in offering a loan of £30,000, all of which has been 
accepted….The people who have lent money on this occasion have been lauded in the newspapers 
as patriots, but there is not much patriotism in investing in gilt-edged Government securities on a 
certain 4 per cent when most other investments are in a state of paralysis or collapse. In the 
circumstances, however, it was a duty, and in this, too, we have done our share.73 
 
Rather Gregory’s further point that ‘the strongest correlation between high subscription 
and any other variable [was] size of the urban centre and a distinct sense of civic 
identity’ is more salient for the working classes of towns such as Bradford.74 The 
success of funding drives in such places did not necessarily reflect patriotic fervour in 
the national sense, nor love of ‘King and Country’, but rather a local pride and 
patriotism that could be radical and progressive rather than reactionary and 
conservative. 
Hector Munro, a prominent Bradford ILPer went to France with an ambulance 
wagon at the outbreak, as did Alderman J.H. Palin. Jowett admitted that: ‘British victory 
over “Prussianism” had to be won and…he could not agree to a peace settlement which 
did not include the “restoration of Belgium to complete sovereignty”’; Alderman Arthur 
Taylor, an ASE leader and ‘doyen of the Halifax ILP’ claimed that the war had been 
inevitable and that England was the best of a ‘bloomin bad lot’. James Parker, ILP MP 
for Halifax, became a prominent patriot, and when pleading for more recruits claimed 
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that if the Germans won, the working class would have ‘everything to lose and nothing 
to gain’. Of the 461 young men in the Bradford ILP, by February 1916 113 were in the 
trenches, 118 were in training in England, six were in the Navy and 207 had attested 
under the Derby Scheme. By 1918 of 442 members eligible for service, 351 were 
serving while 48 were conscientious objectors or doing national war work.
75
 In London, 
prominent anti-war activist George Lansbury wrote in the revolutionary newspaper The 
Women’s Dreadnought in August 1915: ‘The women of the East End have sent their 
men to fight. Those of us who hate and detest war know that these men must be armed 
and fed, and while the war lasts we shall do our best to see that is done.’76 Similarly 
Fred Montague, London Organiser of the ILP, joined the Army, served in France and 
was commissioned in the Army education department. He would address recruitment 
meetings in his Lieutenant’s uniform and became the MP for West Islington between 
1923-1931 and 1935-1947.
77
 
 While this thesis concentrates on England, it is worth making reference to places 
such as Clydeside and certain parts of Wales where it is sometimes assumed that 
opposition to the war was greater than elsewhere in Britain. In his discussion of Welsh 
soldiers in the First World War, Gervase Phillips noted that 272, 924 men – or 21.52 per 
cent of the population – enlisted into the services, and that 145,205 of those – that is to 
say, over fifty per cent – were volunteers.78 Furthermore, Phillips claimed that there was 
no widespread opposition to conscription, and that a broad social mix served in the 
ranks.
79
 While there does seem to have been a disproportionate tendency for Anglicans 
to join up – there were only 9.1 per cent Anglican communicants in Wales pre-war, yet 
twenty-six per cent of his sample were Anglicans – there was no discrepancy between 
Welsh speakers and English speakers. ‘It would seem’, wrote Phillips, ‘that men in 
predominantly Welsh speaking counties were no less likely to enlist than in counties 
where the English language predominated’. Anecdotally this is supported by Robert 
Graves, then an officer in the Royal Welch Fusiliers, who recorded that from 1915 
onwards there was a flood of Welsh speakers into the regiment until both Welsh and 
non-Welsh speakers were equally represented.
80
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Dai Egan has argued that ‘the extent of the anti-war movement in South 
Wales…has so far been vastly underestimated by historians’, but even he conceded that 
it did not begin to grow until 1917.
81
 Furthermore, Egan uses the results of a SWMF 
ballot in November 1917 to authorise strike action should the government attempt to 
introduce a comb-out scheme to illustrate his point, but surely it undermines it. The 
results were 98,948 against striking if the government attempted a comb-out and 28,903 
for. Egan added: ‘Although no single District voted in favour of strike action, the vote 
was very close in the Western Aberdare and Merthyr Districts.’82 If a strike ballot to 
resist the combing-out of unionised miners in South Wales, after the Russian 
Revolution, after the horrors of the Somme and Passchendaele, and after years of 
intolerable rises in the cost of living could not succeed, then it begs the question as to in 
what context it might succeed. Egan’s statistics, far from strengthening the case for 
trade union opposition to the war, gives more evidence if it was needed that the majority 
of British workers meant to see the conflict through to the end. As Phillips concluded, 
the general population were convinced that this was Wales’ war: ‘The socialists’ 
antipathy to his employer, the non-conformist’s independence from the whims of the 
establishment were forgotten as the war was made their war, as their struggles were 
identified with the struggle against Germany.’83 
In Edinburgh, of the three Labour councillors for whom information exists, one 
was stridently pro-war, and the other two volunteered for the military, even though all 
three were members of the ILP.
84
 In Glasgow, only two of the nineteenth ILP 
councillors came out against the war, and J. O’Connor Kessack, a leading ILPer and 
vice-president of the Scottish Trade Union Congress, was killed in action. The three 
Scottish Labour MPs supported the war throughout, and none of them voted against the 
conscription bill.
85
 Meanwhile, of the Clyde strike leaders who stood for election in 
1918, only Neil Maclean in Govan was successful; John Wheatley lost in Shettleston by 
seventy-four votes to Admiral Adair, the work’s manager at Parkhead, who had stood as 
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a Coalition Unionist, and the only other success for the Left was George Barnes in the 
Gorbals, who was officially a Coalition Labour candidate.
86
 Iain McLean reckoned that 
Labour ‘wilted’ under the burden of its ‘pacifism’; James Stewart, the defeated 
candidate in St. Rollox admitted that his defeat was due to his opposition to war 
indemnities and a policy of expelling Germans from Britain – if this was the result in 
the West of Scotland, it is not hard to imagine the electoral consequences for Labour in 
1918 had it not supported the war.
87
 By way of contrast, the Aberdeen TUC had been 
resolutely pro-war, and Aberdeen North was one of the few Scottish seats won by 
Labour in 1918.
88
 
 
The Leeds and Stockholm Conferences 
 
The Leeds conference was convened by the ILP and the British Socialist Party 
(formerly the SDF/SDP and now divested of its patriotic wing) and held on 3 June 
1917. This hailed the Russian revolution and called for the establishment of workers’ 
and soldiers’ councils around the UK. To some this has served as an indicator of a break 
in the labour patriot consensus and a symbol of how the British labour movement had 
become radicalised by the war, yet this is serious misjudgement of Leeds and its 
significance. Firstly, elements within the ILP and BSP had been sceptical of the war for 
some time, and were not late converts to the pacifistic cause; secondly the conference 
represented only a minority of the labour movement, and the attempts to establish 
workers’ and soldiers’ soviets were an embarrassing failure. Ben Tillett justly claimed 
that the conference did not represent working-class opinion, whilst the Dockers’ 
Executive went further, claiming the conference was convened ‘at the instigation of 
moneyed and middle-class people whose mischievous exploitation of the labour 
movement is disruptive in character’.89 The Executive of the Labour party stated on 18 
July that it had ‘nothing to do’ with Leeds, and asked that no local organisation 
affiliated to the party should convene local conferences nor set up the proposed 
councils.
90
 The full National Soldiers’ and Workers’ Council finally met in the third 
week of October 1917 – almost five months after Leeds – and it was to be the last ever 
meeting.
91
 The Dockers’ Union Executive’s accusations were hyperbolic and unfair but 
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there is no doubting the divisive effect of the Russian Revolution on the Left; while the 
hard Left and the anti-war movement remained only a minority, there was an increasing 
concern that the anti-war pacifists could destabilise both the war effort and the progress 
of the British Left. The South Wales labour paper Llais Llafur, for example, warned 
Russia against the dangers of Leninism and in not continuing the prosecute the war; 
whilst a mob led by Charles Stanton – MP for Merthyr and Welsh miners’ leader – 
broke up a labour council in Cardiff formed in the aftermath of Leeds.
92
 The conference 
held at Swansea on 29 July faced a similarly vicious assault, with up to five hundred 
people in the mob.
93
 
 In the same year as the Leeds’ conference came the ill-fated attempt to convene 
a conference of the various socialist and labour parties of the combatant nations in 
Stockholm. On 9 May the Labour party Executive had voted against attendance at the 
mooted conference, and although he too was initially opposed, Henderson’s first-hand 
experience of the Russian revolution (he spent several months of the summer of 1917 in 
Petrograd; MacDonald was meant to accompany him on this trip but Seafarers’ Union 
sailors refused to sail with him on board) convinced him of the need to avoid further 
turmoil in Russia and keep that country in the war.
94
 He felt that Stockholm would 
clarify British war aims and thereby refute Bolshevik arguments about nature of the 
war.
95
 Thus he envisioned that Stockholm would strengthen the hand of the Provisional 
Government, keep the Russians fighting and the triple entente intact. The Labour party 
executive voted nine to four in favour of Henderson attending Stockholm, yet the 
government initially opposed a member of its War Cabinet attending the conference and 
intended to refuse him a passport. Henderson’s threatened resignation, however, 
persuaded the government to relent, and he was given approval to travel.
96
  
A special conference of the Labour party was scheduled to discuss the issue on 
10 August: the conference endorsed Stockholm, but some unions, in particular the 
Miners, argued that the delegation should be limited to twenty-four: eight from the 
Labour party; eight from the trade unions; and eight further selected by the conference. 
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Hildamarie Meynell has argued that the intention here was to limit the influence of the 
socialist societies, presumably as they were viewed as more inclined towards a lenient 
peace.
97
 According to Meynell it was this issue – minority representation – which 
dominated the Stockholm debate. The initial vote on 10 August was 1,846,000 to 
550,000 in favour; given the clash of interests of a member of the War Cabinet 
attending a peace conference while the war continued, Henderson resigned from the 
Cabinet the following day. In the meantime the largely Webb-penned Memorandum on 
War Aims was presented to the special conference on Stockholm, providing for the first 
time in codified form exactly what labour thought it was fighting for. The conference 
reconvened on 23 August, where the ILP pressed for separate representation in Sweden, 
in addition to the twenty-four argued for by the Miners. Bob Smillie offered a 
compromise: if the ILP dropped the separate representation issue, the MFGB would 
waive the bloc vote and allow its members to vote individually. Philip Snowden held 
out however and this deal came to nothing. Despite the loss of the Miners’ support, the 
second vote came out a narrow 1,234,000 to 1,231,000 in favour; a separate amendment 
proposed by the ILP to allow separate representation was defeated.
98
 The decline in 
support for Stockholm at the vote emboldened the government to yet again state its 
opposition and threaten to withhold passports, although this threat was never realised as 
the proposed Stockholm conference collapsed due to intractable divisions amongst the 
European labour movement. Rather than marking any great turning-point in the war, it 
should be viewed as an embarrassing distraction.  
As Trevor Wilson has argued: ‘The Labour debacle over Stockholm showed 
that, however well Henderson had assessed the situation in Russia, he had misjudged 
the temper of British workmen.’99 Yet despite the government’s attempts to foster 
division in labour ranks over Stockholm, the party did not divide over the issue: the 
Memorandum of War Aims received wide support and on 28 December 1917 Labour 
declared it would only continue to support the war if it was certain that it was being 
fought to make the world safe for democracy and if there was an end to secret 
diplomacy.
100
 Lloyd George spoke to the TUC on 5 January 1918, trying to convince 
the Congress that these pacifistic and internationalist aims were indeed what Britain was 
now fighting for, and three days later Woodrow Wilson gave his famous ‘Fourteen 
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Points’ speech to the US Congress, something which was seized on by the Labour press 
as embodying the very values for which the labour movement was fighting.
101
 
This chapter has attempted to further address the primary research question: if 
there was a patriotic labour majority during the First World War, what were the limits to 
this consensus? While vociferous anti-war movements existed, and did grow in size and 
reach after 1917, these were never more than minority movements. In a recent article on 
the anti-war movement in Manchester, Alison Ronan conceded that: 
 
Anti-war women, who were increasingly marginalised by their position, developed complex, albeit 
narrow, circles of friends within their overlapping groups of association…Many of the activist 
families were already marginalised by their socialist politics or non-conformist beliefs…became of 
this marginalization and isolation, friendship and association between activists became even more 
essential.102 
 
Historians such as Cyril Pearce and Karen Hunt have argued passionately of the need to 
appreciate local radicalism and strident opposition to the war in certain areas, and while 
knowledge of such groups enriches our understanding of labour history, they should not 
disguise the existence of a patriotic majority. Indeed, it is surely the atypical and 
distinctive nature of these groups which attract scholarly attention in the first place.  
While the agitation against conscription, shopfloor strikes and the anti-war 
movement may not have characterised the Left’s response to the war, these experiences 
were an important part of left-wing wartime experience, and these minority trends 
should not be discounted. The anti-war agitation did make an important contribution to 
the type of labour movement that emerged after 1918. As the fervent nationalism of the 
war years gave way to regret and recrimination, Labour was able to highlight war time 
dissent as evidence of its radical and progressive nature, in the same way its war record 
secured patriotic credentials. The next chapter will consider how Labour used its war 
record in the five years between the end of hostilities and the coming of the first Labour 
government. 
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CHANNEL 4: THE WAR AND RECRUITS TO LABOUR 
 
This chapter is concerned with the second research question of this thesis: how exactly 
did the war impact on Labour’s electoral fortunes after 1918? It begins with the post-
war influx of Liberals who felt that Labour was now the real home of the radical Liberal 
tradition, and will argue that, having proved its patriotism during the war, the party 
could show a more radical face over Ireland, India and disarmament. The second section 
will address the experiences of soldiers and ex-servicemen specifically, and argue that 
while the war did not create a long-term radicalisation of veterans, the labour movement 
made a concerted effort to appeal to soldiers, and many ex-servicemen moved towards 
labour after the war. The third and final section describes the most significant 
breakthrough for Labour, concentrating on the extent to which Labour made ‘cultural’ 
appeals to voters: as Englishmen and women, as Britons, as patriots, as Anglicans, as 
Catholics, and as individual people. This chapter will argue that support for the war was 
critical to the successes of Labour in the inter-war period. Not only did it prevent a 
Parliamentary annihilation in 1918, it secured patriotic credentials to counter-balance 
the influx of middle-class radicals; prevented a break with the trade unions; and 
facilitated Labour’s appeals to a working-class culture based on family, neighbourhood, 
pubs and patriotism. It will be argued here that this cultural appeal to the wider working 
class allowed Labour to win support from beyond both the heavily unionised skilled 
workers and the Nonconformist tradition which had hitherto provided most of its 
support, and that the experience of the war – and labour patriotism during that conflict – 
was essential to this cultural appeal. 
 
The Conversion of Liberal and Conservative Elites 
 
While many of those who fled the Liberals for Labour in the 1920s had become 
disillusioned with laissez-faire Liberalism due to the war, economic concerns can only 
partly explain post-war recruitment, and for many former Liberals moral prerogatives 
were the most important factor. In the words of Peter Clarke, many Liberals ‘changed 
allegiance not because they thought there was too little socialism in the Liberal party, 
but because they thought there was more liberalism in the Labour party’.1 As Duncan 
Tanner had it, Labour’s Memorandum on War Aims was ‘almost a [UDC] document, 
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and was supported by many radical Liberal moral reformers. Its views on Free Trade, 
Ireland, conscription, the treatment of alien immigrants, and on issues of liberty and 
freedom raised by press censorship, attracted many radical Liberals to the Labour 
party’.2 Significantly, this did not just occur at a national level but also in individual 
constituencies: while some Liberals continued to support the coalition, ‘Liberal moral 
reformists flocked to Labour in the Nonconformist strongholds’.3 While the UDC 
members and those associated with pacifistic Labourism were ejected from the House of 
Commons in the khaki election of 1918 – even some men who were instrumental to the 
successful completion of the war, such as Arthur Henderson, lost their seats – by 1922 
the ‘pacifists’ such as Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden had returned both to the 
Commons and the apex of the Labour party, with several former UDC members serving 
in the first Labour cabinet of 1924. Stuart Macintyre has described a ‘post-war influx of 
some leading critics of imperialism who all came from the middle-class and mostly 
from Liberal backgrounds’. Men such as J.A. Hobson, E.D. Morel, Arthur Ponsonby, 
Charles Trevelyan, Noel Buxton and Leonard Woolf all came to Labour via this route.
4
  
The UDC thus provided an essential gateway to Labour for many, yet it was labour 
patriotism during the war that ensured there was a Labour party left for them to join: 
had Labour opposed the war it would have been contaminated in the eyes of much of 
the working class, and the mooted formation of a separate, purely trade union party may 
have met with more success; as it was this proposal was rejected by the TUC of 
September 1916, by 3.8 million to 567,000 votes.
5
 
The securing of patriotic credentials and alignment with the nationalist values of 
the working class also provided a valuable counter-weight to accusations from the right 
of anti-British sympathies and revolutionary intent. As war triumphalism and anti-
Germanism gave way to weariness, regret and resentment, the party was well-placed to 
provide an ‘oppositional patriotism’. The reaction against the war within Labour was 
fierce. A special conference held in December 1921 on unemployment and the 
European crisis condemned the actions of the government since the Armistice in 
destroying Central European trade and causing subsequent distress in Britain, while a 
resolution was passed at the Brighton 1921 conference instructing the Executive to 
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strengthen links with the Second International.
6
 Speeches at the Labour party National 
Conference of 1922 called for the renegotiation of German reparation payments, 
condemned the use of force in foreign policy, and claimed that Labour ‘will appeal to 
the working-class to support them with all its means and strength in this struggle against 
armaments’.7 By 1923 non-intervention in Russia had become a central pillar of 
Labour’s foreign policy, and the same sentiment lay behind the Barrow Labour party 
and Trade Council putting forward the motion: ‘That the time is long overdue for a 
determined protest to be made by organised Labour, backed up by an industrial 
stoppage, in order to awaken the public conscience to the crimes committed by the 
British Government against subject races in the interests of the expansion of the Empire 
and for imperialistic and capitalistic ambitions’.8  
As Jon Lawrence has described in his article ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom’, 
Labour began to attack what it portrayed as ‘Prussianism at home’, such as the Amritsar 
Massacre and the Black and Tan outrages in Ireland, claiming that such incidents were 
harmful to the spirit and soul of Britain and shameful stains upon the nation.
9
 This 
clever positioning was designed to both curry favour with radical patriots and win over 
the increasingly important Irish vote; as Lawrence has claimed, ‘Labour’s reluctance to 
become involved in all-party campaigning over Ireland was no accident. Besides its 
determination to assert its independence, Labour rightly saw Ireland as an issue on 
which it could outbid the Liberals and thereby win over both traditional Radicals and 
the British Irish’.10 This radicalism was applied to elsewhere in the British Empire. A 
resolution adopted by a Joint Meeting of the General Council of the TUC and Executive 
of the Labour party in 1922 declared that: ‘The present policy of the Government in 
Egypt is producing in that country precisely the same effect as its similar policy did in 
Ireland’, while a further resolution adopted by the National Joint Council (representing 
the TUC, Labour Executive and the Parliamentary Labour party) warned that ‘the 
antagonisms now growing in India are disastrous to the future relations of the British 
and Indian peoples’. At the same time, it should be noted, the Council ‘deplor[ed] no 
less the action of the Non-Co-Operators in boycotting those Parliamentary institutions 
                                               
6 Report of the Twenty-First Annual Conference of the Labour Party. Curiously, while British labour was 
represented on the Executive of the International by the pacifistic internationalists Fred Jowett and Tom 
Shaw they were joined by ultra-patriot Ben Tillett.  
7 Report of the Twenty-First Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
8 Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the Labour Party: Resolutions. This is perhaps 
particularly significant as Barrow was a major centre for engineering and naval armaments. 
9 J. Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom: War, Violence, and Fear of Brutalization in Post-First 
World War Britain’, The Journal of Modern History 75 (2003): 572 and 577. 
10 Lawrence, ‘Forging a Peaceable Kingdom’, 585. 
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recently conferred upon India, by means of which grievances should be ventilated and 
wrongs redressed’.11 
The temper of the of the 1922 Labour conference – held in the context of the 
1921 miners’ lockout - with regards to militarism is best conveyed by a resolution put 
forward by R.C. Wallhead, ILP member and MP for Merthyr Boroughs: ‘That this 
Conference is of the opinion that the Socialist and Labour Parties of all nations should 
agree to oppose any War entered into by any Government, whatever the ostensible 
object of the war’. An amendment to this was put by Kirkcaldy MP and BSP member 
Tom Kennedy, to be inserted after ‘object to the war’: ‘but should be free to support any 
nation forced by armed aggression to defend its independence or its democratic 
institutions’.12 Kennedy claimed that he was ‘an anti-imperialist and detested war’, yet 
he regarded the motion as ‘wholly unnecessary, purely Utopian and purely a pacifist 
resolution’. Fellow BSP member Councillor W. Pitt seconded the amendment, and 
Silvertown MP Jack Jones spoke in favour. Jones claimed he was against the war in 
1914 and ‘had stood with Keir Hardie in Trafalgar Square to advocate peace’, yet: ‘The 
people who were supporting the resolution to-day believed in war. They had got a Red 
Army and they had invaded countries and told the people who did not believe in their 
policy that they had got to accept it at the point of the bayonet.’13 Despite the support 
for the amendment amongst ultra-patriots and some of the general unionists, it was 
overwhelmingly defeated 3,231,000 to 194,000, and the resolution was passed intact. 
Considering the unions controlled around ninety per cent of the conference votes, such a 
heavy defeat indicates that they endorsed the pacifistic turn. For middle-class radicals, 
such apparent unanimity helped assuage fears that the party was no more than the 
political arm of the unions, and that the unions themselves were unsympathetic to the 
aspirations which had caused Liberal recruits to defect. It was also this adoption of an 
internationalist foreign policy in the early 1920s led the formerly-Liberal newspaper 
The Nation to begin supporting Labour as the only real alternative to the Coalition and 
the true heir to Liberalism.
14
  
The prominent Liberal recruits to Labour during the 1920s were complemented 
by a group of former Conservatives, High Anglicans and various scions of the 
                                               
11 Report of the Twenty-First Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
12 ibid. The two-member constituency of Merthyr Tydfil was split into Aberdare and Merthyr Boroughs in 
1922; that the same area could elect two men as different as the pacifist Wallhead and ultra-patriot 
Charles Stanton demonstrates how shared socio-economic principles cut could across patriotic/pacifistic 
divides. 
13 ibid., Jack Jones had been elected as a National Socialist in Silvertown in 1918, but immediately took 
the Labour whip. 
14 Tanner, Political Change, 407. 
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Establishment. For Martin Pugh: ‘Those families who were dedicated to the idea of 
public service implicitly subscribed to a patriotic-collectivist ideology in the sense that 
they regarded the State as a relatively benign and positive vehicle for promoting the 
interests of the community as a whole.’15 As Godfrey Elton wrote in his Among Others: 
‘The principle of national control…had saved us from losing the war…the nation 
organised for war had been a nation organised for service…I saw no reason why, after 
the war, these inspiring characteristics should not be reproduced in a nation organised 
for peace.’16 A cynic might claim that these high-born recruits sensed an opportunity for 
advancement within a coming political force, yet given the wealth and success already 
enjoyed by most of the Tory converts this scepticism appears unwarranted. Indeed, 
many of the new recruits to Labour in the 1920s soon proved their value to the party: 
Oswald Mosley’s run in East Birmingham in 1924 was an important step in weakening 
Conservative control of the West Midlands, and Mosley came within a few votes of 
unseating Neville Chamberlain himself. Herbert Morrison, Hugh Dalton, and Mosley all 
held office in the 1929 government; Maurice Sankey proved to be one of the most left-
wing of the 1929-31 MacDonald ministry, while all three of Clement Attlee’s 
Chancellors – Dalton, Stafford Cripps and Hugh Gaitskell – were former Conservatives, 
with the first two recruited during this period. The Tory recruits of the 1920s thus 
provided not only financial assistance and policy expertise, particularly in foreign 
affairs, but more significantly: ‘By using middle- and upper-class converts Labour 
could extend its appeal into the more marginal seats where both Tory working-class and 
middle-class votes had to be won.’17  
The recruitment of former Liberals and Conservatives caused some resentment 
amongst the labour movement. The maverick Lib-Lab MP John Ward - who ended the 
First World War fighting against the Bolsheviks in Siberia - grew increasingly jingoistic 
and anti-socialist, eventually standing as an independent Constitutionalist in 1924. 
Lamenting this loss to Labour, W.A. Appleton, the Secretary of the GFTU, wrote to 
Ward: ‘I also regret that there is not sufficient generosity or comradeship in that Labour 
Party which gives shelter and support to the rejected noblemen, lawyers, doctors and 
petit bourgeoisie of the other parties, to leave you alone.’18 Yet clearly there was room 
in the labour movement for Ward, should he choose to stay there. Most of the fifty-
                                               
15 M. Pugh, ‘“Class Traitors”: Conservative Recruits to Labour, 1900 -30’, English Historical Review 133 
(1998): 55. 
16 Quoted in Pugh, ‘Class Traitors’, 56. 
17 ibid., 60. 
18 Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC), John Ward Papers, JW/4/15/1: Letter from W.A. 
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seven
19
 Labour MPs returned in 1918 were patriotic trade unionists, and the idea that 
the party was stolen from sensible and conservative union leaders like Ward by middle-
class liberals and socialists is clearly hyperbole. Indeed, Ward pays tribute to the variety 
of the party in his own memoirs. In ‘The Beginnings of my Parliamentary Career’, he 
noted that, before the war: 
 
Mr Outhwaite, and J.C. (now Colonel) Wedgewood belonged to the same group, though I could 
never make out what these two men held in common. Outhwaite was a denationalist and strongly 
anti-British, Wedgewood was a Nationalist and a patriot. Outhwaite hated the very sight of the 
Union Jack, Wedgewood marched and fought under it. Outhwaite’s mind was such a puny thing 
that it could not contain more than one idea at one time, Wedgewood’s mind was so facile that it 
could gather to its fold knowledge upon every conceivable subject under the sun, the only thing 
that seemed to bind them together was the sure and certain faith that the only cure for every ill in 
the world, from malaria to mumps, is the single tax.20 
 
Yet by 1918 both Josiah Wedgewood the patriot and Robert Outhwaite the pacifist had 
joined Labour. Not that this variety and heterogeneity was to Ward’s liking. Continuing 
in his critique of the post-war party, he wrote: 
 
Recently the Party threw open its doors to individual membership, and by so doing has provided a 
new channel into and along which the tide of the politically abnormal can flow… 
The Wee Free [Asquithian] Liberals will gradually discover that their power to attract the Single 
Taxer, the Food Reformer, the Prohibitionist, the Anti-Vaccinationist, and the “Anti-
Everythingist” has been lost. The Wee Free has a younger, more magnetic competitor in the field 
claiming the allegiance of the Singular and the Particular…  
The truth and force of this suggestion will be strengthened by only a casual reference to some of 
the men who used to stand as Liberal candidates, and have recently transferred their affections to 
Labour, such a perusal also proves, what I have often suspected, that a crank is not necessarily a 
fool.21  
 
Similarly, St Helen’s MP James Sexton had complained at the 1918 conference that the 
new constitution would let anyone in: ‘He would remind those who objected to the 
                                               
19 Fifty-seven official Labour MPs were elected in December 1918; in addition two ‘Independent Labour’ 
MPs were returned in Frank Herbert Rose at Aberdeen North and Owen Thomas at Anglesey. Alfred 
Edward Waterson became the first Co-operative Party MP after his election in Kettering, and he 
subsequently took the Labour whip. The labour patriot Jack Jones was elected for the National Socialist 
Party in Silvertown, four MPs stood as ‘Coalition Labour’; George Wardle, George Barnes, George 
Roberts and James Parker, and nine MPs were returned for the National Democratic and Labour Party, 
giving a total ‘Labour’ complement of seventy-four. 
20 JW/4/23/1: Manuscript for The Beginnings of my Parliamentary Career. 
21 ibid. 
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British Workers’ League that if anybody was responsible for its existence it was the 
cranks inside the Labour Party. Nothing had been said about the cranks inside the 
U.D.C. and the Council of Civil Liberties avowedly opposing the policy of the Labour 
Party.’22 Of course, individual membership was essential for Labour to move beyond 
the trade union base and become a truly national party, yet men such as Ward still felt 
that their movement was being adulterated. They believed that middle-class socialist 
recruits were culturally alien to working-class sensibilities; while the middle-class 
socialists believed men like Ward and other Lib-Labs lacked political conviction. In this 
respect we can see the significance of the war in providing a clean break from the 
politics of 1906: out went the old Lib-Labs of impeccable working-class credentials; in 
came often newly-minted socialists from various backgrounds. 
 This section has highlighted how labour patriotism during the war allowed for 
the movement of former Liberals – and some former Tories – towards Labour in the 
post-war era. Yet this has focussed almost entirely upon politicians and intellectuals and 
as such has examined only the experiences of elites. In the next sections we shall turn to 
Labour’s appeals to the masses during and after this period, beginning with an 
examination of the relationship between servicemen and the Left. 
 
Labour, Soldiers, and Ex-Servicemen 
 
The relationship between soldiers, ex-servicemen and the Left, the extent to which 
military personnel were ‘radicalised’ by the conflict and the changing perception of the 
soldier in British society generally and the labour movement in particular, has been the 
subject of some controversy. In June 1915, one of the soldiers’ letters which had 
become a frequent feature in The Clarion claimed that that the paper was missing an 
opportunity through lack of availability in barrack towns: ‘In Aldershot I had some 
trouble in obtaining The Clarion, and did not see a single newsagent with the bill 
displayed. Were it well-advertised I think it would have a very good sale.’23 Although 
there was no concerted effort by Blatchford and his team to specifically target troops, 
the apparent popularity of the newspaper amongst soldiers was a common theme in the 
letters sent from the trenches. Corporal R. Palmer of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers claimed 
The Clarion was immensely popular amongst his battalion; particularly interesting as it 
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was considered an elite unit.
24
 ‘Tommie’, writing in July 1915, assured Blatchford that 
‘Whenever it arrives the boys in my section make a rush to get a look at it’; Sapper J.G. 
Moir claimed it was ‘greedily read’ by everyone in his section and Private Fred Vesey 
confirmed that ‘you would be surprised at the way it is sought after by the other boys’.25 
Private A.E. Price of the 4
th
 Hussars suggested that there was a certain amount of 
circumspection amongst some of those who borrowed his copy: ‘I think it my duty to let 
you know’, he wrote ‘along with the other chaps who have written, of the beneficial 
results attained amongst the rest of the troops, who all come sneaking round for the first 
rub of The Clarion when it comes.’26 The impression generally given is that most troops 
had not heard of Blatchford or his paper, yet – despite occasional scepticism at a 
supposed ‘socialist’ tract – often found much to agree with: ‘The Clarion goes round the 
“bhoys”, and it is a study to watch a man who has never seen or heard of our paper 
before as he casually glances first and then gets stuck into it’, as one soldier attested.27  
Perhaps a more realistic – yet still encouraging – account of the paper’s reception 
amongst the troops was given by Private B. Solway: ‘I can assure you the paper is read 
till it is properly black. Old Robert is a great favourite with Tommy. There is always a 
lot of arguing over his comments’; an assertion echoed in an interview with a group of 
Glaswegian soldiers in August 1916, who spoke of the importance of The Clarion in 
barrack room debates and the arguments it had caused.
28
 One suspects that the 
combination of nationalism, populist leftism and a concerted effort to root the paper in 
working-class culture was agreeable to many; especially given Blatchford and The 
Clarion’s proud history of recruiting ordinary workers to the labour movement through 
cultural activities and a shared language. We cannot know the exact circulation of The 
Clarion in the trenches, nor the number of its new readers who agreed with what they 
read. Yet the very fact that a new audience was reading the paper meant that many were 
being exposed to concerted leftist arguments, couched in a language of family, 
patriotism, pub and soldierly camaraderie, and edited by a former soldier. For this alone 
The Clarion played an important role as a channel for soldiers into the labour 
movement, much as it had done for the wider population in the decades since its launch. 
One indication of communication between the Left and men in the services came from a 
letter from Middleton to A.N. Field, serving in the Navy: ‘I am sorry that our stuff has 
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25 ibid., 2 July 1915, 21 July 1916, 2 July 1915. 
26 ibid., 2 July 1915. 
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reached you in Party envelopes, and can quite appreciate the ragging you may have got 
from your comrades’, Middleton apologised, before continuing: ‘however, it will 
interest you, and probably them, to know that there is hardly a mail that reaches us now 
without enquiries for our literature, and particularly of our Reconstruction Policy, War 
Aims, etc., coming from men with the colours.’29 
The extent to which soldiers were radicalised during the conflict and imbued 
with a sense of class allegiance is contestable. David Englander has described how Petty 
Officers led seven hundred sailors through Liverpool to protest at demobilisation delays 
in 1919
30
 and claimed elsewhere that: ‘From reports compiled by Military Intelligence it 
was clear that class allegiance had not been transformed by the wearing of the King’s 
uniform.’31 Certainly there was a real fear of insurrection amongst some in the military 
establishment: as late as September 1920 Sir Henry Wilson wrote in his diary that there 
was ‘good cause for anxiety’, that Army and air force mechanics were ‘much in with the 
Unions’ and that ‘[Admiral of the Fleet David] Beatty has Soviets in every port’.32 
Andrew Rothstein, himself a soldier and militant during the last year of the war, argued 
that the mood of soldiers - who were notably more restrained in Armistice celebrations 
that civilians in Britain - grew steadily more mutinous from the cessation of hostilities.
33
 
The strike movement that characterised the demobilisation period was a truly 
‘subaltern’ agitation according to Rothstein, and began in spite of the best efforts of ‘the 
great majority of the trade union leaders and most Labour MPs’.34 Rothstein’s general 
thesis was that the strikes were instrumental in preventing large-scale British 
deployment in Russia - which seems a reasonable assertion – although he equivocated 
over whether sympathy for the Bolshevik cause lay behind this refusal to go to Russia. 
However, according to the material utilised in Rothstein’s book, political concerns 
barely featured in the demands elucidated by troops. Instead they directed their anger at 
more practical, every day concerns, such as red tape and bureaucracy, the quality of 
food, compulsory church attendance, lack of leave and the maintenance of discipline 
after the Armistice.
35
 William Gillman – East End activist and trade union official after 
the war - said he felt no objection to fitting guns for use against the Bolsheviks, it 
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30 D. Englander, ‘Jack, Tommy and Henry Dubb: The Armed Forces and the Working Class’, The 
Historical Journal 21 (1978): 614. 
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‘didn’t enter into it’ as far as he was concerned; he saw a clear distinction between the 
socialism he believed in and Russian Communism.
36
 
Striking naval ratings in Liverpool probably reflected the general sentiment 
when they simply demanded that the officers treat them as ‘men, not as children’.37 The 
near-constant risk of death, the mud, rats and discomforts of the trenches, the brutal 
discipline and field punishments were all tolerable for the duration of the war, but from 
the moment of the Armistice onwards, poor rations, boredom and patronising treatment 
became intolerable. In the words of Rothstein, ‘what the citizens in uniform wanted 
was, above all, to go home and get back to their jobs’,38 and it is in this context that we 
should understand the soldiers strikes during the demobilisation period, rather than as 
representations of military radicalism, or successful Leftist agitation.  
 Anger at bureaucracy and Army inefficiency also characterised Gloden Dallas 
and David Gill’s The Unknown Army. Speaking of the Etaples mutiny in September 
1917, they quoted the camp adjutant as claiming that the ‘“chief cause of discontent” 
was the fact that men who had already done much service at the front had to undergo 
“the same strenuous training as the drafts of recruits arriving from home”’.39 Similarly, 
at Le Havre, the mutineers ‘tore down a large label: “For officers only”, which was 
posted above a comfortable waiting room. I mention this as it typifies one of the many 
causes of the trouble – the bitter resentment felt at the easy conditions of the officers as 
compared with those of the men’.40 All manner of indignities were accepted whilst at 
the Front, but they soon became seen as unacceptable when in the rear, and demands for 
leave passes to London and extensions of canteen opening hours featured prominently 
amongst the troops’ demands.41 Dallas and Gill described ‘the tensions which resulted 
when a nineteenth century discipline pressed down on several million working men’, 
and it appears that it was these tensions between individuals and state bureaucracy, 
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rather than general anti-war sentiment or political militancy, which powered the post-
war mutinies.
42
 
 Michael Paris has noted how, unlike earlier conflicts, the First World War 
offered little opportunity for individual initiative or heroism; troops were merely single 
units in a great mass of men; cogs in a massive bureaucratic machine.
43
 For some men 
this will have reflected their pre-war lifestyle, with the trenches substituted for the 
factory or mill. Yet for others the subordination and lack of autonomy, the sacrifices 
and hardship for little reward and the lack of means for redress of grievance will have 
been novel experiences. To what extent did the shared experiences of trench life, 
coupled with post-war resentment and disillusionment, lead former soldiers towards the 
Left? Two years after the fighting ceased, war correspondent Philip Gibbs argued that 
‘many men who came alive out of that conflict were changed and vowed not to tolerate 
a system of thought which had led to such a monstrous massacre of human beings who 
prayed to God [and] loved the same jobs of life’.44 Further, Susan Pedersen has claimed 
that it was not merely ex-servicemen themselves who were indelibly changed by the 
war: ‘Soldiers’ wives’, she argued in an 1990 article, ‘learned to intervene in the public 
sphere in their own interest: they responded angrily to charges of drunkenness, lobbied 
Labour organizations for increased rates, and kept up a constant stream of letters to their 
MPs.’45 Many of the letters of ordinary women to Labour figures and the WNC are 
discussed in the next chapter.   
 One of the most important organised manifestations of soldiers’ discontent was 
the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Soldiers and Sailors (the Fed). 
Only allowing officers to join if they had been promoted from the ranks, members of 
the Federation would physically break-up right-wing meetings in Norfolk and South 
Wales, and acted as a conduit for soldiers towards civilian unions such as NALRU, the 
NUR and the Workers’ Union; Jack Beard, President of the Workers’ Union, was 
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prominently involved with the Fed, and wore his old volunteer uniform to meetings.
46
 
Nonetheless the political orientation of the Fed did vary across the country; in some 
areas they worked with the state against aliens and pacifists, and could be hostile 
towards strikers.
47
 More radical than the Federation was the National Union of Ex-
Servicemen (NUX). Formed in May 1919 by Federation members looking to organise 
ex-soldiers within the labour movement, it eventually constituted over one hundred 
branches. The NUX flirted with continental socialists and the Third International, but 
affiliated to the Labour party by 1920.
48
 Despite the initial enthusiasm for ex-
servicemen’s organisations in the immediate post-war period, much like the extreme 
patriotic labour groups such as the British Workers’ League/National Democratic Party, 
these bodies did not translate enthusiasm into solid electoral success. The ex-
servicemen’s organisations nominated twenty-nine candidates in 1918, but only one was 
elected, and within a few years of the Armistice radical soldiers’ groups had lost their 
significance.
49
  
The relative quiescence of British veterans compared to their equivalents not just 
in defeated countries such as Germany, but also in ostensibly victorious nations such as 
Italy and France, puzzled both contemporary observers and later historians. Although 
Lloyd George , after initially handling demobilisation poorly, grew fearful of unrest and 
introduced a large-scale pension scheme, with 1.7 million disability pensions awarded 
by 1921, for all the rhetoric a land fit for heroes failed to emerge, and the recession of 
the early 1920s left many soldiers in penury.
50
 Why, as Derek Cohen asked, ‘did 
German veterans become alienated from a state that provided them with generous 
benefits, while their British counterparts – despite the neglect of successive 
governments – bolstered the established order?’51 Cohen’s answer was a combination of 
the innate conservatism of many soldiers (‘Most men wanted a steady job and a secure 
home life, not a revolution in the East End’), the success of the British Legion – which 
grew from eighteen thousand members in 1921 to over three hundred thousand in the 
early 1930s - and the pronounced public gratitude, which ‘shielded the state’ from ex-
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soldiers’ resentment.52 Peter Reese has depicted a more cynical and passive reaction to 
the war, noting that even at its height the British Legion numbered merely a fraction of 
the millions who enlisted, and that it was never seen as a ‘great military Trade Union 
which could force Governments to give them special help. They had been given the 
initial privilege and subsequent curse of the British fighting man, and, although service 
charities might help, they each had to endure their fight’.53 In short, although the 
experience of war had served to anger and alienate many hundreds of thousands of men, 
they were ‘not angry enough at their fellow citizens to court the unrest that bayonets 
brought’; they were discontented and disillusioned, but not enough to want to bring 
down the state.
54
  
Looking back on the lack of widespread revolutionary arbour among his old 
comrades, former Private C.A. Turner confided to Martin Middlebrook:  
 
One universal question which I have never seen answered: two or three million pounds a day for 
the 1914-18 war, yet no monies were forthcoming to put industry on its feet on our return from 
war. Many’s the time I’ve gone to bed, after a day of “tramp, tramp” looking for work, on a cup of 
cocoa and a pennyworth of chips between us; I would lay puzzling why, why, after all we had 
gone through in the service of our country, we have to suffer such poverty, willing to work at 
anything but no work to be had. I only had two Christmases at work between 1919 and 1939.55  
 
Yet while many soldiers lost their radicalism in the years after the war, many channelled 
their anger through the labour movement, and former soldiers would feature 
prominently as future Labour and trade union leaders: Nick Mansfield has drawn 
attention to one Bill Curtis of Salhouse, Norfolk, one of only twenty-four from the 8
th
 
battalion of the Norfolk Regiment who survived the Somme, who became one of the 
new local activists for Labour after the war.
56
 Similarly, the Imperial War Museum 
archive contains interviews with men who would become prominent labour and trade 
union activists after the war, such as William Gillman in East London, Jack Dorgan in 
Northumberland and Frederick Orton in Nottingham.  
Contrary to those commentators who felt that the war brought the Left and the 
military closer together, David Englander argued that in fact ‘nothing could be further 
from the truth…if anything, the war had accentuated Labour’s prejudice against the 
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serviceman’, and, in addition, ‘during the war the Labour movement became concerned 
about the soldier, not for him’.57 Furthermore, claimed Englander, the Labour party 
treated ex-servicemen’s claims for special privileges with suspicion, and failed to 
develop at coherent policy on the Army until 1939.
58
 This lack of concern – or even 
disdain – for the soldier was not apparent in the language of the labour movement at the 
time. Almost immediately many leftist newspapers and organisations developed a 
preoccupation with the welfare of soldiers and sailors, particularly papers which had 
campaigned for better treatment for troops in the years before the war, such as Justice 
and The Clarion. As with the Boer War, the call for recruits had revealed the poor 
physical condition of many British workmen, and patriotic labour papers – and left-
wing ones such as The Herald - used this to indict the economic creed of the Liberal and 
Conservative parties. As an example of corroborating evidence from an ostensibly 
objective outsider, The Clarion printed a letter in January 1915 from a New Zealand 
officer, who observed: ‘There are some English Territorials here, and they look very 
small alongside our men. I did not know there was such a difference until I saw a 
regiment of each together.’59  
As early as 1916 the Minority Report of the Departmental Committee on 
discharged soldiers and sailors suggested setting aside plots of land for veterans, in 
addition to a minimum industrial wage and quality affordable housing.
60
 The labour 
movement organised a War Pensions Conference in Pontypridd on 3 June 1916, 
attended by over four hundred delegates from 189 trade union branches, sixty-six 
churches, fifteen trades councils and six friendly societies, where the following 
resolution was passed unanimously: 
 
This Conference considers that the method of providing for our brave Soldiers and Sailors who 
have sacrificed so much for their country, by collections in various ways, is unworthy of the 
British Public; that we pledge ourselves to take every step necessary to bring pressure to bear on 
Parliament to make provision for the disabled Soldiers and Sailors, so that they and their families 
shall not suffer or be dependent on charity. And furthermore, that we, the Delegates assembled at 
this Conference, are prepared to advise the members of the various organisations we represent not 
to assist in any local efforts in furtherance of the Charity Clauses in the Naval and Military War 
Pensions Act, 1915, so as to place upon the Government the onus of providing all the funds 
required to administer the Act.61 
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By September 1917 Co-Partners’ Magazine – organ of the London Gas and Electric  
Light Company – argued in an article entitled ‘Hope for Disabled Soldiers and Sailors’ 
that ‘every sailor and soldier is entitled to the benefits of this [War Pensions] scheme; 
which is not a charity, but a part of the recompense owed by the nation to the men who 
have fought and bled for it’.62 In 1917 the WNC pushed for an increase in soldiers’ 
wages, with Jim Middleton tabling a question for Charles Duncan MP to ask the 
financial secretary of the War Office. ‘You will be interested to know’, he wrote, ‘that 
the Workers’ National Committee is going into the whole question of soldiers’ rates 
with a view to demanding a general increase, and I will see that the remuneration of 
men in your position is considered.’63  
In May 1915 the WNC decided to give assistance to the wives of British 
prisoners interned in Germany who ‘as a result sending regular parcels of food, etc. to 
their husbands, find themselves in distress’.64 The Committee also lobbied against the 
practice of suspending separation allowances to the relatives of men executed for 
desertion; Middleton wrote in a letter to J. Dawson of the Keighley and District Trades 
and Labour Council: ‘This is a matter I took up personally with Mr Barnes in the early 
days of his Pension Ministry, but without success. The views of some of the permanent 
officials on the subject were simply detestable, while others, with whom I discussed the 
matter, were altogether more sympathetic. The former, naturally enough had not been in 
the Service, the latter had.’65 After the war, the former soldier Ernest Thurtle was one 
Labour MP prominent in the struggle to abolish the military death penalty, and the 
wider party took steps to fight for soldiers’ rights.66 In the words of Terrence Bogacz: 
‘Reflecting popular concern and claiming to speak for the other ranks, the Labour Party 
argued that among those men executed for cowardice were many who had been shell-
shock victims and thus had been unjustly sentenced to death.’67  
In the spring of 1917 the WNC circulated a pamphlet entitled ‘The Soldiers’ and 
Sailors’ Charter’, which described the changes to pensions and gratuities introduced to 
Parliament by Labour’s George Barnes, Minister for Pensions, on 5 March. The new 
rates granted a pension of between twenty-five and sixty shillings depending on rank, 
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degree of disablement, and pre-war earnings. Full provision was made for soldiers 
needing treatment away from home, with pension and allowances paid to wives, 
children and dependents; there was a five shilling bonus payable for each week of 
rehabilitation training, and men were to be paid ten shillings a week for work missed 
due to medical procedures. Furthermore, in a concession to pressure from the labour 
movement, men who suffered disablement not directly attributable to nor aggravated by 
military service were to be paid a £150 gratuity, whereas previously they had not 
qualified for any remuneration.
68
 Another pamphlet, ‘The Labour Party: For Services 
Rendered’ carried the full text of Barnes’ speech. Describing men who would not be 
able to return to their old way of life, Barnes argued that ‘a pension in a case like that 
seems to be like giving an old friend 1s.to get rid of him instead of putting him in a 
position to earn 2s., which is what he really needs’. He went on to praise voluntary 
organisations such as the Star and Garter hospitals, the Lord Roberts Workshops and St 
Dunstan’s, where hundreds of men blinded in the war had been rehabilitated, with many 
more scheduled to follow.  
Barnes proudly announced that men who had served in the Army before the war, 
and had been claiming an Army pension, were now allowed to apply for an additional 
disablement pension – something denied to them previously – and that this change was 
to apply retrospectively. Furthermore, he described the more generous arrangements for 
disablement not directly caused by service: ‘In future if a man’s disease is aggravated 
by service he will get his pension just the same as if it were attributable to it or caused 
by it; and if it arises seven years after the war he will get a pension if it is clear that it 
has been substantially aggravated by the war.’ Barnes ended his speech on a 
controversial note, however, confirming that men who were passed fit for military 
service, but later found unfit and dismissed, would not be granted any gratuity or 
pension. Responding to an interjection from Edinburgh East Liberal MP James Hogge 
that these men should be paid their due, Barnes was unequivocal: ‘These men have been 
passed into the Army owing to the great pressure under which doctors had to work in 
the early days. Hundreds of them have been passed into the Army who should never 
have been passed in – veritable weeds, that ought never to have been there at all.’69 This 
remark caused consternation amongst some in the labour movement, and contributed to 
a building resentment against Barnes and other Labour figures involved with the 
government from those on the Left of the party. 
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 The ILP placed a demand for a Soldier’s Charter on the agenda for the Labour 
party Conference of January 1918. This charter called for a increase in pay, separation 
allowances and pensions; more generous industrial training for injured ex-servicemen; 
more ‘humane’ and ‘comfortable’ medical examinations; for the use of the death 
penalty to be reduced to the smallest possible margins; for the grievances of ex-
servicemen to be justly represented; and for the Labour party to pressure the 
government into adopting this programme.
70
 Perhaps the final aspect of the charter was 
the most significant: the ILP was pressing for the Labour party to take up the ex-
servicemen’s cause; to become the party of the veteran and an agitator for equitable 
treatment for those who had fought and served.  
Almost immediately after the outbreak of war The Co-operative News featured a 
hastily-written and somewhat patronising homage to the pre-war Army entitled ‘A 
Tribute to the Lower Classes. The Men Upon Whom the Nation Has Had to Depend: 
Heroism Out of Poverty’.71 A further article in October 1914 asked: ‘Who is Tommy 
Atkins? Glorified in Battle, but Despised in Labour Struggles: Plain John Smith in 
Khaki’. The papers’ correspondent concluded that the soldier represented the best 
values of the British working man: ‘Tommy’s name was not Tommy Atkins, but John 
Smith, the plain working man, whom Robert Blatchford addressed in those remarkable 
articles of his which formed the volume of “Merrie England”.’72 Will Crooks paid 
similar homage to the ‘everyman’ nature of the British soldier during a speech to the 
Co-Partnership Committee on 2 November 1915. After detailing reported German rapes 
and outrages, he contrasted that with the spirit of the British soldier: ‘Tommy is not a 
plaster saint’, Crooks claimed, ‘but he is a man!’73 This phrase encapsulated the 
message of the patriotic wing of the labour movement during this period: both the 
previously-despised pre-war soldier and his New Army or conscript equivalent were 
now representative of the best of the traits of the British working man: far from perfect, 
fond of drink and rough amusements, coarse of language and not given to abstract 
thought, but solid, dependable, honourable, indefatigable, and the source of all wealth 
and security and greatness of the nation. The argument that followed logically from this 
position was that government policy must be tailored to improve the lot of such people: 
it owed it to them before the war, and its obligations had been multiplied by the conflict. 
A year before the end of the war, even Punch marvelled at the idea of these heroes 
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returning to their old occupations after their extraordinary experiences - a cartoon 
entitled ‘Glimpses of the Future’ depicted a housemaid calling to her employer: ‘Mr, 
Jones, Sir – Him wot killed seventeen Germans in one trench with his own ‘ands-‘as 
called for the Gas Account, Sir’ (see Fig. 4.1).74  
There was an extended tale in a June 1915 edition of The Post – entitled ‘Vulgar 
Fellows’ - which is worth quoting at length as it revealed the patronising attitude of 
many of the elites of the labour movement towards the working class, and how this 
shifted during the war. There were seven men in a crowded bank-holiday carriage: two 
Kitchener troops off to train at trench-digging, two Yeomanry troopers, a big 
artilleryman, ‘loaded upon us in a drunken sleep’, an Army doctor, and the author: 
 
Just before the train started, however, a sturdy chap wearing the neat cap badge of the Royal 
Fusiliers climbed in upon us. He cheerfully rearranged the form of our gunner, and so provided 
himself with a seat. Then the train moved off, and as we passed the long line of faces on the 
platform, the weary smile of one old woman was directed towards our new arrival. 
 
The Fusilier produced a quart bottle of beer:  
 
After drinking himself he offered it to the Yeomen. With some persuasion one of them partook. 
Then, perhaps with greater honesty, certainly with greater enthusiasm, the trench-diggers helped-
themselves. It was then my turn. I excused myself, politely, but with decision. I have never worn 
the blue ribbon. It is sometimes pleasant to drink a friendly glass, seated with a good chum in a 
comfortably furnished lounge. It is more pleasant still, as one of the jobs of the road, to call at 
mine inn with “a thirst like that of a thirsty sword.” But a quart bottle, offered by a stranger in a 
railway carriage on a Bank-holiday, and with one lying before me whose abnormal thirst had led 
him astray – certainly not! 
 
The men began to talk, and the Fusilier related how he had been at the Front since the 
outbreak and had survived unmarked until late January, when a shell had torn open his 
chest and thigh. As he was recovering, two of his brothers were killed in the trenches.  
Discharged from the hospital, he had been given 48 hours leave to return home, and was 
now en route back to France: 
 
He gazed out of the window in a thoughtful silence for a considerable time...Later, something said 
prompted him to tell us that the old woman who had watched our train start was the mother of a 
regimental comrade. She had asked him to deliver a parcel of cakes and cheap cigarettes to her 
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son, from whom she had not heard during many weeks. He had taken the parcel and promised to 
deliver it because he lacked the courage to tell this mother something the War Office had failed to 
tell her. To his certain knowledge, her son had fallen several weeks previously. When the Fusilier 
told that story someone in the carriage swore audibly, and the whizzing landscape became blurred 
to at least one pair of eyes. 
 
At Rugby the troopers were replaced by two middle-aged civilians, and the conversation 
turned to after-the-war matters, with one of the civilians positing that the Government 
would have to do something to help the workers: 
 
“The Government!” scoffed our Fusilier. “We can’t wait for those beggars. We’ll put things right 
ourselves.” For the first time I noticed that he looked just like that square-jawed chap on the 
posters who invites us to fall in and follow. No doubt he was at the moment connecting the 
economic future with the ugly scars over his heart, with his two dead brothers, and with the 
waiting mother of his lost chum. No one in the compartment had any reply for him… 
Shortly afterwards the Royal Fusilier produced again his homely flask. After satisfying his own 
thirst he presented the bottle to me. This time I took it, and, after passing the palm of my hand over 
its mouth in the approved fashion, I drank. It was proffered by a man – a fighting man and a 
thinking man.75 
 
It was precisely this type of worker that the labour movement had usually failed to reach 
up until this point; perhaps due to the distain which many left-wing elites had for such 
men. Labour patriotism during the war was vital to making inroads into this 
constituency in the years that followed. 
One of the most high-profile of the recruits with no previous interest in politics who 
later joined the labour movement was Douglas Houghton. Houghton – who has the 
distinction of being the last Cabinet Minister born in the nineteenth century and the last 
veteran of the First Word War to serve in the Cabinet and both Houses of Parliament – 
was born in Nottinghamshire in 1898, the son of a lace maker. In 1914 he worked as an 
apprentice clerk, in addition to studying for the Civil Service Exams. After joining the 
Civil Service Rifles he fought at the Somme, served as a Lewis Gunner, and ended the 
war as a bayonet instructor at training depots in England. His letters to his parents prior 
to the war had been largely devoid of any political content and were mainly concerned 
with requests for cakes and clean laundry. When in France, he observed in an 
uncensored ‘green envelop’ letter that officers were granted undue luxuries and 
privileges, but his tone was more one of envy than outrage:  
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You ask me what I think of an officer’s life out here. Well, frankly speaking I only wish I had 
taken the opportunity of getting a Commission before I came out. The greatest consideration 
is…incidental comfort. They rarely have to put up with any inconvenience. Their position is least 
enviable when up the line but even then it’s worth it. Then again officers “work” things. As soon 
as the news comes than we are going up the line we find our officers going away on “courses”. We 
have been up twice and the second time only one officer accompanied us that had been up the time 
before.76 
 
Houghton clearly enjoyed Army life, extended his service after the war and censored his 
mother when she expressed exasperation that he was not yet demobilised by April 1919: 
‘You are passing grave criticism about things of which you have only limited 
information. The army of occupation is not such a dreadful affair as you would have us 
believe. Life in it is not much more strenuous than in England – there are new and 
interesting surroundings.’77 Later that year, whilst back in England, he opined: ‘Further, 
I have no desire to return to the office. I get fed up enough with long hours and exacting 
work and the monotonous daily routine and lack of exercise and I certainly like army 
life in England.’78  
 Although a fan of Army life, Houghton felt aggrieved by the treatment of 
soldiers and ex-servicemen in the period after the Armistice, and his criticisms of the 
government feature more prominently in his post-war correspondence, particularly 
concerning British prisoners of war. Writing to his father: ‘I think we have made rather 
a tame ending to victory. Fancy the prisoners of a victorious alliance being turned adrift 
to fend for themselves. I would have insisted that they be sent to the frontier in 1
st
 class 
carriages.’79 After the khaki election, he noted that ‘Some of the election results startled 
us, especially in the electorate’s handling of Asquith and most of the Liberal side…It is 
certainly a fact that thousands of soldiers were unable to record their vote’.80 He 
witnessed the industrial disruption which followed the war at first hand, but not from 
the labour side, confiding to his mother in July 1919 that ‘I don’t know how the leave 
will go. There is some uncertainty owing to the strikes. The Battn. is being held in 
readiness to move in connection with local colliery disputes.’81 The preparations for the 
1919 police strike, however, he considered excessive: ‘Detachments were detailed, 
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armed, equipped etc and sent to do guard duties pending the settlement of the police 
strike. Even Lewis Guns and 3000 rounds of ammunition per gun were mobilised. One 
would have thought that they were dealing with armed bandits instead of harmless 
bobbies.’82 It is important to remember that at this point Houghton was not a member of 
a trade union or any other group affiliated to the labour movement; he was an 
individual, and after 1918 it was to individuals that Labour appealed.  
This section has showed labour patriotism allowed service in the military to 
become a channel towards Labour, and how this was important to Labour’s post-war 
success. The military identity and camaraderie engendered by this did not last much 
longer than the war, however, and Labour needed to formulate its appeals to the post-
war working class in a language that would win through even as memories of the war 
faded. It is to the construction of this language, and the role which labour patriotism 
played in this construction, that we now turn. 
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Fig. 4.1 ‘Glimpses of the Future’, Co-Partners’ Magazine, October 1917. (Originally printed in Punch.) 
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The War and the Appeal to the New Electorate 
 
This final section is concerned with how Labour’s experiences during the war affected 
their appeal to the post-war electorate. The new franchise and new party constitution 
which resulted from the conflict required new methods and new ways of organising, and 
the war reinforced the need for Labour to appear culturally analogous to working-class 
voters. This section considers the changes to the party and its election campaigns; the 
relationship between unskilled workers and the party; attempts to attract new female 
voters; and finally appeals to voters based upon community and culture. Thus far the 
labour movement had drawn its strength from areas which featured either high rates of 
unionisation in skilled or craft unions, or a tradition of radical Nonconformity, or very 
often both. After the First World War the party broke out from these bridgeheads to 
become a truly national party by 1945. It is argued here that the war itself and Labour’s 
support for the war were crucial in this transformation. Labour began to win votes 
amongst unskilled workers, women, Catholics, patriots, and ‘the football crowds’ at 
exactly the time when it most needed to broaden its appeal. In the words of Arthur 
Henderson: ‘Trade unionism had very little hold upon the agricultural constituencies; 
but there was evidence that they wanted Labour candidates. How were these people to 
be organised? They could only do so by saying to every man and woman… “Come 
along with us, our platform is broad enough and our Movement big enough to take you 
all.”’83  
Henderson used his speech to the 1918 party conference to argue for the new 
constitution: ‘There has been a notable increase in the general interest taken by all 
sections of the community in the work of the Party and its future development, and 
during recent months a cordial and welcome spirit of enquiry both as to our actual 
principles and more particularly as to our proposals for reconstruction after the War.’ 
Hence there was to be individual membership for those unable or uncompelled to join 
trade unions and not prepared to join socialist societies, and similar special preparations 
made for organising women.
84
 Arthur Peters – the National Agent – reported:  
 
At no time in our previous history has the vitality of the party been so manifest. Requests for 
advice and assistance from all parts of the country continue to be received, and during the past two 
months numerous local Conferences have been successfully carried through and many others are 
to follow. Local Labour Parties are being established upon the lines of our suggested new rules 
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and the warm welcome accorded the proposals for individual membership afford grounds for 
believing that the new organisation will soon develop good and substantial machinery for the 
effective working of all our future elections.85 
 
On the report of the Boundary Commissioners he declared: ‘The battlegrounds for the 
future are now defined, many handicaps being removed, and with considerably 
increased facilities for contests our democratic forces will welcome the opportunity for 
an appeal to the country immediately after the world-conflict has ceased.’86 Chairman 
Frank Purdy proclaimed: ‘We aim in the years coming to be the People’s Party – a Party 
not parochial in its conception, but national in its character and broad in its aspirations; 
constructive in its programme; watching keenly the foreign policy and international 
relations of the nation; and bringing to the service of the State all that makes for the 
social and industrial improvement of the people.’87 
 
Pre-War Labour and Working-Class Culture 
 
In the 1960s Richard Hoggart observed that ‘the more we try to reach the core of 
working-class attitudes, the more surely does it appear that that core is a sense of the 
personal, the concrete, the local; it is embodied in the idea of, first, the family, and, 
second, the neighbourhood’.88 When Martin Pugh wrote of ‘the sentiments of a 
conservative working class that, in certain circumstances, was prepared to vote Labour’, 
he cannot be said to be wide of the mark.
89
 This was not lost on some Edwardian 
Labour leaders; in his autobiography, J.H. Thomas declared that ‘the workers are more 
conservative than the Conservatives’.90 While some areas such as the coalfields of 
South Wales and North East England or the textile districts of West Yorkshire were 
home to a proud radical tradition, often arising from Nonconformity and increasingly 
supportive of the Labour party, this tradition was generally absent from large areas of 
West Lancashire, London, the Midlands, and most southern towns. As Gareth Stedman 
Jones has noted, there was a distinct lack of temperance tradition amongst the radical 
artisans in London, and the impression conveyed by Charles Booth’s survey of the turn-
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of-the-century London poor ‘was of a working-class culture which was both 
impermeable to outsiders, and yet predominantly conservative in character: a culture in 
which the central focus was not “trade unions and friendly societies, cooperative effort, 
temperance propaganda and politics (including socialism) but “pleasure, amusement, 
hospitality and sport”’.91 Elizabeth Ross has written of pre-war East London that 
‘Church goers often had to face choruses of mockers’, and one convert walking with a 
missionary in South West Bethnal Green in 1889 was assaulted by former drinking 
companions.
92
 Of course we cannot make any easy assumptions and there were always 
exceptions to apparently homogenous cultures: Andrew Davies has noted of inter-war 
Salford that, far from being an omnipresent background to daily life, ‘people took part 
in pub culture when they could afford to’; and that whilst football was enormously 
popular amongst working-class men, very often people could not afford to attend 
matches featuring Manchester United or Manchester City, and to make do with more 
humble grassroots teams.
93
 Yet generally, most working-class areas exhibited a culture 
of centred around the pub, the music hall, family and patriotism, which often inhibited 
leftist recruitment. 
The Social Democratic Federation – the leading socialist society in London – 
never had more than three thousand members out of a population of more than six and a 
half million.
94
 In London, Jones concluded that the ‘republican and international culture 
which had been such a characteristic feature of artisan tradition in the first three quarters 
of the century had all but died out by 1900’. The persistence and popularity of working-
class Toryism confounded and perplexed many on the Edwardian Left. Many towns and 
cities seemed dominated by people who, though living in conditions of terrible squalor, 
being independent of mind and not averse to riots and general rowdiness, continued to 
loyally vote Conservative.
95
 Stedman Jones quoted a member of the Paddington Radical 
Club from the Boer War era: ‘When I ventured to point out to one member that the cost 
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of the present war would have put old age pensions on a sound basis, the answer I 
received was “to Hades with Old Age Pensions”.’96 Yet the Labour party needed the 
support of these people: as Pugh has argued, in areas such as Lancashire and the 
Midlands it was not enough to absorb Liberals; the party needed to convert working-
class Tories as well.
97
  
 ‘If the Labour Party could select a King’, Ben Tillett had sneered in 1908, ‘he 
would be a Feminist, a Temperance crank, a Nonconformist charlatan…an anti-sport, 
anti-jollity advocate, a teetotaller, as well as a general wet blanket…Horse-racing would 
vanish [and] as for music halls, they would be anathema!’98 Tillett was voicing his 
frustration at the apparent dichotomy in cultural values between the wider working class 
and its supposed representatives: early socialists had looked to create a ‘morally 
uplifting’ popular culture, which had often served to alienate them from the wider 
electorate.
99
  In 1918 MacDonald claimed that his defeat in Leicester and Labour’s 
relatively poor showing was ‘the fault of the minds of the people’.  ‘We all know 
perfectly well’, he further asserted in 1919, ‘that electoral majorities are composed of a 
small minority of active politically minded people influencing a mass of people who 
have no fixed convictions or orientations.’100 He also blamed his Leicester defeat on 
female voters, suggesting that they were more susceptible to the patriotic fervour of the 
khaki election than men; something backed up by chairman J. McGurk’s address to the 
1919 party conference: ‘[Lloyd George] denounced the party as Bolshevist, and 
frightened the electors, particularly the women, by lurid descriptions of what would 
happen in England if Labour came to power.’101 
September 1915 had witnessed an oration in the House of Commons by J.H. 
Thomas, attacking the conscriptionist press. In the speech Thomas lambasted ‘Lord 
Northcliffe, whose cynical estimate of the intelligence of the masses of the people is 
indicated by the class of reading he serves up for their edification’.102 Yet unfortunately 
for Thomas and the rest of the Labour movement, Northcliffe and other right-wing, 
populist press barons and editors – most notably Horatio Bottomley – had a very keen 
understanding of the character and sensibilities of the British people; hence the high 
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circulations of their newspapers. Blatchford, in contrast to Thomas, was aware of this. 
Ruminating on the issue in an article entitled ‘Why Labour and Socialist Papers Do Not 
Pay’, he asked: ‘Is it because the working people don’t know what’s good for them; or 
is it because the Labour and Socialist journals do not know what the working people 
want? Men like ourselves…always make the mistake of assuming that the millions of 
British workers have tastes, interests, habits of minds and concentration of purpose 
exactly like our own.’ After calling for more sports reportage in left-wing newspapers, 
he concluded: ‘I think the chief reasons why Labour and Socialist papers fail are, firstly, 
that they give the public too much Labourism and Socialism, and, secondly, that in the 
nature of things they appeal to a small minority of the people. The kind of daily paper 
that might succeed, if it were backed financially, is, I think, a bright newspaper of broad 
and comprehensive general interest with an editorial brief for Socialism or Labour.’103 
If Blatchford blamed cultural differences for the limited appeal of Labour, this 
was not something appreciated by orthodox Marxists such as the Plebs’ League. On the 
contrary, they were frustrated and antagonised by the apparent obnoxious and pig-
headed nature of much of the working class. In an editorial entitled ‘To Our Critics’, 
Plebs magazine claimed in May 1917 that the difficulties of the labour movement to 
date could be overcome if only the workers spent more time studying economics, and 
learned to view the world from a more scientific and logical perspective.
104
 A piece by 
Frank Jackson in August of that year went further. Discussing an article by Sir Harry 
Johnston in the Cambridge Magazine, Jackson argued: ‘His contention that “the 
weakness of the Labour Party is that it is not as it should be, the Party of all Workers” is 
scarcely a criticism of the Labour Party; since the Constitution of that body makes it 
abundantly clear that, if it is not the Party of All Workers, then it is the Workers’ and 
not the Party’s fault.’105 It was this contemptible argument – that workers should 
naturally move towards the labour movement but were too obtuse to know their own 
best interests – which the labour patriots fought against. They knew full well that to 
convert the mass of the working class to the Left they needed to offer pragmatic and 
practical means to achieve palpable goals, whilst rooting their appeals in the local 
culture and vernacular. In the words of C. Brown, whose letter appeared in The Clarion 
in March 1916: ‘What we shall need to keep before us will not be so much of Marx, or 
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even [NUR President Alfred] Bellamy, but of [William] Morris.’106 Further, the patriots 
believed the war had revealed that the labour movement was perfectly in tune with 
British sensibilities: an editorial in the Railway Review of February 1915 claimed that 
‘the case for Trade Unionism – loyal, patriotic, level-headed, and sane – has never 
received ampler justification’.107 The Co-operative News welcomed the promotion of 
George Barnes to Labour chairman and representative in the Cabinet after the 
resignation of Henderson over the Stockholm affair in similar terms: ‘Mr Barnes is a 
typical Englishman. There is nothing flashy about him. His qualities are those of sound 
common sense.’108 John Clynes was on the Executive of the General Municipal 
Workers for thirty years from 1909, and wartime patriots Charlie Cramp of the NUR 
and William Hutchinson of the Engineers would go on to represent their unions 
throughout the 1920s.
109
 Pugh has noted, ‘Men like Clynes and Thomas would scarcely 
have achieved lasting power in their unions and in the Labour Party had they not 
reflected rank-and-file sentiment’: the argument that cautious, conservative leaders held 
back the radicalism of their membership is highly implausible.
110
 
In addition to providing evidence of a type of leftism easily compatible with 
working-class cultural values, the labour patriots lambasted the cultural distance 
between some of the leaders of the labour movement and the people they aspired to 
represent. Future NUR leader Cramp wrote a strongly-worded letter to the Railway 
Review on this subject in May 1916. After asking why the people did not understand the 
Independent Labour party, he argued that it was because the ILP ‘does not understand 
the people’: 
One of the most important things is…to learn that the world is not a huge cosmopolitan Sunday 
school, but a planet peopled with men and women who are the heirs of instincts, habits, and 
frailties accumulated by the race through ages of pain and striving. The Socialism which they will 
adopt will be as an easy-fitting garment, not a straight-jacket composed of fads intended to restrict 
their liberties; and all the time that ILP MP’s [sic] run after Temperance Bills, Insurance Acts, and 
other Liberal nostrums, the people will not understand them. 
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Similarly, in April 1915 The Clarion thundered that ‘Socialism is to the bulk of our 
people a novel and foreign idea. One is sufficiently handicapped by an open 
championship of Socialism without having Labourism, Pacifism, Little Bethelism, 
Teetotalism, Anti-Patriotism, Pro-Germanism, and all the fantastic vagaries and 
flatulent sentimentalities of the Lib.Lab. rump stuck in one’s hair like straws.’111 The 
newspaper continued in this vein in October 1915, when an article defending the 
patriotic labour viewpoint concluded with: ‘It is the fault of those who do not 
understand The Clarion that the very name of Socialism is despised and detested by the 
great mass of British people.’112 
Yet change was on the horizon: R.H. Tawney, a Christian socialist and 
intellectual who had nonetheless enlisted as a sergeant and fought on the first day of the 
Somme, claimed after the war that he saw in Henry Dubb the ‘common, courageous, 
good-hearted, patient, proletarian fool’ with whom the labour movement should be 
particularly concerned.
113
 Even Snowden in the 1920s argued for appealing to ‘matter of 
fact people’, rather than to an intellectual elite.114 Criticism from the Right about their 
internationalist, Bolshevik sympathies ‘was very much in the minds of Labour leaders 
throughout the early 1920s and beyond, as they endeavoured to demonstrate their 
party’s patriotism, moderation and respectability as suitable credentials for governing 
Britain and the British Empire’.115  Discussing the Edwardian working class in London, 
Stedman Jones pronounced that ‘fatalism, political scepticism, the evasion of tragedy or 
anger and a stance of comic stoicism were pre-eminently cockney attitudes’.116 It was 
precisely these attitudes revealed by a letter to The Clarion, from a correspondent 
signing himself ‘A London Working Man’, in February 1915: 
 
The Sleepers Are Waking. Sir,-Your sensible remarks about the war have made me and 
my mates think more of your queer ideas about Socialism and Determinism. We think 
there’s something in them as well, but what we cannot stand is the wishy-washy 
sentimentalism of some of your writers and readers about such things as pensions and 
coal and bread. We have got a big war on and we have got to pay for it. Well, we do not 
kick and you cannot make us kick. There is no unemployment worth speaking about, and, 
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if the masters are making a bit, well, so are we. What with full-time and overtime, there is 
more money about than there was before the war, and many of the poor widows with 
fifteen and twenty bob a week that you seem to want us to make a song about, are a long 
sight better off than they were when the old man took half his dibs to the pub. So me and 
my mates thinks you might draw it mild, and wait till there’s more to kick about.117 
 
This brief passage, with its acceptance of the class system as a natural phenomenon and 
its allusions to the pub give us an insight into the soul of the British working man who 
was untouched by either radical Nonconformity or trade unionism. Labour patriotism 
during the war – either from newspapers such as The Clarion, unionists like Ben Tillett, 
or politicians such as John Clynes, George Barnes and Will Thorne – offered a new 
kind of leftism to these people, and  persuaded them that one could quite comfortably be 
both a patriot and on the Left. There was no better demonstration of these values or 
evidence of Labour’s concord with the beliefs of the mass of British people than the 
Left’s record during the war, and many of the candidates it fielded in the 1920s.  
 
General Unions and the War 
 
Even after the rise of ‘New Unions’ at the end of the nineteenth century, the Labour 
movement still counted on skilled and more prosperous workers for much of its support. 
In industrial towns socialism was more feasible in ‘richer’ areas with better organised 
skilled workers,
118
 and in London the SDF and other socialist groups were ‘still 
recruiting their activists to a striking degree from among artisans, skilled craftsmen, and 
other self-improving minorities, but not from the mass of the labouring poor’.119 
Furthermore, many unskilled unions, such as those representing dockers and seafarers 
had a spasmodic relationship with the Labour party, something which severely curtailed 
Labour influence in solidly working-class portside towns.
120
 General, unskilled unions 
such as the NUR and the Workers’ Union grew substantially during the war and moved 
closer towards Labour, and given the patriotism of most of these unionists - at both a 
grassroots and elite level - we can see the significance of labour patriotism in this 
convergence.  
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During the war the National Union of General Workers grew to 302,390 – ten 
times the size of its membership in 1910,
121
 while the Workers’ Union grew from 
140,000 members to 379,000 by 1918, eventually reaching a post-war peak of half a 
million and becoming the largest single union in the country.
122
 Significantly, London 
and the southern counties witnessed the largest growth; of minimal importance in 1914, 
they accounted for fully one quarter of the membership by 1918, and one third by 
1920.
123
 This growth of unionism in London during the war was vital to Labour’s 
success in the capital after the Armistice. By 1926, the Central London Labour party 
had an affiliated membership of 371,260 across sixty-one constituencies.
124
 Along with 
the South, the Workers’ Union became particularly prominent in the Midlands – exactly 
the areas where industry was expanding at the greatest rate. At the end of 1914, the 
Workers’ Union became the first general workers’ organisation to become nationally 
recognised – ‘an achievement which officials saw as final confirmation of its 
established status in…industry’.125 The newfound confidence was demonstrated by the 
Workers’ Union alone taking a stand against the restoration of pre-war practices, which 
President Jack Beard criticised as irrelevant in the post-war world.
126
 While the 
Workers’ Union was to fall away – membership was down to 140,000 by 1923127 – and 
eventually be absorbed by the Transport and General Workers’ Union, its wartime 
experience reflected the more general trends taking place. Large, ‘unskilled’ unions 
such as those of railway workers, labourers, transport workers and dockers were 
increasing in membership and moving towards the Labour party. This was crucial in 
terms of Labour acquiring a broader base of support than the craft unions which had 
traditionally provided the bulk of their support, and given the conservative nature of 
many unskilled trade unionists, war patriotism was an essential element in this 
transformation.  
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Women Voters  
 
Notwithstanding the assistance given to the wives and mothers of soldiers, at first the 
labour movement largely resisted the greater autonomy given to women by the war. The 
Railway Review repeatedly mocked, in print and cartoons, the very idea of women 
working in any position on the railways, while R.B. Walker of NALRU wrote to Labour 
secretary Jim Middleton concerning his belief that the WNC supported the introduction 
of women into farmwork, warning that ‘our members protest most emphatically against 
the very suggestion of such a thing’.128 Although dilution and replacement of men by 
women remained a cause for concern throughout the war, towards the end of the 
conflict the Left had largely begun to concern itself with securing wage equality to 
prevent undercutting. The WNC archive file ‘30/3 – Wages’ contains numerous 
complaints from around the country about inconsistent wages, and resolutions from 
local trades councils calling for an equal minimum wage for both male and female 
workers.
129
 There was some success in minimum wage agitation for women, at least in 
agriculture; Arthur Balfour wrote to the WNC’s Marion Philips in January 1918 
promising a twenty shilling per week minimum wage for women who could pass an 
efficiency test and eighteen shillings for those who could not.
130
  
The change in fortunes of the general, unskilled unions was mirrored by the rise 
of women within the labour movement: in 1915 the NUR began to admit women for the 
first time, while the Workers’ Union – which had admitted women since its inception – 
saw its female membership climb from three thousand in 1914 to eighty thousand by 
1918. They took up the cause of those neglected by the craft unions; in the words of the 
Workers’ Union’s Trade Union Worker in 1916: ‘Our special object, in a humble way, 
is to champion the cause of the woman worker, the labourer, the semi-skilled 
worker’.131 In contrast, the ASE never allowed women to join. Nor was it only in areas 
featuring high levels of female employment that women’s sections flourished; as Stuart 
Ball, Andrew Thorpe and Matthew Worley have noted, ‘somewhat ironically…given 
the masculine character of the miner-dominated labour movement throughout the 
region, notable Labour women’s section minutes exist for Bishop Auckland, Durham, 
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Seaham, Spennymoor and Sedgefield’.132 Enthusiastic female union organisers were 
critical to this change. Ellen Wilkinson, for example, spent the war as an organiser for 
the Amalgamated Union of Co-operative Employees, and led a drive to recruit women 
who had been substituted for men. Wilkinson and her contemporaries argued that if 
trade unionism was to prosper the privileged position of male craft unionists needed to 
change – and the war provided the catalyst for this change both in terms of skill and 
gender.
133
 
Given the likelihood from 1916 onwards of franchise reform after the war, it 
became apparent than women would form a crucial constituency for Labour in the post-
war world. This was reflected in the mixture of innovation and caution in Labour and 
the New Social Order – not an appeal to the converted but to twenty million electors, 
ten or twelve million of whom had never voted before.
134
 Sue Bruley has argued that the 
establishment of Labour party Women’s Sections in inter-war South Wales was an 
important ingredient to Labour’s growth, whereas the economistic Communist party 
concentrated on the miner at work and did not attract women.
135
 In the so-called 
‘housewives budget’ of the first Labour government in 1924, the tax on sugar was 
reduced from 2 ¾ a pound to 1 ½ a pound.
136
 Before the 1918 general election there 
were five national women organisers appointed, and ‘endeavours were made to visit as 
many constituencies as possible in order that something might be done in each to 
organise women for election work’. In 1919 special attention was given to the Black 
Country, the West Riding and Lancashire and Cheshire, ‘as the results obtained in these 
places at the General Election were most promising’.137 
 
Communities 
 
In inter-war Britain, unionised men and women were not enough; there was a need to 
turn to the wider community. Michael Savage has observed of inter-war Preston that 
Catholic and Anglican social clubs came to terms with the need to provide drink, while 
the Nonconformist societies did not, partly contributing to their failure to develop a 
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vigorous popular culture.
138
 Local Labour was sensitive to this, and from 1900 onward 
all the new working-men’s clubs were Labour clubs; originally drinking was ‘not 
encouraged…but after the election defeat of 1910 the Labour party felt that it had to 
reduce the hold of the licensed victuallers by providing its own drinking facilities’.139 
Having described Labour’s biggest weakness before 1914 as ‘its inability to develop 
organisations to tap neighbourhood capacities’, by the 1920s popular politics were 
based ‘mainly on neighbourhood and female support’ and in 1929 Labour MPs took the 
two Preston seats for the first time.
140
  
Another area in which Labour greatly expanded after the war was the East End 
of London. In the 1919 municipal elections in West Ham the party won seven of the 
nine seats contested; after the 1922 election Labour held thirty-six council seats.
141
 In 
1923 the Labour vote in West Ham fell at a council level, but at the general election 
they won all four constituencies with a notable increase in their vote, and by 1924 
Herbert Morrison could point to a four-fold increase in the Labour vote over just six 
years.
142
 Significantly, Labour held on to these gains in the East End and was not 
affected the reversals of the late 1920s and early 1930s which damaged the party in the 
rest of the capital.
143
 Why then was labour so successful in this area, which had not 
seemed promising before the war? John Marriott has argued that Labour in the East End 
treated voters ‘as industrial workers, as mothers, as citizens, as consumers and as 
tenants’, and that its success ‘had been based on an ability to articulate the demands of 
an enlarged working-class electorate’.144 Certainly, practical and pragmatic reforms to 
improve the lives of ordinary people were important, as was the growth in unionism and 
the Co-operative movement, but just as crucial was the acceptance of the East End 
electorate that Labour was ‘their’ party and best able to represent the working class:  
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Membership of political organisations, regular attendance at meetings to debate policy and 
formulate strategy, steady work in electioneering, propaganda, even voting at elections were alien 
to this political culture. But at the same time it was not positioned outside the boundaries of 
labourism. To say that support for the Labour Party was not active is not the same as saying that it 
did not exist. The support derived from an instinctive, traditional, commonsensical identification 
with the party rather than an intellectual, ethical or moral commitment.145 
 
David Howell has described Silvertown MP Jack Jones as ‘epitomiz[ing]  in an 
extreme and personal fashion the politics of the General Municipal Workers in West 
Ham-a stress on the needs of muscular male workers, a distaste for middle-class 
intellectuals, a suspicion of all things foreign’.146 Similarly James Sexton in St Helens 
emphasised his patriotism and utilised vitriolic anti-German language in his election 
addresses. For Howell, dockers’ officials such as Sexton and Tillett in Salford North 
‘sat in the Commons not for constituencies where their members were a significant 
sector of the electorate, but for working-class districts where a Labour appeal rather 
than a socialist agenda could be attractive.’147 Furthermore, Duncan Tanner has written:  
 
Whilst some of the newly captured London seats contained groups with strong Labour leanings 
(like railwaymen), constituencies containing large numbers of lower middle-class voters and new 
council and private housing developments were more numerous… Many of the newly captured 
provincial seats were influenced by similar trends, and did not contain a massive concentration of 
trade unionists or other “traditional” Labour voters.148   
 
Patriotism was essential to this language of ‘labourism’, and provided a useful 
counter-weight to the pacifism and internationalism of the Parliamentary party in the 
1920s. Speaking at the 1919 party conference, Mrs Bamber of the British Socialist party 
claimed:  
 
If the Labour Party…would stop trying to be statesmen, and get on with the work which the rank 
and file were doing outside, they would be surprised at the support they could get from the 
country…With one or two exceptions it had not been possible in most of the labour speeches to 
draw a dividing line between the speeches of Labour Members and some of the advanced Liberals 
in the House of Commons…Speaking as a woman of the working class, but a woman who 
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understood the whole international position, she declared that there was a mighty difference in 
being a Labour Member and understanding the international situation. If they were going to build 
up a Party to dominate the thinking of workers of this country, they would have to go on definite 
working class lines.149 
 
The Conservatives attempted to exploit what they saw as a Labour weakness over 
international affairs: Christopher Cook has noted how a great deal was made of 
Labour’s links with the Second International, with the Hackney Conservatives branding 
Labour as ‘a party whose policy is directed by the German Socialistische Arbeiter 
Internationale’; there were similar attacks in Islington South, Southwark Central and 
Wandsworth Central.
150
 In other areas such as Battersea North, Poplar South and rural 
Norfolk the Liberals aped these tactics, accusing local Labour parties of Bolshevist 
sympathies. Labour made a concerted effort to fight these accusations: along with W.F. 
Toynbee, prospective Parliamentary candidate for Chelmsford, and J.E. Kneeshaw, 
former agent in Rushcliffe, Captain Edward Gill, M.C., made up a three-man 
propaganda team for the 1922 election, and visited over seventy constituencies between 
them – significantly, Captain Gill was appointed chiefly to the southern and south-
western counties.
151
 Of unsuccessful Labour candidates at the 1918 election, eleven 
were current or former officers, including four in London: Major A.J. Lewer in 
Islington East; Colonel A. Lynch in Battersea South; Captain Haden Guest in 
Southwark Central; and Captain D. Sheehan in Stepney Limehouse. Furthermore, 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. Kynaston stood in Wolverhampton Bilston; Major Trestrail in 
Torquay; Captain Kendall in Stroud; Major D. Graham-Pole in East Grinstead; Captain 
E. Gill in Frome; and Captain E.N. Bennett in Westbury, Wiltshire.
152
 Labour in 1918 
was very careful to select appropriate candidates for each constituency. In contrast to 
the southern seats contested by former officers, in Scotland, although South Ayrshire 
was won by the staunchly pro-war James Brown, none of the Labour candidates had a 
military prefix.
153
 
There has been a tendency to overstate the importance of sectarian differences in 
undermining community solidarity; perhaps resulting from a concern to explain why 
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class consciousness was absent from socio-economically homogenous groups. In the 
words of John Bohstedt, there is a need to rescue people of different religious and ethnic 
groups ‘from the enormous condescension of labour history’.154 Very often a dividing 
line in working-class communities was not so much ‘religion’ or ethnicity per se, but 
rather ‘culture’.155 For example, it could be argued that Irish Catholics who enjoyed the 
music hall, pub culture, football, the racecourse and gambling had more common 
ground with like-minded Protestants than with their more sober-minded, abstemious co-
religionists. Issues such as community, neighbourhood and patriotism could cut across 
old divides such as skilled/unskilled and Catholic/Protestant. In the East End of London, 
for example the 1889 Dockers’ Strike featured an unusual alliance between Irish 
Catholics and Methodists;
156
 while the committee established to oversee the Bethnal 
Green war memorial reflected the new coalition of the labour movement in the East 
End, consisting of representatives of the council, Christian clergy, a local synagogue, 
two benevolent societies, two hospital aids funds, the Union of Boot and Shoe 
Operatives, the Rifle Club, and Special Constables.
157
 Similarly, the establishment of 
the Stepney Labour party after the war featured inter-community co-operation between 
Jewish, Irish and indigenous communities. In Liverpool the ‘trauma’ of the 1911 
Transport Strike had allowed for inter-communal co-operation, and Catholic councillors 
had co-operated with Conservatives for two decades to sustain an impressive housing 
programme.
158
 Describing the sort of people who followed demagogic Protestant 
preachers in pre-war Liverpool, the Liberal editor of the local Daily Post had them as 
‘good, hard-headed fellows…don’t care twopence about religion at all; but they to a 
man hate “Popery” intensely’.159 This suggests that doctrinal differences were of far less 
importance that matters of culture, loyalty, community and identity; issues which began 
to fall into abeyance after the Irish treaty was signed, when most of the Nationalists 
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joined the Labour party, taking their voters with them, and Labour was able to appeal to 
people as Liverpudlians, rather than as Protestants or Catholics. 
  If the central challenge for Labour after the war was to move beyond the radical 
artisans and highly unionised skilled workers who had previously provided the bulk of 
its support, and capture groups hitherto unsupportive of labour, then a constituency 
which served as a microcosm for Labour’s cultural appeals to the wider electorate was 
that of the Irish Catholic Diaspora in England. For many Catholics (and, for that matter, 
Anglicans), unlike Nonconformists, religion was a public, rather than a private issue. 
Whereas for most Nonconformists, faith was a deeply personal matter, involving private 
reflection and reading of scripture, for many Catholics it was a highly public issue based 
around attending weekly mass, regular confessions, significant feast days and 
ostentatious ceremonies. In this respect, Catholicism in England was more analogous to 
the ancient Roman concept of religion – which was entirely concerned with public 
displays of faith rather than personal belief – than the doctrinaire religiosity of the 
Nonconformists. As with the politics of much the wider working class, popular 
Catholicism was more about identity (‘socially grounded loyalties’, in the words of 
Steven Fielding) than doctrine and ideology – hence few Catholics took anti-socialist 
pulpit sermonising seriously.
160
 As Fielding had it, ‘it had been on the level of culture, 
rather than explicit ideology, that the [Labour] party had made its most powerful appeal 
to Irish Catholic loyalties’.161 That is to say, Labour appealed to Catholic immigrants in 
towns such as Liverpool through cultural identity, rather than ‘class’ identity or 
doctrinaire socialism. 
Clearly breakthroughs in areas such as Liverpool were slight: the party 
continued to struggle on Merseyside throughout the inter-war years and it was only in 
the 1950s that Labour took control of the council. Yet very often Labour’s appeal to 
culture was successful: Catholics’ political allegiances were increasingly won over to 
Labour after the war, and throughout the inter-war period the Irish were amongst the 
most consistent Labour supporters within the working class.
162
 Thus in areas without 
either a strong craft union movement or a radical Nonconformist tradition, we may have 
seen a Labour ‘evolution’ largely without a labour movement. In his forward to Eric 
Taplin’s study of the dockworker’s union, Jack Jones paid tribute to James Sexton, ‘a 
                                               
160 S. Fielding, Class and Ethnicity. Irish Catholics in England, 1880-1939, Buckingham: Open 
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man who came out of the Fenian stable but over the years became a pillar of society’.163 
Yet men like James Sexton, who saw no contradiction between Catholicism, patriotism, 
and trade unionism were by no means exceptional in the post-war Labour party. The 
success of this strategy is personified in Jack Hayes – who became the first Labour MP 
to sit for a Liverpool constituency when he was returned in Edge Hill in 1923. Hayes 
was an Irish Nationalist and a former Metropolitan policeman who was involved in the 
police strikes of 1918 and 1919, yet neither his Irish nationalist beliefs, nor his former 
career as a policeman were barriers to his involvement in the labour movement. Three 
of the police strikers were adopted by Labour as municipal candidates in 1919 and two 
of them – Hayes and Charles Burden – were elected.164 Through people such as Hayes 
we can see how the party could have some success in presenting itself as a broad church 
welcome to all.  
 
Seats won by Labour before and after the First World War 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
English constituencies provided the vast majority of Labour’s forty seats after the 
January 1910 general election, with only a few exceptions: George Barnes in Glasgow 
Blackfriars and Hutchesontown and Alexander Wilkie sharing Dundee’s two seats with 
Winston Churchill; Thomas Richards in Monmouthshire West and Keir Hardie, the 
biggest of the ‘Big Four’, representing Merthyr Tydfil.165 The English seats generally 
represented either mining or industrial districts, or those combining a mixture of both. 
                                               
163 Forward by Jack Jones in E. Taplin, The Dockers’ Union. A Study of the National Union of Dock 
Labourers, 1889-1922, Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986, xiv. 
164 Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism, 285. 
165 Election statistics and constituency results in this section according to Labour Party Annual Reports, 
1910 – 1924 and F.W.S. Craig, British Electoral Facts, 1832-1987, Dartmouth: Parliamentary Research 
Services, 1989. 
Table 4.1: Candidates Fielded, Seats Won and Total Votes Won by Labour at each 
election, January 1910 – 1923. Source: Labour party Annual Reports, 1910 – 1924. 
Election: Candidates Fielded: Seats Won: Total Votes: 
January 1910 78 40 505,690 
December 1910 56 42 370,802 
1918 361 57 2,244,945 
1922 414 142 4,235,457 
1923 427 191 4,348,379 
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There was a fair regional spread, incorporating the North East (Chester-le-Street, 
Barnard Castle); North West (Blackburn, Bolton, Manchester North and East, St 
Helens, Stockport and Wigan) Yorkshire (Bradford West, Chesterfield, Halifax, Leeds 
East, Sheffield Attercliffe)  and a small but significant foothold in London, with C. W. 
Bowerman at Deptford and Will Thorne in West Ham South.  
Labour barely improved their standing at the next election twelve months later: 
George Lansbury won in Bow and Bromley, Frank Water Goldstone took one of the 
two seats for Sunderland; Thomas Richardson was returned in Whitehaven and Will 
Crooks won back the Woolwich seat he had lost in January. Yet these gains were offset 
by setbacks, such as James Seddon losing Newton and Thomas Glover’s defeat in St 
Helens; overall Labour made a paltry gain of two seats, with the Parliamentary Labour 
party almost exclusively trade unionist in composition. They had a total of thirty-four 
seats in England, five in Wales and three in Scotland. 
Despite a combination of the loss of virtually every Labour MP associated - 
fairly or otherwise - with the anti-war movement, and the widespread effective 
disenfranchisement of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, Labour added fifteen MPs to 
their pre-war total in December 1918. The party made important gains in London and 
the Midlands, capturing Wentworth, Woolwich East, Holland with Boston, Nottingham 
West, West Bromwich, Smethwick and Mansfield. Furthermore, in a Parliamentary 
Labour Party even more dominated by trade unionists, Labour patriots were prominent: 
Ben Tillett took Salford and James Sexton won back St Helens. Although the Coalition 
Government generally vanquished candidates who did not have the so-called ‘Coupon’ 
of support, and even Labourites who had had a crucial role in the war effort such as 
Henderson lost their seats, the party did not merely hold on: it expanded. Clearly 
Labour patriotism during the war was essential not only in avoiding an electoral 
catastrophe (which, admittedly, may have only been short-lived) but in winning new 
voters and new seats.  
After the opening of Parliament, Brigadier-General Sir Owen Thomas of 
Anglesey, Jack Jones of Silverton and F.H. Rose of Aberdeen North all took the Labour 
whip, as did A.E. Waterson, elected in Kettering as the first Co-operative MP, thus 
bringing the total of the Parliamentary Labour party to 61. The first three were 
undoubtedly Labour patriots and Waterson’s links with Labour forged during the war 
were significant in his recruitment; hence we can see the importance of labour 
patriotism in securing these four new members. Over the course of the Parliament one 
MP withdrew from the PLP whilst two others – originally elected as an independent and 
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a National Democrat – joined, bringing the strength up to sixty-two. Furthermore there 
were thirteen gains from by-elections, resulting in seventy-five Labour MPs at the time 
of the dissolution.  
The promising bridgeheads of 1918 were more fully exploited in 1922, when the 
post-war catholicity of the party allowed expansion in labour heartlands, London, and 
parts of the countryside. Labour was able to succeed in traditional areas with a strong 
trade union base, taking Accrington, Barnsley, Batley and Morley, Bradford Central, 
Bradford East, Crewe, Derbyshire North-East, Dewsbury, Doncaster, Eccles, Elland, 
Gateshead, Ilkeston, Jarrow, Keighley, Leeds South, Newcastle-upon-Tyne Central, 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne East, Newcastle-upon-Tyne West, Oldham, Rochdale, 
Sedgefield, Sheffield Attercliffe, Sheffield Brightside, Sheffield Hillsborough and 
Wrexham in 1922. Crucially, the party also made big breakthroughs in London, 
capturing Bermondsey West, Bow and Bromley, Camberwell North, Limehouse, 
Stratford West Ham, Walthamstow West, Whitechapel, and Poplar South.  
It is after 1922, and the return of the Labour ‘pacifists’, that we can see the 
variety of the post-war party. Pre-war ILPers and Liberals such as Jowett in Bradford, 
Lansbury in London, Snowden in the Colne Valley (former seat of maverick labour 
patriot Victor Grayson), Josiah Wedgwood in Newcastle-under-Lyme, Arthur Ponsonby 
in Sheffield Brightside and Charles Trevelyan in Newcastle-upon-Tyne Central, were 
elected to stand alongside ex-servicemen such as Clement Attlee in Limehouse, WNC 
executives such as Sidney Webb in Seaham, and ex-serviceman, future First Lord of the 
Admiralty and Defence Minister A.V. Alexander  who was returned as Co-operative 
MP for Sheffield Hillsborough. 
There were sixteen by-elections in between the general elections of 1922 and 
1923, and Labour contested twelve of these, making a net total of two gains. J. Chuter 
Ede gained Mitcham, Surrey from the Conservatives by 8,029 votes to 7,196, fighting 
against Sir A. Griffith Boscawen, then the Minister of Health. This was the first time the 
constituency had been fought by Labour, and Chuter Ede was helped by Griffith 
Boscawen being parachuted in from Taunton, where he had lost his seat at the general 
election, and by a four-cornered contest: E. Brown, an Independent Liberal, took 3,214 
and J.T. Catterall, an Independent Conservative, took 2,684. Similarly, Major Hills - 
another Minister, defeated at Durham in the general election - fought Edge Hill, and was 
defeated in a straight fight by Labour’s Jack Hayes (10,300 to 9,250): ‘The victory is 
the first breach which the Party has been able to make in the walls of this Conservative 
stronghold.’ 
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At the general election of 1923 the party fielded 427 candidates; there was a 
seventy-four per cent turn-out, and the total Labour vote increased to 4,348,379. Of 144 
seats held, 128 were retained, merely sixteen were lost, with sixty-three further gains. 
101 MPs were returned under the auspices of trade unions, thirty as ILP candidates, the 
same number were nominated by district Labour parties, four were from the BSP, two 
were Fabians and six were Co-operative party members. In addition, fourteen women 
were returned. London accounted for fifteen of the sixty-three gains, and these 
successes were not confined to the East End heartland; seats were won in South and 
even West London (Hammersmith North). New areas with seats won for the first time 
included Bristol and Reading, and there were victories in several diverse southern 
constituencies: Dartmouth, Gravesend, Ipswich, South Norfolk, Norwich, South-East 
Essex, and Maldon. Labour success in established heartlands increased: in Salford all 
three seats were won, in West Ham all four, and both East Ham seats were taken. 
Further, Wakefield, Huddersfield, Northampton and Coventry – which had all been 
fought continuously for twenty years – now yielded victories. 
The low number of losses in 1923 was encouraging: in 1922, when defending 
seventy-nine seats, Labour had lost nineteen; but defending 144 seats in 1923 they lost 
only sixteen. Of these thirteen were due to local pacts between Conservatives and 
Liberals, including against Henderson at Newcastle East and C. Roden Buxton at 
Accrington. The other three were lost by small majorities – in Sedgefield by only six 
votes. 
 
 
 
Graph 4.1: Candidates fielded by the Labour party at each general election, January 1910 – 1923. 
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Graph 4.2: Seats won by the Labour party at each general election, January 1910 – 1923. 
 
 
 
Graph 4.3: Votes won by the Labour party at each general election, January 1910 – 1923. 
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radical-socialist tradition in Bow and Bromley, and the populist-patriotism of Will 
Thorne and Jack Jones in West Ham - across Britain the party displayed a somewhat 
contradictory image. Certainly the post-war party was a broad church, but the patriotism 
displayed during the war, the securing of union allegiance, and the bespoke appeal to a 
broad and varied working-class culture gave credence to the party as the representative 
of labour, rather than a vehicle for middle-class liberal aspirations.  
Mathew Worley has noted that ‘despite the concerted efforts of Labour’s 
subcommittees, the party’s ability to extend its appeal was neither uniformly nor 
quickly achieved. Moreover, potential areas of support were not wholly realised’.166 Yet 
both in terms of organisation in the constituencies and cultural acceptance, important 
breakthroughs had been made, even if they did not translate into seats. Furthermore, 
while it is true to say that most of the advances of the 1920s were wiped away in the 
defeat of 1931, this defeat was the result of a particular set of circumstances, rather than 
a wholesale rejection of Labour. 1931 did not mean that Labour had ceased to be a 
national party anymore than 1906 or 1945 signified the wholesale rejection of the 
Conservatives. Indeed, Labour began recovering at the local elections of November 
1931; by 1933 they had recovered all of the municipal seats lost in 1931, and within a 
year of the 1932 ‘A Million New Members and Power’ campaign, they had recruited 
one hundred thousand new members.
167
 The crucial initial objections – both economic 
and cultural – had been overcome, and although the 1930s were to prove problematic, 
with core constituencies alienated – Jewish people through policy over Palestine; 
Catholics due to church schools – these coalitions of support did not collapse.168  
Henry Pelling wrote in 1953 that ‘By the nineteen-twenties [Labour] had 
become the party of the Celts and the nonconformists, of the teetotallers and the 
pacifists’,169 yet for other historians Labour’s weakness in the inter-war period was that 
it was identified too strongly with organised labour, and thought of as a ‘sectional 
interest’.170 So which interpretation was the more accurate? Did right-wing trade 
unionists, such as John Ward, have it right when they painted Labour as a refuge for 
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middle-class liberals and abstemious, soft-voiced, Nonconformists unrepresentative of 
the wider working class? Or were middle-class conservatives right to see the party as 
the dangerous vanguard of organised labour? As it turns out, they were both slightly 
right, but largely wrong. The Labour party which emerged after 1918 was both a 
welcome home to pacifists, teetotallers, Nonconformists and middle-class radicals 
fleeing the Liberals, and at the same time a vehicle for socialists, Fabians, trade 
unionists and social democrats. It is this catholicity that explains the post-war success of 
Labour, and the First World War – and labour’s support for the conflict – had an 
essential role in enabling this heterogeneity.  
As Blatchford himself affirmed in a leading article of May 1915: ‘Let us 
recognise the very obvious fact that one may be an enthusiastic vegetarian, freethinker, 
spiritualist, meat-eater, teetotaller, moderate drinker, Catholic, Protestant, anti-
tobacconist, theatre-goer, footballer, Protectionist, Free Trader, evolutionist, or 
creationist, and yet remain a sound and loyal Socialist.’171 In their book on the first 
Labour government, John Shepherd and Keith Laybourn argued that fear of association 
with Bolshevism or anti-British sentiment ‘was very much in the minds of Labour 
leaders throughout the early 1920s and beyond, as they endeavoured to demonstrate 
their party’s patriotism, moderation and respectability as suitable candidates for 
governing Britain and the British Empire’.172 Keith Laybourne has said of the 1930s: 
‘Labour’s clear hostility towards European fascism, and its support of the Republican 
side in the Spanish Civil War confirmed it to be a party which was prepared to face up 
to fascism. It marked it out as a patriotic party, in contrast to the general image it had 
earned during the 1920s.’173 The word earned is interesting: one the one hand, the anti-
nationalist image was placed upon Labour by its opponents; on the other the party did 
take a very deliberate pacifistic turn in the 1920s. But this was only made viable by the 
patriotic credentials earned during the war. Fortunately Labour did not need recourse to 
empty words and hollow sentiments: the record of the movement during the war, when 
it had been drawn into the government and played an instrumental part in victory, could 
speak for itself. The empirical fact of labour’s support for the war and its crucial role in 
winning the conflict could not be denied, and allowed the leaders of the 1920s to 
perform the delicate manoeuvre of pushing for disarmament and decolonisation whilst 
at the same time espousing patriotism and their readiness to rule.  Indeed they went on 
to claim that by 1924 Labour ‘had furled the Red Flag and unfurled the Union Jack’, yet 
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there was no need to do this; throughout the war and the immediate post-war years, both 
had been flying together.
174
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CHAPTER 5: LABOUR AND THE WARTIME STATE 
 
This chapter is concerned with the growth of the British state during the war, the 
relationship of the labour movement vis-à-vis the state, and the ramifications of this for 
the ideology and practice of the Left after the conflict. The expansion and - at least 
temporary - transformation of the British state during the war has received a great deal 
of scholarly attention over the past seventy years, yet it is still worth attempting to 
gauge the true extent of the expansion in the remit, responsibilities and power of the 
government. Also worth examination are the debates surrounding the motivations for 
this (did military necessity march in step with social reform, or was combat efficiency 
the only concern, and any improvements in welfare incidental?), and the extent to which 
the enhanced state apparatus was dismantled after 1918. Surprisingly, the co-ordination 
and operation of the British Left throughout the war is an area which has been largely 
neglected by historians. This is a significant oversight for, principally through the 
operations of the War Emergency: Workers’ National Committee, the labour and trade 
union movement fought against the most malign pressures and deprivations of the war 
upon the civilian population, successfully represented thousands of otherwise powerless 
people, sought redress of grievance for the voiceless, and helped to ensure that the 
Britain which emerged from the war was at least a slight improvement on the pre-1914 
nation. Finally, it has often been assumed that a larger, more interventionist state was 
always a long-term goal and aim of the labour movement, and hence that most on the 
Left would have been pleased by trends in this direction during the conflict. In reality, 
the first three decades of the twentieth century saw a variety of viewpoints as to how 
best theoretically and practically organise the economy and society, and the vision 
which was put into practice after 1945 was not necessarily destined to dominate. While 
the experience of the Depression and the Second World War - and the memory of 
broken promises and failed ambitions after the First – was certainly crucial to the 
coalescence of the ‘spirit of ‘45’ it will be argued here that not enough significance has 
been attributed to the experience of 1914-1918 in this development.  
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The Wartime Growth of the British State 
 
‘Thus in the hour of its supreme need does the nation turn to the collectivist experiments 
urged for so many years by the Labour movement. And the experiments are not found 
wanting.’       --- Daily Citizen, 5 August 
1914. 
 
‘Methods of state control which would once have been regarded as intolerable 
infringements of the rights and liberties both of employers and workmen have been 
accepted without effective protest even from those bred in the individualist tradition of 
the last century.’ 
--- Arthur Henderson, January 1919.
1
 
 
The Millgate Monthly, a cultural periodical attached to the Co-operative movement 
which did not normally advocate a greatly expanded bureaucratic state, still could not 
help but remark wryly in September 1914 at the sheer speed and alacrity with which the 
government had moved to interfere in areas previously considered the sacrosanct 
territory of free market liberalism.
2
 What the publishers and readers of the magazine 
could not have predicted was just how much further the British government would 
travel from its hitherto accepted role over the following years. If the previous decade 
had seen the British concept of state provision of welfare radically reformed, then the 
four years of the war were to see the British state transformed, from the product of 
Victorian laissez-faire liberalism to something containing the seed of the modern 
welfare state as we understand it today. While previous scholarship had tended to 
underplay this transformation, highlighting the dismantling of much of the wartime 
changes in the early 1920s, and claiming a lack of continuity between the statist 
principles of the First and Second World Wars, in her 2001 book The War Come Home, 
Deborah Cohen claimed that to fuel their ‘war machine[s], the societies of Europe were 
fundamentally transformed. Belligerent states arrogated unprecedented powers to 
regulate and coerce. They conscripted labor, rationed commodities, controlled profits, 
and sent men to die’.3  This section offers an overview of the expansion of the state 
during 1914-1918 and the debates as to the extent of and motivation for this expansion, 
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and argues that the experience, institutional changes, and ideological changes of the 
First World War were central to the continuance and development of statism until 1945. 
Almost from the outset the British government began to expand into areas 
previously untouched by the state. Lloyd George may have spoken of ‘business as 
usual’ in order to reassure banks and businesses, but as David French has argued, the 
actions of the government ‘made nonsense of this slogan’.4 From 4 August onwards the 
government pledged credit to underwrite the entire financial system and interfered in the 
markets on a massive scale: the Stock Exchange closed on 31 July and remained so until 
4 January 1915, and for the first time governmental controls were imposed on the 
domestic money market.
5
 If Liberals of an earlier generation would have been horrified 
at the deviation from Gladstonian non-intervention represented by Britain’s entry into 
the war, they would have been left distraught at this heresy against economic orthodoxy. 
The railways were commandeered on 4 August, mines and other industries soon 
followed, and as early as February 1915 the government began to buy up wheat.
6
 Jose 
Harris has pointed out that Britain in 1914, unique amongst developed nations, had no 
tariffs to protect its agriculture; yet from this laissez-faire beginning fully eighty-five 
per cent of the British food supply was under control of the Ministry of Food by the end 
of the war.
7
 In addition to foodstuffs, the government concerned itself with the drinking 
habits of its citizens: chief constables were given to power to close pubs and alter 
opening hours in August 1914, and while the Cabinet baulked at full-scale 
nationalisation of the liquor trade, it introduced taxes and controls to curb alcohol 
consumption which would have been impossible before the war, and which set the basis 
for restrictions that were to last for over ninety years.
8
  
By early 1915 it was clear that ‘business as usual’ would not win the war. The 
shell scandal of May of that year - in which it was revealed that up to a third of British 
shells were ‘duds’ that failed to explode – made this even more apparent, plainly 
exposing the shortcomings of the economic and military organisation of the country.
9
 In 
response to this the Ministry of Munitions - one of the most dynamic and far-reaching 
government departments of the war - was established under the leadership of Lloyd 
George in May 1915. By 1917 the efficiency and health of the thousands of munitions 
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workers had become a top priority for the government: numerous reports were compiled 
on the subject, and over six hundred firms appointed supervisors whose sole duty was to 
promote the welfare of their workers.
10
 Sick pay at one pound a week was introduced in 
the summer of 1916, and a per capita grant to cover hospitalisation of munition workers 
suffering from jaundice was issued in March 1917.
11
 Both miners and farm workers 
benefitted from state intervention into their industries, farm labourers in particular, with 
their importance to the war effort recognised with the introduction of a minimum wage 
for agriculture in 1917, a year after it had been introduced for munitions workers.  
The war created an acute concern for the well-being of the working classes who 
provided the bulk of the troops and labour required to win the conflict; an often-quoted 
statistic claimed that whilst nine British soldiers died every hour in 1915, more than 
twelve babies perished in the same time period.
12
 In this new environment even the 
traditionally Conservative The Times and The Telegraph lambasted previous 
governments for failing to tackle malnutrition and infant mortality. From 1915 the 
Board of Education began to finance child care classes for mothers; the Midwives Act 
was amended in 1916 to improve mortality rates in childbirth; and the Milk and Dairies 
Consolidation Act was introduced in 1915.
13
 Jay Winter has gone as far as to say that 
Britain came close ‘to the setting up of an embryonic national health service during the 
First World War’.14 In a similar vein ‘captains of industry’ began to proclaim the 
necessity and desirability of public ownership of electricity supply,
15
 and by 1917-1918 
the majority of workers, perhaps as many as eighty or ninety per cent, were involved in 
war-related work.
16
 By the end of the conflict even the most conservative were 
questioning the shibboleths of the free market. Winston Churchill asserted his belief that 
prices ‘will have to be fixed so as to secure to the poorest people in this country who are 
engaged in fighting this War as comrades with us, the power of buying a certain 
modicum of food’;17 he would also argue in December 1918 for continued railway 
nationalisation. Meanwhile Lord Carson claimed in February 1918 that Britain would 
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be beaten by Germany if it ‘refuses to learn the lesson that in modern commerce, as in 
war, the power of organized combinations pursuing a steady policy will speedily drive 
out of the field the unregulated competition of individual enterprise’.18 
Many on the Left were naturally exasperated that it had taken the bloodiest 
conflict Britain had known in order to create a clamour in the mainstream press for 
some of the simple, humane reforms they had been proposing for years; that it had to 
wait for ‘the war [to create] the political conditions necessary for the implementation of 
ideas formulated in the pre-1914 period’.19 In 1914 a cartoon in the Railway Review, 
captioned ‘Home Defence’, depicted barricades marked as ‘State Control of Railways’, 
‘National Relief of Unemployment’, ‘National Control of Food Prices’, ‘National 
Shipping Insurance’ and ‘National Relief of Distress’ protecting ‘John Bull’s Home’ 
(see Fig. 5.1). A John Bull figure, complete with rifle and bayonet, mopped his brow, 
while a Britannia figure stood atop the barricades. The caption had John Bull saying to a 
railway worker: ‘There! Now I think we have fixed up something to help us defend the 
old home!’, to which the worker replied: ‘Yes, but how much better to have 
permanently incorporated them in strengthening our defences, instead of falling back 
upon them in an emergency! What can be done in time of war can be done in time of 
peace.’ This was an early example of a common feature in the cartoons of the Railway 
Review: John Bull pictured as a sympathetic character, allied with a figure representing 
labour, sometimes against a German figure but more often against a figure representing 
employers. An article in the Annual Reports of the Amalgamated Society of 
Papermakers, headlined ‘The Duty of the State’, proclaimed in October 1914: ‘If these 
men are, as it were, duty bound to fight on behalf of the State, equally the State owes a 
duty to these men in return, and they have a perfect right to receive at the hands of the 
State a reasonable and assured recompense’.20 The NUR’s Railway Review concurred: 
‘If men have a duty to perform in the common interest of the State’, it argued, ‘equally 
the state owes a duty to those of its citizens who are prepared – and readily prepared – 
to make sacrifices in its defence and for the maintenance of its honour.’21  
The Ministry of Pensions was created in 1916 to oversee the increasing vast 
provision to bereaved families: initially mainly for widows, by the end of the war 
parents were the main recipients.
22
 According to Susan Pedersen the allowance system 
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21 Railway Review, 11 September 1914. 
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cost almost half a billion pounds; or almost as much as the amount paid to the soldiers 
themselves: ‘By the Armistice’, wrote Pedersen, ‘allowances were absorbing some 120 
million pounds per year, a figure roughly comparable to two-thirds of the total annual 
expenditure of the central government in the pre-war years.’23 Similarly it became 
difficult (at least in the short term), for the government to dodge responsibility for the 
poor and unsanitary housing of its citizens. At the outbreak of the war the Housing (No. 
2) Act 1914 empowered the Local Government Board and the Board of Agriculture to 
spend up to four million pounds on new houses,
24
 and although this spending failed to 
materialise, by 1915 all three political parties accepted that when building began again it 
would be on the basis of some sort of public control.
25
 The Ministry of Munitions itself 
became a major house builder, spending over £4.3 million on hostels, cottages and 
houses between 1915 and 1918.
26
 In October 1916, the Daily Chronicle announced the 
first ‘state farm’ for ex-servicemen: a 2,363 acre estate near Hull had been taken over by 
the government, and was to be settled by former soldiers for paid agricultural training.
27
 
Such schemes to re-settle ex-servicemen on the land may well have had their origin in 
the land-reform tradition amongst some of the older Lib-Labs – and amongst the Liberal 
recruits to Labour – and ultimately proved unsuccessful. The fortunes of agriculture 
continued to decline after the war, and those veterans who did secure small-holdings 
could be seen to have lost out.
28
 
The transformation of the pre-war state caused no little resentment, both during 
the war and subsequently. In her book Conscripts, Ilana Bet-El described the 
‘conceptual shift from free will to a printed summons’ that conscription involved, and 
the establishment of an unsettling bureaucratic process.
29
 ‘In theory’, wrote Bet-El, ‘an 
individual’s conscription was a form of trade in which he gave himself as a soldier, and 
in return the state became responsible for every aspect of his existence’.30 While Adrian 
Gregory and others have disputed this picture of individual agency subsumed into an 
unresponsive, bureaucratic state, there is no doubt that the immediate post-war period 
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featured something of a backlash against the state, not only politically and 
economically, but also culturally. In terms of aesthetics, for example, Catherine 
Moriarty has described the controversy surrounding the decision to have identical 
headstones at the war graves, and how head sculptor Eric Gill – later to become a 
sympathiser of the British Union of Fascists - questioned the uniformity of cemeteries 
and the role of the state.
31
  
There was further controversy around the expansion of the tax system. As 
Martin Daunton has noted, income tax was conceded as a principle in Britain much 
earlier than in other countries, to fight the previous ‘Great War’ a hundred years earlier, 
and the United Kingdom was able to raise money for warfare and welfare with 
considerably less strain than other countries – indeed taxation played a larger part in 
financing the British war effort than in any other nation.
32
 The tax system expanded 
during the war to incorporate many new tax payers and the standard rate increased; 
many working-class wage-earners were drawn into the tax system for the first time after 
the lowering of the exemption level in September 1915 from £160 to £130, which 
caused some resentment. Richard Whiting has recounted how ‘a Scottish miner agreed 
about the injustice of paying income tax but not “when the very existence of the country 
is at stake, whilst we are fighting for our very existence as a nation”’.33 George Barnes – 
Glasgow Gorbals MP and former Minister for Pensions - later recalled that ‘there was a 
great deal of intelligent heckling at the meetings with the [trade union] lodges and even 
then it could be noted that though the tax was loyally accepted there was a strong 
undercurrent of opposition to it’.34 Miners’ leader Herbert Smith thought that more 
direct taxation would result in workers taking a more active interest in their relationship 
with the state, and that trade union unemployment funds would appear less attractive, 
and it does indeed seem that this was the case: despite some resentment, the increased 
tax burden brought people closer to the state.
35
  
Noelle Whiteside stridently held that these were not developments in state 
socialism as such, but were driven instead by scientific concerns for efficiency that gave 
little thought to the welfare of citizens. For Whiteside the growth of industrial welfare 
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was a malevolent development designed to place constraints on organised labour.
36
 She 
argued that as the war went on support for increased state involvement began to wane, 
claiming that ‘in its purest form, scientific management could not be reconciled with 
free collective bargaining over working conditions’, and that in the end, ‘it was tacitly 
acknowledged that welfare at workplace was best determined by negotiation between 
employers and unions through join industrial councils’.37 Chris Wrigley concurred with 
this view, arguing that the Ministry of Munitions promoted welfare in order to hold 
labour in place: there was a high degree of worker mobility due to the labour shortage, 
and good pay and conditions were needed to keep men. It was American-inspired 
efficient paternalism, rather than state ‘socialism’.38 Indeed it could have been that 
employers feared, in the words of Arthur Henderson to Lloyd George, the ‘only 
safeguard against control of workmen is control by the State’.39 
 Whatever the motivations behind the transformation of the British state during 
the war, the changes were to prove temporary in most cases. Asquith had set up the first 
Reconstruction Committee on 18 March 1916 with its remit including the conversion of 
munitions factories for civilian purposes and maintaining central control of the railways; 
Lloyd George established his own in February 1917, and on both of these boards labour 
men were well-represented.
40
 Christopher Addison’s February 1918 memorandum on 
Reconstruction Finance stipulated seven tasks to be tackled immediately upon the 
outbreak of peace, even ‘at considerable cost’. These included housing, road and 
railway repair, land purchase, financing of essential industries, extending 
unemployment insurance, strengthening healthcare provision, and guaranteeing credit.
41
 
For Neville Chamberlain: ‘Every legitimate effort should be made to prevent 
unemployment and its accompanying demoralisation [after the war]. It was far better to 
run the risk of manufacturing commodities which would not be required, and to resolve 
them into their elements later, than to have multitudes in receipt of unemployment 
benefit.’42  Yet the Coalition Government would ultimately reject pressure from Labour 
and the unions for post-war investment in construction and other industries to combat 
unemployment, and there was no lasting overhaul of economic orthodoxy. Many 
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Asquithian Liberals joined the Coalition in rejecting most of the statism of the war 
years, and as Pat Thane has observed, ‘the Poor Law’s unscathed survival of the 
war…and the fate of health reform’ indicates the limited effect of the war on British 
social organisation.
43
 
The dismantling of a great deal of the state commenced quickly in the 1920s: the 
Ministries of Food and Munitions and the Coal Control Department were wound up on 
31 March 1921; the Railway Executive followed on 14 August; and controls over 
alcohol sales – the last wartime control to be abolished, which perhaps gives an insight 
into the confidence the Coalition had in big business relative to the discipline of British 
drinkers – were relaxed between February 1919 and June 1921, culminating in the 
Licensing Act of August of that year. The process of rolling back the wartime state 
featured public spending cuts not repeated in size and scope for ninety years. Yet war-
related extensions of social services were not all dismantled after the Armistice: a 
decision was made to grant out-of-work relief to the unemployed in addition to newly 
released soldiers in November 1918,
44
 and unemployment insurance – which had been 
extended to all munitions workers during the war - expanded to cover almost the entire 
workforce in 1920.
45
 Sir Eric Geddes, despite earning his reputation as the man who 
took an axe to state spending through his role as Minister of Reconstruction, felt that 
government promotion of domestic industry was an essential pre-requisite to its taking 
up the demand left by war contracts and overseas trade, arguing that the country ‘must 
be prepared to spend money on after-the-war problems as [it] did on during-the-war 
problems’.46 The Wages (Temporary Regulation) Act empowered the government to 
maintain the wartime wage level for eighteen months,
47
 the Housing and Town Planning 
Act was passed in 1919, and the same year saw the establishment of a Ministry of 
Health. Rent control remained in place until 1920, and while in certain areas the 
provision of working-class housing remained lamentable, nationwide the housing 
shortage was never again as severe as it had been before 1914. Similarly, the Mining 
Industry Act of August 1920, the Railways Act of 1921 and the establishment of the 
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Food Council in 1925, while rather pale impressions of what much of the Left felt was 
needed, they would surely not have come to pass were it not for the war.
48
 
More important than the institutions and legislation which survived the war era 
was the experience of the expanded state during wartime, and the intellectual and 
ideological Rubicons which were crossed during the conflict. As Wrigley has said of the 
Ministry of Munitions:  
 
The experience… left a lasting impression on people’s thinking, and not just on that of politicians 
and civil servants. After the First World War many industrialists, bankers, politicians and trade 
unionists became disillusioned with free market competition at home and abroad and favoured co-
operation in industry, mergers and large-scale organisation. The Ministry of Munitions could be 
eulogised as an example of what could be achieved.49  
 
The vast curtailment of public expenditure and the return to the gold standard in 1925 
indicated that no lessons had been learned from the war – and the war did not introduce 
Keynesian ideas to Labour or anyone else – the breaks with the past, both in terms of 
symbolism and actual policy, cannot be ignored. In areas such as agriculture there was a 
clear break with laissez-faire; although the Corn Production Act was repealed in 1921, 
farmers both expected and continued to call for state intervention. The notion took hold 
that working-class housing was a responsibility of the state; in response to the Sankey 
Report the government conceded the principle of nationalisation in some areas; and 
limited protectionism was introduced in the shape of the 1920 Dye-Stuffs Act and the 
following year’s Safeguarding of Industries Act.50  
Geoffrey Field described a great expansion of social services that took place 
during and after the Second World War, including ‘controlling rents, providing 
nurseries, paying numerous types of allowances, and even fixing the calorific intake of 
different occupational groups under the rationing system’. Yet all of these occurred to a 
certain degree during and after the 1914-1918 conflict, and while much of it was 
removed in the inter-war years, the principle had been conceded, and the mistakes made 
and lessons learned from the 1918-39 period meant that establishing the wartime state 
and the welfare state which followed was made all the easier, and executed all the more 
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promptly.
51
 In terms of the legal and institutional changes and precedents which were 
been broken, the First World War deserves due prominence as a time when the British 
attitude towards the state was transformed. This  
section has argued that the expansion and contraction of the British state during the war 
was not for naught: both in terms of the economic and policy changes which remained, 
and the ideological break with the past, the growth of the state during the First World 
War gave great encouragement to the Left and set the groundwork for 1939-45 and 
afterwards. The next section considers how labour attempted to create a safety net, or 
‘second state’ for British workers during the war.  
 
Labour and the Workers during the War 
 
The apparatus of the British state – of which Labour formed a part for most the of the 
conflict – expanded and evolved during the First World War, yet the activities of the 
labour movement outside of Parliament in this period are of tremendous significance in 
the history of the British Left. This section will relate the activities of the labour 
movement to further the interests of its members, and argue that the WNC provided 
almost a ‘second state’ or safety net for the most vulnerable. It represented workers at 
the highest levels of government, facilitated communication and propaganda amongst 
the labour movement, and pursued redress of grievance over individual injustices. These 
functions enabled the gathering of information, the building of activist bases on the 
ground, and attracting new support to the cause. 
  
Unemployment and Child Labour 
 
Unemployment was one of the first concerns for the Committee: almost immediately 
after war was declared certain employers began to use the conflict as an excuse to lay-
off troublesome workers, and some local authorities began to refuse out-of-work relief 
to men eligible for the Army, in strict contravention of Asquith’s proclamation on the 
matter. Letters flooded in about this discrimination, and the Committee successfully 
lobbied the Local Government Board to proscribe the practice, and had both Asquith 
and President of the Local Government Board Herbert Samuel further denounce the 
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policy.
52
 Expecting great dislocation and misery after the onset of the war, the Left 
initially looked to combat the threat of high unemployment. The Parliamentary 
Committee of the TUC made overtures to the Insurance Commissioners to have the 
government accord financial assistance to unions in the event of large numbers of their 
members being laid-off, and a number of schemes for dealing with the expected 
joblessness were put forward by labour organisations.
53
 A further concern was the use 
of service personal for civilian labouring work, at the expense of or undercutting local 
labour. Within a couple of weeks of the outbreak a letter to Dr J.T. Macnamara at the 
Admiralty told of coaling work being done at Southampton by Royal Navy sailors, 
despite dockworkers being unemployed, and men at Deptford working twelve hour 
shifts despite similar unemployment there.
54
 A month later a further letter to the 
Admiralty complained of discharges at Chatham dockyard when overtime was being 
worked and new men were being taken on.
55
 Ben Tillett asked Middleton to write to the 
War Office, requesting that whenever work was required to be done for the military, 
civilians who were usually engaged in such work should be taken on first. Yet despite 
an initial slackening of trade in some industries, by the end of the year unemployment 
had shrunk and most industries faced a shortage of labour. 
Such was the labour crisis in agriculture – with men leaving farms in droves for 
the military or better pay elsewhere - that children were often taken out of school and 
put to work. The WNC pressurised J.A. Pease, President of the Board of Education, to 
release the records of school attendance in agricultural districts, and sent out five 
hundred forms to be distributed amongst NALRU branches, in order for them to report 
use of child labour.
56
 Despite the efforts of the Committee this issue was still proving 
problematic by the autumn of 1915, and a deputation met with the Home Secretary on 
13 October to discuss the issue. During the meeting Henderson claimed that 1,538 boys 
and fifty-three girls had been granted exemption from school in rural areas, and 540 and 
228 respectively in urban areas. Of these fifty-four were under twelve years old, about 
930 were between twelve and thirteen, and the rest between thirteen and fourteen. 1,394 
boys and twenty-five girls were engaged in agricultural work; 121 boys and fourteen 
girls in factory work; and 300 and 179 respectively in unspecified employment.
57
 The 
Committee’s agitation in this area was so persuasive – chiming as it did with concerns 
52 WNC.8/74.  
53 WNC.30/1/7-140 – Unemployment.  
54 WNC.1/3/1 – letter to Dr J.T. Macnamara at the Admiralty, 15 August 1914. 
55 WNC.1/3/3/6 – letter to Macnamara, 15 September 1914. 
56 WNC.1/4/3/49-50 and 67. 
57 WNC.3/7/2/20 – Henderson’s speech to delegation on child labour. 
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about the health and well-being of Britain’s youth – that a resolution was moved at a 
meeting of the National Land and Home League (headed by the Conservative Lord 
Henry Bentinck): ‘This meeting regards with grave apprehension the far-reaching 
effects of the employment of children in agriculture, which must necessarily put them at 
a disadvantage throughout their lives, and urges the Board of Education to take 
measures for restricting the exemption of children under 13’.58 In addition to keeping 
children in school, the labour movement worked hard to ensure that they were properly 
fed; the London Labour Emergency Committee issued a leaflet, which advised: 
If you are out of work, not only can your children be fed by the school authorities on the school 
days (Monday to Friday), but they can also be fed by them on Saturday and Sunday. You ought 
not to allow your children to go hungry, and if you are unable to feed them, tell the children to ask 
the Teachers for BREAKFAST AND DINNER ON SATURDAY AND SUNDAY (as well as 
the other days of the week), and if necessary see the Teacher yourself.59 
The high demand for agricultural labour led the military to send men to work on 
the land, and complaints were received by the Committee in August 1915 from Norfolk 
farmworkers alleging that local farmers had been employing soldiers at a lower rate 
despite agricultural workers being registered at the labour exchange.
60
 Later in the war 
the WNC facilitated petitions to the Secretary of Agriculture complaining of under-
cutting by soldiers: ‘We the undersigned Farm Workers beg most respectfully to inform 
you that owing to the large number of soldiers now working on the land in this District 
we are unable to obtain work consequently our wives children and other dependants 
have to go short of food and other necessaries which we consider most unjust as these 
soldiers receive pay for and clothing as soldiers and should not be allowed to rob 
civilians of their living.’61 There were incidences of this around the country but they 
were usually only temporary: in this case Bob Walker of NALRU reported a few weeks 
later that the matter had lost its urgency as the soldiers had left and the men were 
reported to be back at work.
62
 Eventually, the 1917 pamphlet ‘Conscription Enters the 
Workplace’ was able to proudly claim that: ‘As a result of pressure from the Labour 
58 WNC.3/7/4/12. 
59 WNC.26/1/2. 
60 WNC.1/5/2/1-WNC.1/5/2/4. 
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minimum wage corrected the pay imbalance. See P.E. Dewey, ‘Government Provision of Farm Labour in 
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Party, Mr. Forster, on behalf of the War Office, has now stated that, in future, when it is 
found necessary to lend military working parties, the pay of the men shall be based on 
the current local rates for similar civilian work.’63 The issue of soldiers employed in 
agriculture further highlights the WNC’s two-way function as a means of airing 
grievances whilst collecting information and building up a activist base on the ground: 
former ILP chairman W.C. Anderson noted to Walker that the information about labour 
conditions which came in from displaced farm workers would be useful for Labour 
during the passage of the Corn Production Bill.
64
 
 
Food and Fuel 
 
Another key concern of the Committee was to stabilise food prices for the poor.  As 
early as October 1914 the WNC was pushing for the commandeering of home-grown 
wheat to ‘interfere with unpatriotic profiteering by British farmers and merchants’.65 
The end of 1914 saw the publication of the pamphlet ‘The Workers and the War: a 
Programme for Labour’, point eight of which called for ‘The encouragement and 
development of home-grown food supplies by the national organisation of Agriculture, 
accompanied by drastic reductions of freight charges for all produce, in the interests of 
the whole people’. Further attacks were made upon free-market orthodoxy with the call 
in point nine for ‘Protection of the people against exorbitant prices, especially in regard 
to food, by the enactment of maxima and the commandeering of supplies by the nation 
wherever advisable’.66 In November 1916 the WNC established a Food Prices Sub-
Committee, incorporating a broad spectrum of the British Left, from trade unionists 
such as W.C. Anderson, Alfred Bellamy, Fred Bramley and Ben Tillett, to ILPers and 
BSPers such as Ramsay MacDonald and Henry Hyndman, the CWS’s Bob Williams, 
and members of the Women’s Labour League in Susan Lawrence and Marion Philips. 
This committee immediately sent out a survey to all local labour organisations 
requesting information on the prices of various food stuffs.
67
  
In 1917 the Committee published a ‘Memorandum on The National Food 
Supply’, and distributed thousands of copies nationwide, encouraging the setting up of 
Food Vigilance Committees by local leftist organisations, hundreds of which were 
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eventually established. By May of that year the intensification of the U-Boat campaign 
resulted in a previously untenable food situation reaching crisis point. The Committee 
demanded the purchase of all imported foodstuffs, the commandeering of all home-
grown products, commandeering of ships, control of supply and regulation, and the 
fixing of the price of bread and flour for the rest of the war and six months afterwards.
68
 
They wrote to Lord Devonport, the hapless Food Controller, urging that he consider at 
least some of their ideas for assuaging the crisis, whether it be the registration of 
customers; the adoption of a scheme for sugar rationing; a Food Rationing Committee 
to be set up by the Ministry of Food; or controlling the supply and fixing the price of 
flour substitutes.
69
 A cartoon in The Co-operative News of January 1918 depicted a 
mass of people outside of a shop, marked ‘Competitive System’, trying to gain entry 
while a policeman attempted to keep order (see Fig. 5.2). In the caption John Bull spoke 
to a Co-operator: ‘This sort of thing is undignified and degrading. What do you do?’  To 
which the Co-operator replied: ‘Our system of equal distribution is the only method of 
dealing with this crisis.’ John Bull responded: ‘You seem to be in close touch with the 
people. We must solicit your help.’ 
Dozens of food conferences were held in cities and towns across Britain, and 
these were tremendously successful, rallying the local labour movements (the efficacy 
of these conferences in bringing together different groups in various localities is 
discussed in the Chapter 6) and raising over one hundred pounds for the coffers of the 
WNC. Perhaps their greatest feature, however, was in allowing labour to take the lead 
on a vital issue and demonstrating the relevance of the Left to ordinary people hitherto 
untouched by the movement. In the words of the convener of the Bradford Conference: 
‘The most pleasing feature of the conference was the hearty support given by the clergy 
of the city, in fact one of the Church of England parsons stated the resolution [calling 
for state control of the food supply] did not go far enough for him, so that I think you 
will agree things are moving.’70 
Describing local food vigilance committees, Karen Hunt claimed that: 
 
The existence of a local politics of food enabled some women to broaden the political agenda to 
include what had previously been seen as domestic and beyond political intervention. This 
included the provision of communal kitchens and the “nationalization” of the food supply. Such 
achievements had considerable potential to connect an expanded realm of politics with the 
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everyday life of ordinary women, if the case could be made for their continuation beyond the 
emergency of wartime and into peacetime reconstruction.71  
 
Certainly the agitation over food supply and pricing at a local level was highly 
significant for the development of local labour bodies and organisations, and could 
aided in the radicalisation of previously apathetic groups. Professor Hunt went on to 
assert that ‘to examine food through the prism…of national organizations, such as the 
WEWNC…neglects how the politics of food played out at a local level’ and that such 
negligence results in our underestimating local radicalism and anti-war sentiment.
72
 
This assertion seems mistaken. Food vigilance committees were usually set up under the 
auspices of the WNC, utilised speakers and propaganda material sent by the Committee, 
and very often remitted funds to the Committee’s coffers. By no means did the WNC 
act as a conservative anchor on these groups; on the contrary, it was very often crucial 
to their co-ordination. The WNC was emphatically not a mechanism for suppressing 
working-class dissent. Furthermore, such local agitation, whilst critical of the war and 
existing social structures, were not revolutionary nor defeatist; they formed a part of the 
Left’s reaction to the war; not a rebuke to it.  
In June 1917, at the height of the food crisis, the WNC learned of a plan to 
sterilise and sell meat infected with tuberculosis, and sent the following strongly-
worded resolution to the Prime Minister:  
 
That this Committee learns with amazement that the Local Government Board has sent to local 
authorities the suggestion that they should sterilise and offer for sale the purpose of human 
consumption the meat of cattle affected with tuberculosis and that such meat should be disposed of 
at a low price to the poor. The Committee protests strongly against such a policy both on the 
ground of public health and class distinction, and urges that permission to sell such meat should be 
at once withdrawn.73  
 
A report came in from Dundee immediately after the start of the war that the local 
Labour Representation Committee had been informed that two wholesale firms were 
trying to corner the sugar supply in Dundee, and called for the government to take 
action against this behaviour, adding that the names of the firms involved could be 
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forwarded if requested.
74
 Middleton replied requesting for the names to be sent to the 
Board of Trade, and stating that ‘What they require is specific information of the kind 
you have. It is useless for us to send forward complaints of a general character.’75 
A letter from the Retford and District Trade and Labour Council carried the 
resolution that: ‘This Trade Council does emphatically protest against the proposed 
representation of Labour on the Food Control Committee (one in twelve) and contend 
that as Labour represents the greater portion of the population, it is entitled to at the 
least half the representatives on such Committees.’76 The Middlesbrough Co-operative 
Society complained to Middleton that they had no representation on Middlesbrough 
Food Control Committee and other committees in the Middlesbrough district. 
Middleton wrote to Food Controller – now Labour MP John Clynes – to press him on 
the matter. Clynes responded that co-operators were proportionately represented on the 
appropriate committees, and that in any case appointment of members to Food Control 
Committees was the responsibility of local authorities. This disappointment anticipated 
the problem of trade unions and left-wing groups under later Labour governments, who 
would find out that they faced much the same problems with their own people in power 
as they had done under Liberals and Conservatives.
77
  
This focus on the price of food was to win the movement praise – and from 
some unlikely quarters. The Yorkshire Post in December 1916 noted: 
 
This week the Workers’ War Emergency Committee, an important auxiliary of the Labour party, 
has adopted a series of agricultural resolutions, asking the Government to take over “at least four 
million acres of the land at present abandoned to grass or fallow”; the land now devoted to private 
parks is to be included; implements to be furnished by the Government, and a “civilian body of 
mobile labour” organised “including German prisoners.”78 
 
Similarly the Sheffield Daily Telegraph at the same time was full of praise for WNC 
action on high food prices and Army allowances.
79
 In a May 1917 article entitled ‘The 
Real Danger’, the Pall Mall Gazette praised the Miners’ Federation for their resolutions 
on food control: ‘It is time the Government used the powers they possess to stamp out 
this trafficking with the food of the people, this wicked exploitation of the war. The 
profiteer, when discovered, should be prosecuted, and, on conviction, should be 
                                               
74 WNC.11/54 – letter from William Westwood J.P. of Dundee LRC, 17 August 1914. 
75 WNC.11/55 – letter to William Westwood, 20 August 1914. 
76 WNC.10/3/20 – letter from Retford and District Trade and Labour Council, 17 August 1917. 
77 WNC.7/2/135i – letter from J.R. Clynes, 13 May 1918. 
78 Yorkshire Post, 6 December 1916. 
79 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, December 1916. 
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sentenced to the imprisonment he so richly deserves.’80 The Evening News excoriated 
the deeply-unpopular Devonport, asking: ‘If he has completely misled patriotic and 
intelligent Labour leaders, is it any wonder that…the nation as a whole has failed to 
realise the seriousness of the situation?’81  
Finally, the Daily Mail praised the working of the Committee, claiming that the 
‘manifesto issued by the Workers’ National Committee shows the effect of Lord 
Devonport’s failure to make the country understand the food position’.82 Although the 
cost of food was to remain a significant issue throughout the war, the Left had a great 
deal of success in this area through Food Vigilance Committees, food councils, and 
eventually the introduction of rationing and the Corn Production Act. Noting the 
desirability of the state subsidising farmers to increase production, Sidney Webb wrote 
to the Secretary of the Rural Advisory Committee in July 1918: ‘[The Corn Production 
Act] does nothing to raise the price of food to the consumer. Whatever protection and 
assurance is thereby afforded to the farmer comes out of the Exchequer, not out of the 
pockets of the consumers. Its burden falls, therefore, on the tax-payers, roughly in 
proportion to their means, instead of upon the consumers in proportion to their 
mouths.’83  
Further to the increasingly precarious food supply, the price and distribution of 
coal became a major issue as the war wore on. In 1915 the Coal Prices Limitation Act 
had fixed the pit head price of coal to a maximum of four shillings above the price 
generally prevailing before the war, yet by July 1916 the Coal Controller had authorised 
South Wales coal owners to make a further increase in two shillings six pence 
(apparently due to the increased wages being paid to miners), so that the maximum pit 
head price was six shillings six pence per ton above the pre-war prices. Significantly, 
these restrictions only applied to coal sold at the pit top, and made no allowance for the 
cost of coal to individual customers. Middleton warned the Prime Minister in 1916 that: 
 
The concession so readily granted to the South Wales owners will be followed by demands from 
the owners in other coalfields with the inevitable result that consumers will be faced during the 
coming winter, and probably earlier, with considerable enhanced retail prices, for it cannot be 
assumed for a moment that coal merchants will be content to pass on the increased cost without an 
increased percentage of profit added thereto.84   
                                               
80 Pall Mall Gazette, 18 May 1917. 
81 Evening News, 12 May 1917. 
82 Daily Mail, 12 May 1917. 
83 WNC.1/4/11/1 – Sidney Webb to Secretary of Rural Advisory Committee, 2 July 1918. 
84 WNC.3/10/24.i – letter to Asquith, 25 July 1916. 
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During the winter of 1916-1917 the WNC urged the establishment of municipal coal 
distribution, but the proposal did not find favour.
85
 In a rather sarcastically-worded 
letter to E.J. Hollands of the Cowes Trades Council, Middleton warned: ‘The presence 
of Lord Rhondda, who, of course, was formerly Mr. D.A. Thomas, the South Wales 
Coal Magnate, at the Head of the Local Government Board, is, I think, a pretty firm 
guarantee that the Coal Trade will not be municipalized just yet.’86 On the same day he 
complained to Robert Brown of the Dartmouth Ratepayers Association: ‘The several 
Governments which have been in office during the War have steadily refused to fix 
retail coal prices despite the pressure that has been brought to bear repeatedly by the 
Workers’ National Committee and its kindred local organisations.’87  
 
Pensions 
 
Soon after the first casualties of the war began returning to Britain a campaign 
developed to ensure adequate pensions for wounded and disabled men. A resolution of 
the Clydebank and District Trades’ and Labour Council called upon the Government to 
‘establish adequate pensions for disabled soldiers and sailors, and strongly protests 
against any attempt to introduce charitable offerings, thus relieving the Government of 
their duty and humiliating the men who have responded to their country’s call’.88 A War 
Pensions Conference in Pontypridd on 3 June 1916 further emphasised this demand. 
Over four hundred delegates from 189 trade union branches, sixty-six churches, fifteen 
trades councils, six friendly societies and three Labour parties unanimously passed the 
following resolution: 
 
That this Conference considers that the method of providing for our brave Soldiers and 
Sailors who have sacrificed so much for their country, by collections in various ways, is 
unworthy of the British Public; that we pledge ourselves to take every step necessary to 
bring pressure to bear on Parliament to make provision for the disabled Soldiers and 
Sailors, so that they and their families shall not suffer or be dependent on charity. And 
furthermore, that we, the Delegates assembled at this Conference, are prepared to advise 
the members of the various organisations we represent not to assist in any local efforts in 
furtherance of the Charity Clauses in the Naval and Military War Pensions Act, 1915, so 
                                               
85 WNC.3/10/1-2. 
86 WNC.3/10/10a – letter to E.J. Hollands, 31 May 1917. 
87 WNC.3/10/12 – Middleton to Robert Brown, 31 May 1917. 
88 WNC.24/1/94i – Resolution of the Clydebank and District Trades’ and Labour Council, 16 February 
1916. 
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as to place upon the Government the onus of providing all the funds required to 
administer the Act.89 
 
In September 1916 Middleton wrote to D. Rogers of the Llanelly Labour Association, 
assuring him that every attempt was being made to co-ordinate the various Pensions 
Authorities, and that the party leadership was very anxious to secure reform for all the 
existing anomalies.
90
  
In addition to agitating for more generous pensions across the board, the 
Committee also dealt with a great deal of case work on this issue. For example a County 
Durham woman, Mrs Gardiner, had a son killed in France; as her husband was in work 
the War Office offered a one-off gratuity rather than a pension. Mrs Gardiner insisted 
that since her husband – a colliery chargeman earning four shillings a day – was sixty 
years old he could not be expected to make up the loss of the fifteen shillings a week the 
son had provided to the household.
91
 This obtuseness in withholding pensions from 
relatives who - while not technically dependent on the deceased were still heavily 
reliant upon them - was fairly common. Middleton wrote in the case of Mrs Gardiner, ‘I 
am not very hopeful of any change [to this practice] being made in the War Office 
decision but will do what I can’:92 eventually, however, the War Office decided that ‘a 
pension could not be awarded ‘in view of [her] means of support’.93 A case of active 
connivance to reduce disablement pensions was reported by Tom Sullivan of the 
Lanarkshire Miners’ Union. Sullivan told of the case of Sergeant Andrew Stoddart who, 
after nineteenth months in the field, was wounded on 6 December 1916, and had his left 
leg amputated. Early in January 1917 his wife received a letter informing her that he had 
been demoted to Corporal as of 6 December 1916, and so her allowance would be 
reduced. Nor had he received any pay since being hospitalised. Sullivan alleged: ‘Now 
you will see the harshness of this case, as their sole object seems to be the fixing of a 
lower pension as Private instead of the Serjeant’s [sic] rank. Trusting you will give your 
assistance and if possible get justice done.’94 After Middleton called for an explanation, 
the War Office claimed that Stoddart had only been ‘appointed Acting Sergeant on 
                                               
89 WNC.24/1/172 – letter from South Wales Campaign to Demand Adequate Public Maintenance for 
Disabled Soldiers and Sailors and their Dependents, 15 June 1916. 
90 WNC.24/1/218 – letter to D. Rogers, 11 September 1916. 
91 WNC.2/5/2/1 Letter from W.H. Johnson of the Durham Miner’s Association to Middleton, 9 October 
1916. 
92 WNC.2/5/2/2 – Middleton to Johnson. 
93 WNC.2/5/2/3. 
94 WNC.2/5/4/2 – letter from Tom Sullivan of Lanarkshire Miners’ County Union, 8 January 1917. 
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August 18
th
; reverted to Corporal November 13
th’.95 Finally, labour activists in 
Wolverhampton brought to light the case of a soldier discharged after twelve months 
with a tuberculosis ulceration of the neck – it was confirmed by two doctors that it was 
almost certainly caused by service in the Army. However, it was discovered that he had 
spent six of those twelve months in Wormwood Scrubs, so despite the protest of the 
Labour members, the sub-committee (of the Local War Pensions Committee) refused to 
recommend him for a pension, on the grounds of ‘character’.96 
 
Housing 
  
Given the parlous state of working-class housing before August 1914, and the cessation 
of virtually all house building during the war, the provision of homes for the workers 
became an even more pressing issue.
97
 After being informed via Ben Tillett of delays in 
house building projects in Swansea, W.C. Anderson asked Walter Long, President of 
the Local Government Board, whether he would publish a list of housing schemes that 
had been sanctioned since the outbreak of the war, and those which had been refused. 
Long responded:  
 
Speaking generally, the Department have since March last been forced, owing to the restrictions 
on expenditure, to take the line that loans for housing and other purposes cannot be sanctioned at 
the present time. An exception has been made in the case of munition areas where further 
accommodation is urgently required for the workers, and in some half-dozen cases terms have 
been arranged under which housing schemes will, I am glad to say, shortly be put in hand.98   
 
Before the war, most of the working class had lived in privately rented 
accommodation, and as Ken Weller has noted, distraints for rent arrears were a 
depressingly common feature of Edwardian England, with sixteen thousand in 1908 in 
the North London borough of Islington alone.
99
 The War Rents League created a 
pamphlet, ‘Rent Raising Made Illegal’, which explained the implications of the War 
Rents Restriction Act. It advised that increases in rents were not legal and tenants 
should refuse to pay more than pre-war rents; that tenants could not be ejected for 
                                               
95WNC.2/5/4/3 - letter to Middleton from Ministry of Pensions, 30 April 1917. 
96 WNC.2/5/8/1 – letter from Wolverhampton WEW Vigilance Committee, 15 May 1917. 
97 In some areas, long-term undersupply of housing reached crisis point during the war. See B. White, 
‘Wigwams and Resort Towns: The Housing Crisis in First World War Devon’, in N. Mansfield and C. 
Horner (eds.), The Great War: Localities and Regional Identities, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing, 2014, 97-118. 
98 WNC.13/7/22/1-2.  
99 K. Weller, Don’t Be a Soldier!, London: Journeyman, 1985, 16. 
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refusing to pay increases; any increases paid since 25 November 1915 should be 
deducted from future rent; landlords were not permitted to alter terms of tenancy in any 
way unfavourable to tenant; only increases permitted were for improvements or 
structural alterations or for increases in rates; and that landlords were obliged to give 
tenants notice in writing of intentions to raise rent four weeks in advance.
100
 Leaflets 
were distributed to various trade councils, from Abertillery to Sunderland, advising of 
changes to the law and warning people not to pay excess rents, and the campaign to 
publicise changes in the law brought in queries and requests from the general public, 
such as this from Mrs Westwood of Warrington:  
 
To The Secretary, 
Having seen your letters in the Daily Citizen I am writing to ask you if my land-lord can take my 
doors off and turn me out. I owe him a month’s rent and as my month’s pay has not come I asked 
him to take 5d a week until it was paid up and he said that would not do for him he asked me for 
my wing paper and because I would not give it to him he told me he would take the doors off 
before the night was out and he came everyday last week for rent. Can he stand to turn me out my 
husband is at the front and I have two children would you kindly give me a little advice. 
Yours truly Mrs Westwood.101 
 
In response Middleton forwarded the details of the case to a supporter in Warrington 
and assured Mrs Westwood that under the Courts (Emergency Powers) Act she could 
not be turned out. Similarly in a letter to another concerned correspondent he gave 
assurance that: ‘Your landlord cannot distrain or terminate the occupancy of your house 
without an order from the Court and you will have an opportunity of stating your case to 
the magistrate and of showing that your arrears are due to the intervention of the war.’ 
He enclosed further particulars relating to the Act and added that ‘if you have any 
difficulty whatever I shall be glad if you will communicate further with us’.102  
As with the food supply and undercutting in agriculture, the WNC did not 
merely agitate on behalf of tenants; the rent issue was used as a means of collecting 
information to bolster Labour’s position on the matter in Parliament. Middleton advised 
Asquith in October 1915 that the WNC was collecting data on rents – amongst other 
things – that would then be used in official speeches.103 Given that prosecutions for 
breeches of the Rent Restrictions Act were very rare, these actions by the WNC were 
                                               
100 WCML Pamphlet Collection, World War One, Box 2: ‘Rent-Raising Made Illegal. The War Rents 
Restriction Act Explained to Tenants’, by Dan Rider (Honorary Secretary of the War Rents League). 
101 WNC.15/4/20 – letter from Mrs Westwood, 14 October 1914. 
102 WNC.27/1/7 – letter to Mr Foulis, 11 January 1915. 
103 WNC.27/3/2 - letter to Asquith, 18 October 1915. 
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important in reassuring people of their rights under the law, preventing abuses by 
landlords, and giving poor working-class tenants the novel feeling that the force of the 
law and the authority of the state could be used to their advantage. 
 
Apprentices  
 
Another area of concern for the Committee was the question of apprenticeships. There 
was some uncertainty about whether or not the period in which an apprentice was 
serving with the forces was to be considered part of the apprenticeship. The 
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners, the Shipwrights and Ship Constructers 
Society, and the ASE reported back that there was no general established practice on 
this issue. The House Painters and Decorators claimed that they would be considered 
full members of the Society but whether or not they received full rates would depend on 
the state of the trade at the time.
104
 Perhaps the most candid response came from the 
Boilermakers and the Iron and Steel Ship Builders:  
 
The employers in our trade, in many cases, made certain promises to the lads – which, perhaps, 
don’t count for much. It will depend on trade conditions at the end of the war…We, however, as a 
Society, have decided to recognise the merits of such lads, and give them some credit for the time 
they have been away.105  
 
Another problem arising out of apprentices serving with the colours was brought to the 
Committee’s attention by Charles Dukes of the Lancashire and Cheshire Federation of 
Trades and Labour Councils. According to Dukes, if a young man - working as a 
general labourer or unskilled machine tender and earning sixteen to eighteen shillings a 
week - were to enlist, his parents or dependents would be able to recover from the 
government any sum over the cost of his maintenance – assumed to be around five to 
six shillings a week. In contrast, the parents of an apprentice could not claim the same 
remuneration ‘yet the youth is sacrificing the best years of his apprenticeship & will 
suffer a greater loss when he returns to his Trade’. Dukes suggested that a flat rate be 
introduced whereby the parents or guardians of the apprentice would benefit to the same 
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105 WNC.2/4/1/5. 
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extent as those of children earning a full wage.
106
 Middleton assured Dukes that George 
Barnes had suggested such a scheme, but with no success.
107
  
  
Aliens 
 
Letters also arrived from various labour bodies around the country describing the 
persecution and ill-treatment of enemy aliens within Britain. A Hungarian named Oskar 
Beck of St. Pancras had been working with the GFTU until he was interned; Middleton 
wrote to the Under Secretary for Home Affairs, the Labour MP William Brace, to try 
and secure his exemption. In this he was unsuccessful, and Beck was interned on the 
Isle of Mann, although Brace advised that since he was disabled, having only one arm, 
he might be exchanged for a medically unfit British subject in Germany.
108
 Wilhelm 
Floerke, who had been driven from Germany due to his protests against the autocracy of 
the regime, and who held a Professorship at Glasgow University, found himself 
interned, and the WNC fought vainly on his behalf.
109
 Similarly, a Mr Edit Heumann, 
the Honorary Treasurer of the National Union of Clerks District Council, and the 
Honorary Secretary of the Fulham branch, was to be deported until WNC intervention 
secured his exemption.
110
 A Mr Doviack of Liverpool wished to Anglicize his name; he 
spoke to Wright Robinson of the local ILP, who put him in touch with Middleton. He 
then in turn contacted Labour Counsel H.H. Slesser – who had himself changed his 
name from Schloesser – who advised on the appropriate legal procedures to change his 
name from Doviack to Denton.
111
  
 
Profiteering and Exploitation 
 
One of the more surprising functions of the WNC was its role as a conduit for people to 
inform on cynical and illegal practices which were either to the detriment of working 
people, or the war effort, or both. A letter from Liverpool activist Fred Hoey in August 
1916 relayed a scandalous report from the Warehouse Workers’ Union. The Union 
alleged that 1450 cases of Canadian corned beef had been docked in Liverpool around 
the time of the outbreak of the war, stored for two years, and then returned to Canada so 
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that they could be sold to the Government at a higher price. An outraged Hoey 
suggested that a question should be asked in the Commons on the matter.
112
 The 
Newcastle Fabian Society reported in October 1915 that a large number of firms owning 
merchant ships had sold vessels at greatly inflated prices and made huge profits which 
could escape taxation due to the transaction being designated as ‘realisation of capital’ 
rather than profit. This would result in a massive loss to national income, as vessels and 
even whole fleets had been sold at a profit of over one hundred per cent. ‘It is hoped’, 
the letter continued ‘that the Committee will use its influence to prevent this profit, 
which has been paid by the poorer classes in this country (in the shape of increased food 
prices) escaping taxation’.113 Examples such as these suggest it is clear that while the 
war waged on, organised labour at the grassroots level would remained hawk-eyed 
about profiteering and undermining of the war effort. 
 Of particular concern for the WNC and local labour bodies was the awarding 
and completion of government contracts. As early as November 1914 the Committee 
asked the government to ‘make public the names and addresses of the contractors who 
are supplying material in the form of food, clothing, huts, etc., etc., to His Majesty’s 
forces’.114 Army and Navy contracts had been published prior to the war, but this ceased 
upon outbreak; due to WNC pressure the practice was resumed by the Army in January 
1915, but the Navy continued to obfuscate.
115
 Within the first few months of the war the 
Committee began to receive reports of firms producing shoddy materiel and short-
changing the government. A letter from H. Bassford of the Ilkeston and District Hosiery 
Union on 14 December 1914 reported that: ‘There is, I am told by one of the workmen, 
a firm in our Trade that is robbing the Government on Contracts. There is no doubt 
about it. I think the firm could, if care was exercised, be caught at the work. It is a firm 
that has always and is now fighting us [the union].’116 A further letter added that: ‘The 
firm is not only robbing the Government but are working females until 9. O. Clock at 
night for about 10/- per week.’117 Middleton wrote to Sir George Gibb, Director of 
Contracts at the War Office, to report Bassford’s claim that water was being added to 
the hose to make them the required weight.
118
 The Trimmers’ Union, Scourers’ Union, 
the Dyers’ Society and the Auxiliary Workers’ Union all supported Bassford’s claim, 
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and Gibb met with a deputation from the Committee, including Henderson, Anderson, 
Middleton and MacDonald, to discuss the matter early in the new year.
119
 
 In February of 1915 the authorities reported back that an investigation had taken 
place and no water had been found, but Middleton warned the War Office that the 
unions concerned were not satisfied with this outcome.
120
 ‘With respect to your 
communication of February 18
th’, Middleton wrote, ‘I enclose herewith a 
communication I have received from my correspondent and shall be glad to have your 
observations on its contents as the allegation so flatly contradicts the opinions of the 
Department…I am bound to say that it appears a little unreasonable to suppose that men 
working in the hosiery factories have imagined the process of which they complain.’121 
He then advised the Contracts Department that if they desired to avoid a scandal there 
was a need for a ‘frank enquiry’ to be made into the matter as ‘the organised trades in 
Leicester were not prepared to allow the matter to rest as it is a present’, and that, 
furthermore, he proposed to secure more publicity of the issue in the Daily Citizen and 
other newspapers.
122
 The obtuseness of the state over this issue suggests the absurd 
situation that the military was less concerned with the quality of their hosiery than were 
the men employed to make it, and that the government may even have been complicit in 
its own deception, an impression confirmed by Middleton:  
 
On Wednesday, March 3rd, 1915, I had a conversation with an employer in the hosiery finishing 
department, and in reply to my questions he said: “Yes, we all water Government hosiery. I have 
to add water on the instructions of the manufacturers to bring them all to the required weight. We 
all do it, and the Government knows we do it…I know it’s a fraud, I know it’s dishonest, but it’s 
done throughout the trade; and as I know the Government are aware of it my conscience does not 
prick me, but it’s wrong all the same.123  
 
 The hosiery dispute was not the only controversy involving government 
contracts. An article in The Clarion in January 1915 alleged that ‘the timber merchants 
rushed up the price for timber immediately they heard that the troops were to be 
sheltered in wooden huts, the increase being 37½ per cent above pre-war rates’.124 
Similarly, in a letter to the editor of the Daily Citizen which was passed on to 
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Middleton, Timothy Smith - a Labour councillor in Colchester and President of the 
Local Branch of the Workers’ Union - decried the poor standard of Army boots being 
produced, and attached a sample of the shoddy stuffing which lined the shoes. 
Middleton took up the issue, sending the stuffing on to the War Office.
125
 The military 
tried to dodge the issue, claiming that the boots must have been purchased locally in the 
enlistment rush which followed the creation of the New Armies.
126
 Somewhat bemused 
by this apparent lack of concern about the quality of the troops’ footwear, Middleton 
replied that ‘While…there is a probability that the boots were accepted in an emergency 
that explanation is surely hardly sufficient to meet the case. Would it not appear 
desirable for the delinquent contractor to be found and properly dealt with?’127 Yet the 
War Office did not share this concern, responding that ‘it is regretted it is now 
impossible to trace the source from which the boots were obtained’.128 Overall WNC 
reports of profiteering and misuse of government contracts tended to come to naught; 
the government made only perfunctory attempts to follow-up and investigate the claims, 
and indeed seemed rather inconvenienced by the allegations. 
The changed atmosphere of the war did not just result in greater scrutiny of 
firms short-changing the government, but also of members of the government who 
appeared to be benefitting from the conflict. By no means was this scrutiny confined to 
the Left. A letter was published in the Morning Post, no less, by a Mr F.G. Banbury, 
who claimed that he had received a circular from “Mitchelson, Ltd”, a company which 
listed its partners as A. Mitchelson, John Hambly, and the Rt. Hon. Lord Rhondda. This 
circular had advertised an investment in a company which paid a dividend in ordinary 
shares in 1915 of fifteen per cent, with an additional distribution of fifty per cent out of 
accumulated profits. The profits for 1916 were forecasted as in the region of one 
hundred thousand pounds, and there was to be a dividend of twenty-five per cent, free 
of income tax, already declared for that year. One of the main sources of profits for this 
company were everyday necessities such as margarine and soap. Banbury noted that 
Ministers were supposed to relinquish Directorships of companies, and Rhondda had 
not done so.
129
 The fact that the Morning Post had taken this line, along with the 
condemnation across all media of the malnourishment and unfitness of British recruits, 
and the praise given to the WNC by organs such as The Times and the Daily Mail, 
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shows how iconoclastic the war had been. If some of the more over-zealous labour 
patriots were to venture into a territory of jingoism and sinister ultra-nationalism, then 
one must not forgot that many on the Right also found a new found and short lived 
enthusiasm for some economic planning and equality of sacrifice. 
 
WNC Casework  
 
One of the most important functions of the Committee during the war was its 
representation of ordinary, otherwise powerless people. There were numerous cases of 
the WNC and the labour movement aiding and supporting individuals in addition to 
their agitation on behalf of working people as a whole, and this representation went 
someway to convince people of the necessity and viability of trade unions and the 
Labour party. As G.A. Robinson of the NUR said to Walker of NALRU of his meeting 
with non-unionised agricultural workers in 1917:  
 
I told them in very plain words that a Branch of the Union had been in existence over a year and 
they had only just found out that it could be of assistance to them…May I suggest to you that it is 
at a time like the present that there is an excellent chance of building up your [union] by showing 
the men that real interest is taken in their complaints which in this case are certainly just and 
require redress.130  
  
H.H. Elvin, General Secretary of the National Union of Clerks, told Middleton of 
his experience, walking down the Strand on a Wednesday afternoon, where by the 
Gladstone memorial, a recruiting meeting was taking place. The recruiting officer 
claimed that: 
 
It was no good for any young fellow of military age stating that he suffered, for example, 
from rheumatism, because on receiving any excuse of this sort, they immediately got into 
touch with the Commissioners, and found out from his Society was his health record was. 
So he warned any would-be recruits not to attempt any excuse of that sort. He also added 
that every individual of military age had to enlist. If he did not so voluntarily, he would 
be compelled to do so; that he had until November 30th to come in, and if by then he had 
not done so, he would be compelled, and the letter “C” would be on his coat collar so that 
everybody would know he had been forced to enlist and he was not a volunteer. 131 
 
                                               
130 WNC.1/4/9/4i – letter to Walker from G.A. Mitchell, treasurer, Sutton Bridge Branch  NUR, 20 April 
1917. 
131 WNC.8/8/8/8 – letter from H.H. Elvin, 29 October 1915. 
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Elvin wanted to know whether someone was liable to be prosecuted under DORA if 
they questioned these assertions. Middleton asked Arthur Peters, secretary of the Joint 
Labour Recruiting Campaign Committee, and he passed on the letter to Lord Derby.
132
 
 The introduction of conscription was to provide many more individual cases for 
the attention of the WNC. Elvin wrote in March 1916 of the Wigan Coal and Iron 
Company starring single men for work although there were married men in the same 
office who could do the same work: ‘The married men are trade unionists and the single 
men referred to are non-unionists and remained in with the Company while their fellow 
clerks were out on strike at the end of last year.’ In addition, after a strike at Ardeer 
factory of Nobel’s Explosive Company in June 1915, one of the most active men, a 
clerk name D. Scullion, found himself called up in March 1916. ‘I am convinced’, 
wrote Elvin, ‘that the action of the Company, through their official at Ardeer is to 
punish Scullion for the part he took in the strike last June and I think you will see from 
the above that there is a very strong case in favour of this contention.’133  
 Another controversy was that of Private Charles Keen, of Tottenham. Keen had 
been awarded non-combatant service by the Middlesex Appeal Tribunal, but this was 
ignored and he was trained in bomb-throwing, musketry and bayonet exercises, before 
being transferred to France to await deployment at the Front.
134
 After WNC pressure on 
this matter, Keen was transferred to a non-combatant unit, although the War Office did 
argue:  
 
It appears that during the four months that Private Keen was in the Reserve Battalion he never 
informed his Company Officer or Company Sergt. Major that he had been granted a certificate of 
exemption from combatant service, notwithstanding the fact that he had ample opportunity of so 
doing, but on the contrary was trained in bomb throwing, bayonet fighting and fired the musketry 
course without making any protest. In these circumstances Private Keen is largely to blame for the 
position in which he has been placed.135  
 
However the brother of Private Keen was not content with this explanation, and wrote 
that: 
 
After my brother received his certificate of exemption from combatant service, he was 
called up to report himself for service, which he did. He was sent to Mill Hill and 
medically examined and passed for General Service. The Colonel of the Regiment was 
                                               
132 WNC.8/8/815 – letter from Arthur Peters, 1 November 1915. 
133 WNC.17/3/1/2 – letter from H.H. Elvin, 3 March 1916. 
134 WNC.17/3/10/5 – question to be put to the Secretary of State for War by W.C. Anderson. 
135 WNC.17/3/10/11 – reply, 26 November 1916. 
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explaining to him what he was to do, to which my brother replied that he quite 
understood; on which the Colonel remarked that he was a very tame conscientious 
objector and asked my brother if he knew which the Colonel would sooner kill a 
conscientious objector or a German. My brother replied that he could not kill anyone. The 
Colonel said he would sooner kill a conscientious objector. So you see they were fully 
aware of my brother’s exemption and deliberately intended to ignore it. My brother told 
me that he protested to his officers against his training which they ignored, so he wrote to 
his Trade Union Secretary for advice and he advised him to write to the Guildhall 
Tribunal which he did, and they told him they would communicate with his Commanding 
Officer and he naturally felt quite satisfied. If the Commanding Officer did not receive it, 
who did? When I asked my brother what was the idea of training him as a rifleman he 
said he thought the military thought he might give way. My personal opinion is that he 
ought to have refused to touch a rifle but he felt secure while he held a certificate.136 
 
A typical example of WNC activism and government intransigence was that of 
Private Forrest. Forrest and his brother owned a tomato farm of some eight hundred 
acres; his brother’s labour alone was not enough to gather the harvest, and so a 
considerable amount of tomatoes faced being left to ruin. Middleton wrote to the War 
Office requesting a month’s furlough, but this was not granted as Forrest was a 
Category A man and could not be spared for agricultural work.
137
 Another case was that 
of Robert Sharpe of Walworth, who was passed as unfit to serve, but was called to be 
re-examined, and had a policeman call at his house, who only failed to arrest him as he 
was sick in bed. Middleton was informed of this case by his local trades council, and he 
wrote directly to the War Office on Sharpe’s behalf.138 The War Office responded 
apologetically: ‘I am afraid there was some mistake on the part of the Recruiting 
Officer; Mr Sharpe was apparently not liable for military service’.139 Successful 
casework such as this reminds us that people were not helpless in the face of the 
juggernaut of the state, and that the WNC could be an effective ally. A great many of 
the individuals who contacted the Committee had no prior association with the labour 
movement; and many of the millions of extra votes Labour gained in 1918 could have 
owed something to this activism. 
 The Committee also played an active role in attempts to secure compassionate 
leave for servicemen who had lost family members in the conflict. Bob Smillie brought 
up the case of Andrew McAnulty of Lanarkshire. McAnulty had lost one son dead of 
                                               
136 WNC.17/3/10/15 – reply from brother of Keen, 29 November 1916. 
137 WNC.17/3/27/16 – letter to Private Forrest, 22 September 1917. 
138 WNC.17/3/21/2 – letter from Robert Sharpe of Walworth, February 1917. 
139 WNC.17/3/21/8 – letter from War Office, 24 March 1917. 
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wounds, another son had lost half of his right foot at Ypres, and his son-in-law had been 
killed, with the result that his daughter and three small children were back living with 
him. He had one son left in the Army, who was not yet eighteen, and who had been a 
coal miner and member of the union since he left school. As Smillie paid testament, ‘Mr 
Andrew McAnulty is a member of our Miners Executive Committee in Lanarkshire and 
has been a life-long worker in the Socialist Movement. He is a close friend of mine and 
he is breaking his heart to secure a brief holiday for his boy.’140 
The Committee’s frustrating dealings with the War Office and Ministry of 
Pensions extended to attempts to restore separation allowances to men executed for 
cowardice and desertion. This was an issue which particularly aroused Middleton’s 
temper. As he wrote to Minister of Pensions John Hodge: ‘In view of the extraordinary 
conditions of modern warfare, and the fact that men are being taken from all sorts of the 
most unsuitable conditions, and that thoughtful men who have experienced the life at 
the Front feel most strongly on this subject, may I venture to hope that you may give 
this subject your own personal thought?’141 
Early on in the war the contempt of the Committee was aroused by the Home 
Office announcement considering surveillance of ‘the soldiers and sailors wives while 
their husbands are serving with the Colours’. As Middleton wrote to Reginald 
McKenna: ‘Very strong expressions were voiced, and I was instructed to ask if you 
would receive a deputation of the women members of this Committee on the subject.’142 
He received a reply assuring him that the police were merely acting on request of 
military authorities, and that he should direct his ire at the War Office.
143
 Henderson 
met with Harold Baker from the War Office and McKenna to discuss the matter, and 
after condemnation of the practice both publically and in Parliament, the surveillance 
was abruptly dropped.
144
 There may be a certain symbolic value to the defeat of 
surveillance and the idea that separation allowances should only go to ‘deserving’ 
candidates: as with the transformation from charitable donations towards centralised 
state provision, the war helped burnish the principle that the recipients of welfare should 
be determined by their need, rather than their morality. By the end of the war such 
surveillance would have been out of the question, as would the idea that the claim of ex-
                                               
140 WNC.2/5/13-14 - Smillie to Middleton, 31 September 1917. 
141 WNC.2/5/17/4i – letter from Middleton to Hodge, 6 November 1917. 
142 WNC.13/4/2/2 – letter to Reginald McKenna at Home Office, 10 November 1914. 
143 WNC.13/4/2/4 – reply from McKenna, 12 November 1914. 
144 WNC.13/4/2/8 – letter from Harold Baker at the War Office, 24 November 1914. 
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servicemen and their dependents upon state welfare might be determined by their 
‘respectability’.  
A final vignette of the vast amounts of casework dealt with by the WNC 
demonstrates how the Committee combated injustice unrelated to the war – and gave a 
taste of the task ahead in the post-war world. The Committee was informed by the 
Gravesend, Northfleet and Perry Street Trades and Labour Council of a boy: 
 
Thomas William Young, aged 12, [who] was recently brought before the Justices at Northfleet, 
[charged] with stealing three pennyworth of apples from an orchard while under probation for 
stealing one pennyworth of bottled lemonade. The boy was convicted and sent to an Industrial 
school for 4 years. The boy’s father is a munition worker, and was unable to leave his employment 
to attend at the court on behalf of his son. Important evidence as to the conduct of home influence 
given by the Probation Officer, and which apparently influenced the Court, was subsequently 
shown to be inaccurate, the magistrates refusing to hear one word in defence of the boy. A similar 
case came before the same Bench at a subsequent Court, and upon evidence being given by the 
father of the boy concerned the charge was dismissed.145 
 
After his first letter to the Home Office was ignored, Middleton wrote again, this time 
receiving a reply from Sir John Simon himself, who regretted that ‘despite all the 
circumstances of this case, I am not able to find any grounds for interfering with the 
Order’.146 Nonetheless it demonstrates the importance on having the Committee as a 
interlocutor between ordinary people and the very highest levels of power. 
These are just a few of the many individual cases dealt with by Middleton and the 
Committee. In some instances they were successful; in many more their efforts failed. 
Nonetheless a great deal of time and effort was expended on these cases, especially by 
Middleton. It has been noted above that he was a vehement critic of the war, and many 
of his friends were Conscientious Objectors who were persecuted and imprisoned by the 
British state he worked so closely alongside. Yet he laboured tirelessly throughout the 
war, falling ill several times over the course of the conflict and finally suffering a 
nervous breakdown in February 1918 that kept him from his post for much of the spring 
of that year. He was not only instrumental in the Committee’s successful agitation on 
various issues from food to fuel, pensions to employment, but also personally responded 
to thousands of letters, from ordinary Britons, very often not connected with the labour 
movement, seeking assistance and redress of grievance. Perhaps surprisingly, it was 
usually women who wrote in, and this was not necessarily due to male absence on 
                                               
145 WNC.13/4/17/2 – letter to from Middleton to Sir John Simon at the Home Office, 24 September 1915. 
146 WNC.13/4/17/11 – reply from Sir John Simon. 
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account of the war; letters were more often in respect of sons than of husbands, which 
suggests that though fathers had remained at home, it was mothers who took the 
initiative to make contact. Hence the success of the WNC and the labour movement 
during the war was tripartite: as a lobbying organisation protecting the workers against 
the worst excesses of the war, as a conduit for information across the broad spectrum of 
the Left, and as friend in high places for those most in need of one. There may have 
been many of Middleton’s humble correspondents, particularly distressed housewives 
and mothers, soon to be enfranchised, who would not soon forget the effort the WNC 
had made on their behalf, even if it was unsuccessful. For these reasons the WNC and 
labour’s wartime activity deserve a great deal more attention than they have henceforth 
received.
147
 
 This section has shown the true extent of labour movement activity on the home 
front during the First World War, and argued that these experiences were crucial to the 
Left’s ability to formulate policy and attract support in the post-war world. The final 
section considers how the growth of the state, and the Left’s wartime experience of 
forming a ‘second state’ for the poorest and most vulnerable, altered the relationship 
between the British labour movement and the state during the war years and afterwards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
147 Although in this respect the WNC was not unique: Michael Roper had noted that it was usually 
mothers who wrote to their sons at the front, not fathers. See M. Roper, ‘Maternal relations: moral 
manliness and emotional survival in letters home during the First World War’, in S. Dudink et al (eds.), 
Masculinities in Politics and War, Manchester: MUP, 2004, 300. 
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Fig. 5.1 ‘Home Defence’, Railway Review, 21 August 1914. 
Fig. 5.2 ‘Competitive System’, The Co-operative News, 5 January 1918. 
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Fig. 5.3 ‘Another Idol Shattered’, Railway Review, 19 January 1917. 
Fig. 5.4 ‘In the Service of the State’, Railway Review, 15 January 1915. 
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Impact of the War on the Relationship between the British Left and the State 
 
‘[The war] cast its shadow over every domestic hearth. It thrust into the melting pot all 
our social institutions. It recast all our political parties and associations. It searched 
every heart and tried every man’s mind. It was the parting of our ways, the supreme test 
of all our ideals and aspirations, and it remains so to this hour.’ 
--- George Wardle at the Labour party conference, January 1917.
148
 
 
This section considers how the growth of the state and the activities of the WNC 
affected the position of the labour movement vis-à-vis the state. It is clear that a certain 
type of labour movement emerged after 1918, and while the tendency of this movement 
towards a centrist, bureaucratic state has been over-emphasised, and is itself the subject 
of some debate, it is fair to say that the Labour party emerged from the war with a 
particular vision for the state that would eventually be realised from 1945. Yet before 
and immediately after the war there was a variety of visions on offer for the fledging 
labour movement. It is the purpose of this third section to question why the practical, 
Fabian-driven vision of the state took precedent within the labour movement after 1918, 
rather than any of the alternatives, such as syndicalism, guild socialism, or an idealistic, 
less mechanical means of organising the economy and society. 
 The early socialists of the decades immediately before the First World War were 
wary of the state: as Stephen Yeo has argued, both William Morris and Thomas Kirkup 
were anti-statist, and Morris in particular had concerns over ‘practical men’ who would 
warp their vision of socialism - emotional, parochial and ingrained in English traditions 
(imagined or otherwise) - and turn it into something bureaucratic, impersonal and 
centralised.
149
 Syndicalism, for a brief period, seemed to offer an alternative. Bob 
Holton claimed that for the Edwardian syndicalists their movement was explicitly not a 
continental import, but rather a continuation of ‘the anti-state traditions of William 
Morris and the Socialist League, combined with elements of an autonomous socialist 
counter-culture available within the Clarion movement’.150 The influential radical 
Thomas Mann, who had been a state socialist prior to his exile in Australia for most of 
the first decade of the twentieth century, returned a convinced syndicalist, and stood for 
                                               
148 Report of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Labour Party. 
149 S. Yeo, ‘Socialism, the State, and Some Oppositional Englishness’, in R. Colls and P. Dodd (eds.), 
Englishness. Politics and Culture 1880-1920, London: Croom Helm, 1986, 330 and 347-59. 
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the General Secretaryship of the ASE in 1913.
151
 Mann failed to gain election, securing 
only 8,771 out of the 34,507 votes cast - an indication that one should not overstate the 
influence of syndicalist ideas of the British labour movement at this time. Yet this does 
not mean that a political or constitutional approach was strongly favoured before the 
war: an attempt to establish an ASE political fund to support the Labour party was 
defeated by 17,324 votes to 15,336 in 1913. Further, at the annual general meeting of 
the NUR the following year the syndicalist Charles Watkins was able to secure 
unanimous support for a resolution criticising railway nationalisation as then proposed 
by the Labour party:
152
 ‘This Congress expresses the opinion that nationalisation of 
public services, such as the Post Office, is not necessarily advantageous to the 
employees and the working classes unless accompanied by a steadily increasing 
domestic control, both by employees and the representatives of the working classes in 
the House of Commons.’153 Thus while Holton overstated the significance of and 
support for syndicalism in the pre-war era, his assertion that ‘it was the war 
itself…which finally halted the development of syndicalism’ contains a seed of truth, in 
that the war did determine the path of the labour movement after 1918.
154
 As Bill 
Schwarz and Martin Durham have noted of Ben Tillett’s description of Parliament as a 
“rich man’s Duma”: ‘Even though the speech was delivered in a moment of defeat 
Tillett’s tone and critique were consistent with much that he had been saying in 
previous years. Coercion, repression and militarism were all that could be expected 
from the state.’155 
There were a variety of opinions amongst the British Left in relation to the 
government, but a general position was one of distrust, and a view that the state was 
more likely to present a problem than a solution. In this sense we can see how far the 
conflict changed the discourse prevalent before 1914, and how instrumental it was to 
the type of Labour party which emerged in 1918. Yet the war did not have a uniform 
effect on everyone on the British Left. G.D.H. Cole, the guild socialist, wrote in the ASE 
Monthly Journal of April 1915: 
 
The doctrine of Guild Socialism, of which the central idea is the democratic control of industry by 
the workers in partnership with the State, is being forced more and more to the front by the 
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unanswerable logic of events. Let the Trade Unions once become conscious of the true nature of 
the demand behind the Labour unrest and it will not be long before our industrial system is 
radically transformed in the interests of the workers. If, on the other hand, the unions fail to realise 
their responsibilities and to rise to their opportunity the period of depression after the war will 
merely serve as the capitalists’ chance to fix yet more firmly upon society the shackles of the 
immoral and demoralising wage system under which we live.156 
 
Discussing the philosophies of labour thinkers such as Cole in this period, Jose 
Harris has argued that ‘the idealist frame of reference became even more powerful and 
all-encompassing in the period after the First World War, when for a time at least the 
earlier traditions of positivism and empiricism virtually faded out of large areas of the 
vocabulary of social science’.157 This is supported by the assertions of prominent 
Labour recruits of the after-war period, such as Josiah Wedgwood, who spoke out 
against the increasing Fabianism of the party, arguing that ‘Real Socialism puts freedom 
above ease and utility. Better to be a man, with God and a crust, rather than a well-
greased cog in the food factory’.158 Harris did not try to overstate the influence of the 
‘idealist’ strain of the post-war Labour party, but for a short period it did hold some 
influence and, crucially, was particularly influential upon provincial Nonconformists 
who had previously been libertarian individualists (such as Wedgwood and many other 
former-Liberal recruits).
159
 Perhaps what can be said for the war is that it transformed 
the state from an embodiment of malevolent force to a potential force for good. In the 
words of Steve Meredith and Philip Catney, ‘This debate was not just a mechanistic one 
based upon the most efficient way to achieve social justice, but one that focussed on the 
nature of democracy and the place of man in the social system’.160   
 The introduction of a comprehensive welfare state was not something clamoured 
for by a majority of the population in the pre-war years. As Henry Pelling noted, ‘the 
mass of working people were hostile or indifferent to state welfare at least until after 
measures such as old age pensions and national insurance were introduced’,161 and 
many working-class organisations opposed state welfare not merely out of opposition to 
the state, but rather from a position of working-class mutual support and 
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independence.
162
 In 1890 the Cotton Factory Times argued: ‘We sincerely believe that 
is what the German Emperor is aiming at: When people look to the state and receive 
from it almost everything they get, they will become the strongest supporters of those 
from whom they obtain their privileges.’163 There is no little irony, of course, that it was 
the German Emperor’s servile state which created many of those privileges for Britons 
in the years 1914-1918. Nor was suspicion of a centralised, bureaucratic state confined 
to the radical Nonconformist strand of the movement: Hyndman and others in Justice 
did not merely mistrust the state for its persecution of socialists and trade unionists, but 
felt – before the war, at least – that a centralized bureaucracy would be dangerous even 
in a socialist society.
164
 In terms of trade unions, the long-established craft societies 
could boast hefty welfare and strike funds - £750,000 in the case of the Boilermakers 
and £2.5 million in the case of the ASE – and were therefore disinclined towards state 
welfare; why should time-served skilled men pay for the misfortunes of the unskilled 
when they had their own funds to fall back on?
165
  
In contrast, the unskilled unions were warmer on state welfare, given that they 
were less able to provide for their own members, and their own people were more likely 
to slip into destitution in the first instance, while the rank-and-file were usually 
unimpressed by abstractions relating to the ‘servile state’ and more likely to place trust 
in state rather than union activity.
166
 An example of this was the Workers’ Union, one of 
the most significant of the new general labourers’ unions. Although it had its origins in 
the syndicalist sentiment stoked by Tom Mann, by the time of the war – of which it was 
decidedly supportive – it was led by statist Parliamentarians and labour patriots in 
Charles Duncan and John Beard.
167
 Beard went as far as to welcome the Munitions Acts 
– decried by most trade unionists, even the patriots, for the restrictions it placed on 
workers’ rights – and urge workers to adopt a conciliatory stance with employers.168 
Overall, fear of the servile state was not a dominant concern of most workers. As Pat 
Thane has concluded, resentment of state intrusion was not strong enough to provoke 
widespread opposition to the state before 1914, and ‘only a highly politicized minority 
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of liberals and socialists thought with any precision about the desirable extent and 
nature of state action’.169 
One of the first effects of the war was to ameliorate a great deal of union 
antipathy towards state interference.
170
 For some of the general unions such as the NUR, 
the change was welcome and long overdue. As the Railway Review triumphantly 
claimed within weeks of the outbreak: ‘Everywhere the State has asserted its power. 
The State seizes the railways and not a word is uttered in protest. The State takes over 
flour mills, fixes prices, commandeers horses and motor-cars, nay, in some cases, even 
controls the food supply, not merely for military purposes, but for the general welfare, 
and no one says them nay. It is a wonderful change. Why in many of those cases should 
it ever lose its hold?’171 The Railway Review welcomed a speech by Andrew Bonar Law 
praising the government-controlled railway system with a cartoon depicting ‘private 
ownership’ being blasted off the plinth of ‘British Railways’ by a shell. A shocked John 
Bull was knocked to the seat of his trousers by the impact. The caption read: ‘Another 
idol shattered. One of the shocks the War has given John Bull’ (see Fig. 5.3).  
Before long organisations as diverse as the largely middle-class National Union 
of Clerks and the ILPers of the Bradford Pioneer were joining the railwaymen in calling 
for the nationalisation of wheat, banks and shipping.
172
 In May 1915 The Clerk saluted 
the decasualisation of dock work that followed the formation of the Liverpool dock 
battalions: 
 
Another part of the organisation of industry which the country has had to take in hand, there has 
now been formed a battalion of dockers, uniformed and guaranteed a regular minimum weekly 
wage, with more wages if there is more than the minimum work to do. For the docker’s wife the 
change must be immense – instead of never knowing whether plenty or starvation will be the lot of 
the family a couple of days hence, she can now reckon on having, at the worst, the minimum of 
35s. a week, with her husband’s clothes provided. The officers of the battalion are the officials of 
the Union, and every member of the battalion must be a member of the Union. If he lapses his 
membership of his Union he is at once “fired” and loses the guarantee of regular employment.173 
 
By August of 1916 the Boilermakers’ were marvelling at unemployment reaching the 
lowest level recorded, yet criticised the government for not taking over shipping with 
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the same haste it had taken control of the railways; it alleged that merchant vessels were 
changing hands for five hundred or one thousand per cent of their real value; 
unacceptable profiteering which could have been avoided had the government taken a 
more proactive stance.
174
 The following month the Boilermakers’ pressed for the state 
to further expand, calling for a Minister of Industry to ‘sort Health, Housing Agriculture 
and Food Supply, the control of Shipping, National storehouses, and Complete national 
ownership of war munitions, ships, railways, mines, etc’.175  
 What is notable about the Boilermakers’ enthusiasm for greater state 
intervention and control of industry is that it was a long-established craft union with 
considerable strike and welfare funds and a healthy interest in remaining free of state 
interference. Skilled unions such as the Boilermakers’ and the ASE and left-wing 
socialist newspapers such as the Bradford Pioneer had usually been particularly averse 
to statism pre-1914, but the war was to change this. Even the passage of the Munitions 
Act, which was to cause a great deal of resentment on many shop floors, was greeted in 
the Boilermakers’ Journal as ‘our latest national confession that uncontrolled private 
enterprise and production for profit has hopelessly failed us, as it always has done when 
our need was greatest’.176 In an editorial of May 1917, ASE General Secretary Robert 
Young responded to a letter criticising ‘tub thumpers’ in Hyde Park, arguing that: 
 
The theories of “tub thumpers” in Hyde Park and elsewhere, are fast becoming realities, and that 
some of us expect that even their ideals, in spite of the horrible calamity of war, will be brought 
considerably nearer as a result of the war. Railway nationalisation, liquor control, early closing, 
minimum wages, women’s suffrage, and other “silly, shallow stuff” advocated by “tub thumpers” 
are now openly accepted, not merely as possible, but actually practicable and essential to the 
country’s moral, political, and economic welfare now and after the war.177  
 
Similarly, an editorial in The Clerk of December 1916 admitted that the NUC had 
achieved more in the past two years through arbitration than it could have expected to 
do without it, that a minimum wage was both practical and desirable, and that there may 
have been something in what was once called the ‘servile state’ after all.178 General 
Secretary of the Boilermakers, John Hill, warned that the government’s new 
responsibility in industry ‘will not end with the war’, and that while ‘we have good 
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reasons for misgivings against too much interference with customs, which have much to 
recommend them, even in war time, we might as well try and stop the ocean with a 
broom as fight against Government control of industry, the fixing of interest on capital, 
and the awarding of wages for labour’. He ended on a positive note, however, reflecting 
a change in opinion precipitated by the war: 
 
The mistake we make is to look upon the Government as a power which will always be biased 
against labour, as it certainly is and has been. We forget that Labour appoints the Government. 
Personally, I welcome the entrance of the Government into our common everyday life. When the 
Government awards us less in wages for our labour than our district delegates consider fair and 
reasonable, we shall begin to realise the need for our own class in Parliament in numbers sufficient 
to give us a majority in the Government.179 
 
In analogous terms, the anti-war William Leech wrote in March 1915 that:  
 
The British Junkers and Jingoes are welcome to make what use they like of their own discovery 
that the application of Socialist principles makes war easier to conduct. If the result is to be an 
addition to the advocates of Socialism of all the military-minded people it should give no cause for 
alarm. The nation which adopts Socialism with a view to strengthening militarism and aggressive 
Imperialism [as he claimed the Germans had effectively done] is welcome to do so, and we will 
promise it our full support in the work of getting for it a sound economic constitution and leave the 
rest to fate and the future with the utmost confidence.180 
 
Overall the mainstream of trade union opinion had grown notably closer towards public 
ownership and the state by the end of the war. A cartoon in the Railway Review – organ 
of the admittedly statist NUR – depicted a group of workers, a businessmen and the 
state. The caption read: ‘For you, sir we would willingly work and die, but there is 
always likely to be strife and trouble whilst he comes in between!’181 In an editorial 
entitled ‘Collective Responsibility is Individual Responsibility’, Robert Young 
highlighted how the war had changed existing attitudes:  
 
The collective responsibilities of the nation become also the responsibilities of each individual in 
the nation. We are no longer interested and anxious onlookers hoping for a successful end to the 
war. We become active participants in the struggle through sheer force of economic circumstances. 
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The economic needs of the nation must be met by the voluntary abstinences of each in the interests 
of all. If in this we fail, compulsion becomes necessary. 
 
In terms of the close co-operation of the trade union movement and the coalition during 
the conflict, he stated: 
 
I am thoroughly convinced that the interests of the workers would have been more seriously 
jeopardised if the Trade Union officials had refused to consult with the various government 
officials in relation to the many trade problems which the war has caused…  
The Labour Party in Parliament cannot be separated from the Labour Party in the country. It is 
mainly Trade Unionist. The Trade Unionists of the country have made their influence felt in the 
industrial arrangements made. Why should their representatives not make their influence felt in the 
government of the country by assisting the nation to cope with the greatest crisis in its history?182 
 
Heralding the appointment of Henderson to the Pensions’ Board, the Railway Review 
solemnly claimed that: 
 
One by one the old shibboleths are going. Sugar, rent, coal, meat, and wheat have all come under 
Government control by instalments. Now a more vigorous and wholesale policy is indicated. It is 
not before time. Even now it is too late to have the effects which such a policy would have had if it 
had been undertaken in the early days of the war as urged by the party, and I am entitled to claim 
for it a far-seeing policy in this matter for which the country ought to be grateful.183 
 
Similarly an editorial by NUR chairman George Wardle in the Railway Review of 
December 1916 noted that:  
 
The war has changed all social values…if we were asked to mention the main change we should 
hesitatingly select the deliberate alteration of the status of the individual and the growing 
recognition of the value of the collective and corporate effort of the people as whole. If the 
individualism of the past is not dead, it is dying. It has been stricken in a vital part. War has 
shattered its illusory philosophy and destroyed its false thesis. It has proved a broken reed, a worn-
out fetish, and a creed from which the life has departed.184  
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Alastair Reid has claimed that:  
 
There was a general tendency for organised labour to drop its pre-war separation of “economic” 
and “political” issues. Thus the unions most centrally involved in the war effort began very rapidly 
to raise non-industrial issues when they made demands on the government (perhaps most marked 
in the case of house rents), there was a slowly growing acceptance among all trade unionists that 
the election of Members of Parliament could have a direct effect on industrial conditions, and there 
was a marked increase in trade union support for the permanent nationalisation of key industries, 
above all coal mining and railways.185  
 
This concurs with the view of the Railway Review from October 1917 that because of 
the increasing numbers of men being employed by the state, ‘a quarrel between a body 
of wage workers and an employer is not now a personal affair in which none other is 
presumed to have interest. Such a quarrel promptly attracts the attention of the 
controllers of the State and State machinery is set at work to settle difficulty’.186 
Fear of the state did not end with the war, however: by January 1917 the 
Bradford Pioneer was carrying articles claiming that the ‘state slavery’ introduced 
during the war was anathema to true socialism, and asking whether trade unions would 
be ‘tricked’ by the ‘sham’ proposals of representation and conciliation being put 
forward by the government.
187
 Even Ramsay MacDonald argued in 1917:‘ 
 
The war has given a new significance to some of the later movements within Trade Unionism and 
Socialism, especially to that known as the Guild movement…no doubt should be left regarding the 
fact that the guild must play a characteristic part in the Socialist industrial State. It is required to 
guard against the deadly evil of over-centralisation in a political servile state, of a community the 
material comforts of which will stifle spiritual spontaneity, of a working class deprived of the 
stimulus of freedom by legal arrangements of a mechanical nature.188 
 
Guild theorist G.D.H. Cole felt that the enhanced state sheltered capitalists from 
pressure and created official machinery designed to control the unions.
189
 In September 
of that year, in an article entitled ‘The Trade Unionists’ Cross Road’, the Shop 
Assistants’ J.J. Mallon argued that nationalisation was a false panacea, and that robust 
trade unions, aided by the conciliation framework recommended by the Whitley 
Committees, would secure better results: 
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Would the happiness and satisfaction of men necessarily be augmented by such a transference [of 
ownership]? Private ownership is bad enough, but it is now seen to have some compensations: to 
be pliable, to reflect and diffuse whatever kindliness may reside in the “owner”, to allow for 
human weaknesses and alternations, in short, to be in many ways preferable to the rigid 
“government by regulation” which at present is imposed on us from Whitehall.190 
 
However despite remaining reservations and scepticism amongst some on the Left, it 
was not the case, as Winter had it, that ‘after three years of war, the state was seen to be 
a very different and far more dangerous creature by even a moderate socialist like 
MacDonald’; on the contrary, for most of the labour movement, despite the awfulness 
of the war and the imposition of conscription, the state was viewed with a great deal 
more sympathy; the government was another matter.
191
 
The Orthodox Marxists of the Plebs’ League - vehemently anti-war, decidedly 
undemocratic and unapologetically out-of-touch with mainstream working-class opinion 
- were even more critical of the wartime state than the ILPers. In an article entitled ‘Will 
Socialism Survive the War?’ H. Wynn-Cuthbert argued that state socialism - 
‘respectable, modern, evolutionary, revisionist Socialism’ – had: 
 
Damped the revolutionary ardour of the workers of Europe, and in the present great crisis is 
leading them forth, flag in hand, to the trenches and the cannon’s mouth in defence of “their” 
country. But we will see to it that Reformism, if it is not destroyed in the war, is “scotched” very 
soon after by the organized Proletariat. We must make it perfectly clear that the workers of the 
world have no more to do with the “State” than they have with the transmigration of souls. The 
fetish of the State must go the way of the fetish of Royalty.  
 
He concluded by predicting that ‘Socialism will survive the war, but the movement will 
be far more revolutionary in character’.192 In a period of time not known for foresight 
and prescience, Wynn-Cuthbert rather distinguished himself: not only did he greatly 
misjudge the temper of the ‘workers of Europe’; within a few years of the Armistice it 
had become clear that it would be through the machinery of the state that socialist 
ambitions would be realised. The extent to which there were any viable alternatives is 
debatable, and post-war experiences such as the General Strike, the failure of hard-Left 
movements, and unhappy experiences of minority government must not be discounted, 
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but nor must the significance of the First World War in determining this route for 
Labour.  
This chapter has addressed the following research question: how did the British 
state grow during the war and retreat afterwards; how far was Labour drawn into the 
British state during the war; what did it do to protect working-class interests; and how 
far did all this affect the relationship between the labour movement and the state? 
Firstly, whilst it cannot be said that the First World War permanently changed British 
political economy and the role of the state – the developments of the 1920s and 1930s 
are proof of that – this does not mean that the changes of 1914-1918 should be 
disregarded. On the contrary, this chapter would concur with Chris Wrigley in arguing 
that the experience of the First World War made an enhanced state politically practical 
and ideologically palatable. Further, many of the results of state expansion during the 
war, such as rent control, housing provision and minimum wages - whilst uneven in 
application and of limited duration - made a significant difference to the lives of many 
people. Since many of the changes brought about by the Second World War had their 
genesis in the First, the latter deserves greater recognition as a break in British attitudes 
towards the state.  
 Secondly, we have seen here how the British Left was not handicapped as an 
agitating, representative movement, despite being drawn into government and declaring 
a political and industrial truce. Nor did wartime patriotism and support for the 
prosecution of the conflict neutralise the labour movement as a force for social justice. 
Indeed, largely through the auspices of the WNC, the full breadth of the Left - 
incorporating socialists, trade unionists, labourites, suffragettes and co-operators - was 
able to fight against the worst effects of the war. The vast effort made by the WNC on 
behalf of ordinary people has gone largely unappreciated, one of the main consequences 
of this chapter will be to correct this oversight. 
Finally, this chapter has argued that the growth of the state during the war, and 
the closer relationship between the labour movement and the state, led to the 
development of a bureaucratic labourism based on a central redistributive state. By no 
means did the war remove all suspicion of the state, and even in the early 1920s the 
model of state bureaucracy aspired towards was more devolved and involved greater 
workers’ control than that which emerged in the 1940s.193 Yet given the evidence as to 
the positive view of the state taken by various unions, and their desire for greater state 
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intervention, it is impossible to concur with John Turner’s assertion that the war 
witnessed greater hostility between trade unions and the state.
194
 Further, it was not 
simply the case that, as Winter had it, ‘when the time came in 1917 for the 
reconstruction of the Labour party as a national organisation committed to socialist 
objectives, it would be to Sidney Webb and his ideas that the party leaders would turn’, 
for this suggests merely the filling of an intellectual void by the salient theory of the 
hour, rather than the experience of the war providing an ideology which embraced 
community, patriotism, and a benevolent view of the state.
195
 A.M. McBriar, in his book 
on Fabianism, claimed that ‘The Fabians supplied a doctrine which could enable a 
churchwarden, or an English trade unionist, to call himself a Socialist’, and that 
‘Fabianism permitted Englishmen to swallow these [statist, anti-laissez-faire] pills 
without too much of a shock to their constitution’.196 Yet far more than any germane 
theory of political economy, it was the war which made socialism acceptable to the 
parson, the Army private, the housewife and the labourer, and the war which laid the 
practical and ideological groundwork for the subsequent success of the Labour party. 
Ultimately the experience of the war directly led the post-war Labour party and trade 
union movement to adopt and accept a more statist programme than might otherwise 
have been the case. In the next and final chapter one of the more troubling questions of 
the First World War will be addressed: how did the disparate strands of the labour 
movement remain intact despite the tremendous centripetal pressures occasioned by the 
conflict? Once again we shall see the importance of labour patriotism and the WNC in 
this development. 
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CHAPTER 6: LABOUR MOVEMENT COHESION AND THE WAR 
 
This final chapter addresses the final research question of the thesis, namely the 
continued cohesion of the labour movement. Given that the war divided the Liberal 
party to the extent that they were to be excluded from office for almost one hundred 
years, why did the conflict not have the same effect on Labour, a far more recent 
political creation, with apparently existential ideological conflicts over nationalism and 
internationalism? On the contrary, British labour emerged stronger, more united, and 
with a new sense of purpose. The idea that the Liberals merely ‘lost’ their position, 
allowing Labour to become the main opposition to the Conservatives by default, is 
unsatisfactory;  and the question of how Labour was able – institutionally and 
ideologically – to not merely to survive the war intact, but actively prosper, has not 
received enough attention. This chapter takes a broad view of all of the various 
organisations which could be said to compose the British Left at the time of the war: the 
Labour party itself; the roughly one thousand trade unions in different groups and 
associations; various women’s groups which, while not necessarily sympathetic with all 
of Labour’s policies, sometimes co-operated on franchise reform; the three-million 
strong Co-operative movement, consisting of the Co-operative Wholesale Society and 
the Co-operative Union; and the socialist societies such as the British Socialist party, 
the Fabian Society and the Independent Labour party. Finally, the war created a great 
impetus for an ultra-patriotic secession from the labour movement, or even of a 
nationalistic coup within labour; the failure of this movement will also be examined. 
Sixty years ago, in his analysis of the adolescence of the Labour party, J.H. Reid 
claimed that before the war, Labour was ‘in danger of losing the support of both 
militant socialists and dissatisfied trade unionists’, and that the outbreak of the war was 
in some ways a blessing in disguise, providing as it did a ‘period of grace’.1 While the 
intervening years have not produced reasons to suspect Professor Reid overstated the 
precariousness of the party’s situation pre-1914, there is a compelling argument that the 
war, far from merely providing breathing space to deal with institutional and ideological 
dilemmas, was actually instrumental in assuaging these issues. The pre-war labour 
movement was a loose alliance consisting of hundreds of trade unions – themselves 
very often divided according to trade, skill, and association – sundry socialist societies 
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with varying levels of membership, some women’s groups, the Labour party itself - a 
federal, dissolved structure - and the Co-operative movement. Yet instead the war 
produced in 1918 a Labour party that was structurally and institutionally reformed and 
in possession of – if not a fully-formed ideology embraced by all quarters – then at least 
an agreed programme on which to campaign.  
This chapter argues that the labour movement in general and the Labour party in 
particular was able to survive the war and prosper intact because of institutional and 
structural co-operation – particularly through the auspices of the War Emergency: 
Workers’ National Committee, which acted as a crucial adhesive – and due to the broad 
spectrum of support for the war amongst the Left. Labour patriotism encompassed 
socialists, trade unionists, co-operators and women as well as the ultra patriots, and 
allowed the Left to turn the war to its advantage in constructing a national party to fight 
for power, and an inclusive message on which to fight. 
 
The Trade Unions and the Labour Party 
 
A vital condition for the relative cohesion of the labour movement that emerged after 
1918 was the failure of the war to cut across different sections of the movement. There 
was no easy dichotomy with right-wing trade unionists at one extreme and middle-class 
radicals on the other; instead disagreement occurred within different unions and 
socialist societies. There were some casualties of patriotic versus pacifistic clashes; 
some local trade councils such as Birmingham and Sheffield were divided by the war, 
and some unions such as the NUR used their own patriotism as a means of criticising 
craft societies such as ASLEF. A Railway Review cartoon of September 1916 attacked 
the non-unionised workman, being fed the war bonus that the unionised men had 
worked for. The caption read: ‘How long before you come off that stool, and do 
something for yourself? Or are you waiting to be knocked off?’ (See Fig. 6.2). A further 
cartoon in November of that year – which depicted the NUR as a tank, another example 
of the parallels drawn between the war and the trade union crusade at home – claimed 
that the securing of the war bonus had proved ‘the superiority of unified organisation’. 
(See Fig. 6.4). 
An editorial in the Railway Review of August 1917 claimed: ‘The action of the 
Associated Society can fairly be described as a policy of frightfulness, and the adoption 
of the doctrine that in things paramount might is right…The threatened strike is not 
against the railway companies, against aggression, nor against the owning section of the 
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community, but at this time is against the State.’2 Nor was it only over strike action that 
the two great railway unions disagreed; in April of the same year the NUR fought and 
won a libel case against ASLEF over charges of incompetence and dishonesty in 
relation to war bonuses.
3
 A cartoon, captioned ‘Not the time and place’, showed a train 
driver (or, ‘the sectionalist on the footplate’ in the language of the cartoon), attempting 
to catch the elusive ‘rabbit’ of an eight hour day, wondering: ‘If only I can catch him all 
to myself.’ Meanwhile, John Bull calls out to him ‘Hi! What about me and the war?’ 
This cartoon is significant not merely for its criticism of ASLEF, but also for its use of 
patriotism as a means to attack the craft union. (Fig. 6.1).  
 The division between skilled and unskilled unions was initially given new 
significance by the war due to the ‘dilution’ of unskilled men and women into positions 
previously reserved for craft men, and the alleged ‘poaching’ of skilled men by general 
unions. In this respect the arriviste Workers’ Union was the greatest troublemaker; it 
alone opposed the restoration of pre-war practices that the craft unions insisted on, and 
it was felt to be ‘poaching’ men from industry and agriculture who should more 
properly have joined a sectional union instead.
4
 Despite this the Workers’ Union 
rejoined the TUC in 1917, and the Congress of that year - held at Blackpool in October 
and lauded as the ‘biggest on record’ in the journal of the Boilermakers’ Union - saw 
over seventy resolutions agreed, including ambitious calls for a conscription on wealth, 
education for all children under sixteen, and pensions for all over fifty.
5
 A resolution 
calling for an international peace conference was passed by over three million votes, 
causing the editor of the journal to proclaim: 
 
At Blackpool, under some influence which we cannot explain, we all seemed to realise that the 
forces dividing us were not within our movement but without, and we had the joyful experience of 
our extreme right and extreme left, men such as Smillie and Thorne, moving and seconding the 
same resolution. It was good business. We began right…In our search for a settlement amongst the 
nations, we first laid the foundations of clear understanding and unity of purpose amongst 
ourselves at home. 6 
 
 The spirit of inter-union co-operation generally took precedence over the 
occasional fractiousness described earlier. As a leader in the Railway Review of October 
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1915 had it: ‘Neither trade unionists nor nations in these strenuous days find it 
profitable to emulate Daniel by standing alone. That way disaster lies.’7 As early as 
March 1915 The Post was calling for a new industrial strategy for the post-war world: 
‘The present should be a time of stock-taking, careful revision, and overhauling. The 
defects in methods and organisation should be remedied. Old forms and traditions 
should be scrapped for up-to-date methods and new ideas. Amalgamation or federation 
with other unions in allied or similar industries should be the first consideration.’8 Nor 
was the spirit of amalgamation and co-operation confined to ultra-patriotic general 
unions; the editor of the ASE’s journal called in March 1915 for the combination of the 
ASE, Boilermakers and the Ironfounders.
9
 Despite disagreements over support for and 
the prosecution of the war, these fault lines existed within - rather than between - 
different unions, and economic pressures engendered by the conflict saw that for the 
union movement the war was a time of amalgamation and co-operation. As Gilbert 
Smith claimed in the Annual Report of the GFTU: 
 
If in normal times the advice to all unions that have not already done so to join the GFTU has been 
sound, it is ten times more so now, in the stormy times which face the Labour movement in all its 
forms in the near future. There has never yet been a great war which was not followed by a period 
of specially severe internal strain, social, economic and political. I make no prophecies, but so far 
as I have been able to ascertain there is no shrewd Trade Union leader who does not anticipate 
troublous [sic] times. Men are at a premium now, but capital will be at a premium when the war is 
over, and heavy rates of interest and heavy taxation will be added to the burdens the productive 
worker has to bear. Unemployment, lock-outs, strikes against reductions of wages are some of the 
troubles that may be reasonably anticipated. Now is the time to prepare. Now is the time for Trade 
Unions to strengthen themselves against the perils of the immediate future. It is all very well to do 
this by building up reserve funds, it is much better to do so by strengthening the organisation.
10
 
 
 As the trade union movement remained intact and increased substantially despite 
the poaching issue and skilled/unskilled tensions, attention turned towards building 
closer links between the unions and the Labour party. Symptomatic of the wider 
behaviour of ‘new’ unions, the Workers’ Union continued to support the Labour party – 
although some leaders had flirted with the ultra-patriotic National Democratic Party - 
yet even unskilled unions had trouble persuading their members to back Labour 
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financially.
11
A cartoon in the Railway Review, entitled ‘Our Little Inconsistencies’, 
queried: ‘Why does this member of the NUR treat with contempt the “non” who 
shelters himself behind the worn-out rag of “objection” – and shelter himself behind the 
same worn-out rag when asked to pay into the political fund?’ (see Fig. 6.3).12 
Similarly, an editorial in the same paper of August 1917 lamented that: ‘Seven-eighths 
of the members are so careless and indifferent that they fail to find the supplies [money 
for the political fund]. We are convinced that it is not so much a desire to avoid their 
share of supply, but that they suffer from mass indifference which can be removed by an 
extension of knowledge of the political fund.’13 Creating greater harmony between the 
trade unions and the Labour party would prove a trickier proposition than even trade 
union unity; as R.B. Suthers predicted in The Clarion: ‘These…problems confront the 
trade unionist, and they will require all the skill and energy and patience he can evoke if 
he is to find a satisfactory solution-a solution that will be a real aid to the building up of 
a sane and civilised State. A trade unionist who is only a trade unionist is a barbarian.’14  
 The formation of a trade union-only party had previously been mooted, and the 
right-wing union leader Havelock Wilson persisted in agitating for the creation of this 
party, convinced as he was that Labour was contaminated by middle-class pacifists. 
This was rejected by the TUC of September 1916, by 3.8 million to 567,000 votes.
15
 
However this motion did not end the debate, and many individual unions continued to 
have ballots on the issue of whether the unions should go it alone: the Amalgamated 
Society of Papermakers, for example, reported in October 1918 that 570 of their 
members had voted for a purely trade union party; ninety-seven against; and with three 
spoiled ballot papers. ‘It is therefore very evident’, the report continued, ‘that so far as 
our members are concerned, the majority do not agree with the recently altered 
constitution of the Labour Party, by which any individual may become a member 
providing he signs the constitution and pays his contribution.’16  
Yet if some unionists felt that trade unions did not possess enough clout within 
Labour, some feared the opposite. An editorial in The Clerk of January 1917 noted that 
the lay press and the general public were often confused when the tone of debates and 
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resolutions at conferences was not reflected in the votes on that issue. The reason for 
this, he explained, is that: 
 
The Socialist societies, Trades Councils, and local Labour Parties send a large number of 
delegates, but carry only few votes, their financial contribution to the party funds being small and 
their members to a great extent already represented by one or other of the Trade Unions. They are, 
however, the effective representation of the active workers in the constituencies – the advanced 
social and political thinkers who are building up the moral force behind the party; and they are 
inevitably the critics of the Executive and of the Parliamentary groups, and the advocates of an 
uncompromising policy… 
The Trade Unions, on the other hand, generally content themselves with a smaller representation 
in numbers than they are entitled to have, secure of their influence in the card vote, when the 
“money talks”. Their delegates, in the main, represent the silent voter, the passenger carried by the 
party, who pays for his share in its direction through the Political Fund of his Union; and their 
attitude is naturally a closer reflection of the views and feelings of the average man in the street 
and in the workshop. Hence on so many questions the rebels take the lead in debate, secure the 
most applause, and are, after all, borne down in the division by the “damned, compact majority” of 
miners, cotton operatives, and metal workers. Bearing these facts in mind, we shall be wise not 
altogether to ignore the spirit shown in the debates, but to judge the party chiefly on the votes 
cast.17 
 
Similarly, in a report on the Labour conference in Manchester of January 1917, J.W. 
Ormanroyd of the Bradford Pioneer, complained:  
 
Anyone listening to the debate, and trying to forecast the vote by the reception of the men and the 
speeches would have thought that the Labour Party would have to leave the Government. But he 
would have been wrong, for as most of you will be aware the Coalitionists won by a thumping 
majority…The votes cast at the conference did not represent either the delegates or the people who 
sent them and the system of block voting will have to be dealt with before the real voice of labour 
can find its expression.18  
 
 A.M. McBriar wrote that ‘at the price of increased trade union control over the 
party organisation, the Labour Party had accepted Fabianism as its doctrinal basis’.19 
Certainly, after December 1918 the Parliamentary Labour party was dominated by 
unionists: most of the fifty-seven Labour MPs were trade union candidates, and fully 
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twenty-five of them were from the Miners’ Federation.20 Thus the overall trend during 
the war was for greater co-operation within the union movement, and between the 
unions and the Labour party; union membership itself increased by fifty per cent during 
the war, and the number of unions affiliated to the party doubled.
21
 
 
Labour and Women’s Organisations 
 
There had been an uneasy relationship between the labour movement and women’s 
groups before the war. Whilst some labour figures such as Keir Hardie were prominent 
suffragists and women’s rights’ campaigners, many on the Left felt that votes for 
women was a distraction from the demand for a full adult franchise; that gender issues 
were a lesser part of the class struggle; and that women’s groups were dominated by 
rich ladies of Tory inclination. By 1912 the relationship between Labour and the 
Women’s Suffrage and Political Union (WSPU) had fractured: Labour candidates were 
opposed at elections; and speakers, particular Snowden, MacDonald, and even Keir 
Hardie, were frequently jeered by suffragettes.
22
  During the by-election of that year 
triggered by George Lansbury’s resignation, the local Labour party secretary refused to 
send lists of voters to suffragettes – who had cars to collect them – whilst suffragettes 
refused to lend their cars to the Labour party.
23
 Whilst the war did not do much to 
enlighten some of the more reactionary men of the labour movement, it did bring 
women’s organisations, the trade unions and the Labour party closer together both 
structurally and culturally. 
Although some women’s organisations – including the WSPU - supported the 
war, and others such as the East London Federation of Suffragettes opposed it, the 
efforts of the labour movement to protect the poorest and most vulnerable from the 
worst effects of the conflict undermined such patriotic/pacifistic divisions as existed. 
Barely a month after the declaration of war, Jim Middleton received the following letter 
from Sylvia Pankhurst: ‘As the East London Federation of the Suffragettes is a working 
women’s organisation, we have come to the conclusion that it would be useful for us to 
apply to you to ask if we may have representation on the War Emergency Workers 
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National Committee.’24 Whilst Sylvia Pankhurst opposed the war, the establishment of 
the WNC as an umbrella organisation for all and sundry labour groups led even those 
who vigorously opposed the conflict to seek representation. The WNC itself made a 
particular effort to ensure that women should be adequately represented on both its own 
sub-committees and regional organisations; early on it was agreed that the proposed 
local Citizen Committees should contain representatives not only of male trade unions 
but also of Co-operative societies and women’s groups.25 An informal conference was 
held at the TUC offices on 22 March 1915, called by Sylvia Pankhurst, Julia Scurr, Ben 
Tillett and George Lansbury, and the following resolution passed: 
 
That this conference representative of the various phases of the organised women’s movement 
invites the War Emergency: Workers’ National Committee to convene a National Conference of 
delegates from the Women’s Trade Unions, Socialist, Labour, Suffragists, and other Societies for 
the purposes of discussing the proposals put forward by the Government for the employment of 
women in the present war emergency and recommends that representatives of Trade Unions 
affected by the Government’s proposals be invited to co-operate.26 
 
This new spirit of inclusion did not extend to all aspects of the WNC and Labour party’s 
actions; a letter from the Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women’s 
Organisations arrived on 14 September 1916, protesting against the actions of the Joint 
Labour after the War Committee in placing no women on three out of the four Advisory 
Committees which they had recently appointed.
27
 
A key source of tension vis-a-vis women and the labour movement was the issue 
of female workers undercutting wage levels. H. Ludlow Crofts of the Ilford and District 
Trades and Labour Council wrote to the Secretary of the Co-operative Wholesale 
Society on 24 April 1915, on the topic of women typists replacing men. He claimed that 
there was a great danger of permanent lowering of wages and conditions if men were 
replaced by women at lower rates: ‘Seeing that special efforts are being made 
throughout the Labour movement to endeavour to secure the same pay for women who 
replace men as such men received, it is thought that the Co-operative Wholesale should 
be one of the first to recognise this’. Furthermore, claimed Crofts, ‘delegates from the 
NUR told the meeting that where women were replacing men on the Railways during 
                                               
24 Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LHASC), WNC.9/1/21 – letter from Sylvia Pankhurst, 10 
September 1914. 
25 WNC.3/6/1/3. 
26 WNC.20/1/1/45 – War Service for Women. 
27 WNC.8/4/16 – letter from Standing Joint Committee of Industrial Women’s Organisations, 14 
September 1916. 
   
 
192 
 
the War, they were in every case to receive equal payment to what the men replaced 
received, and therefore, my Council think that in only asking what a Capitalist 
organisation accepts, the C.W.S. are only asked to do what is fair and just’.28 In 1915 an 
appeal was made by the WNC to women taking men’s jobs to join the relevant trade 
union and demand equal wages and equal conditions: ‘Women cannot more truly 
express their love of their country than by helping to secure justice and well-being for 
man and woman alike.’ This was signed by scores of women from local labour 
societies, women’s groups, academics and trade unions.29 
The issue of the surveillance of soldiers’ and sailors’ wives while their husbands 
were serving with the colours caused a great deal of offence amongst the labour 
movement.  ‘Very strong expressions were voiced’, Middleton wrote to Home Secretary 
Reginald McKenna, ‘and I was instructed to ask if you would receive a deputation of 
the women members of this Committee on the subject.’30 Similarly, there were protests 
issued at the idea that there would be a glut of ‘war babies’ born due to an increase in 
sexual activity; allegations which the Women’s Subcommittee described as ‘offensive’, 
but stressed the need for the WNC to improve the condition not only of the children of 
servicemen, but of unmarried mothers and their babies in general. They also called for a 
change in English law that would legitimise babies if parents subsequently married, as 
existed in Scotland; for the Public Health Authorities to set up adequate numbers of 
Mother and Baby Clinics, as established by a few municipalities already, including on a 
large scale in Bradford; that the Notification of Births Act be made compulsory; and 
that sufficient number of qualified health visitors be appointed by each Public Health 
Authority.
31
 In a letter to Mary Macarthur of the Women’s Trade Union League on 23 
July 1915, Middleton stated that the ‘WNC is very anxious that full advantage should be 
taken of the new Notification of Births Act’; he further suggested agitating for the 
adoption of the provisions of the Act by local authorities, and ensuring the 
representation of working women upon Committees that may be set up by local 
authorities.
32
 
 Gillian Scott has highlighted an enduring body of opinion within the labour 
movement over issues such as birth control and family allowance payments which 
reflected a masculine culture in which ‘women’s issues’ were subservient to matters of 
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class and economics. For Scott the war served to enthrone this body of thought: suffrage 
and women’s incorporation into the Labour and Co-operative parties undermined 
commitments to married women’s rights and connections to wider feministic and 
socialist ideals: ‘[Women’s Co-operative] Guild leaders followed priorities set by the 
Labour Party, rather than by their membership; as they did so, they tacitly laid to rest 
the critical analysis of sexual relations in the private sphere, alongside the willingness to 
recognize the gendered character of the working-class, which had been such outstanding 
hallmarks of the earlier, pioneering phase of its history.’33 There is little to challenge 
this in terms of the post-war labour movement, yet one has to ask how much of an 
appetite there was amongst working-class women to challenge prevalent gender roles, 
and whether or not the radicalism of post-war women’s movements may have 
manifested itself in other ways. As Mathew Worley has argued: ‘Though some women 
referred to their being sidelined or ignored within the party, most Labour women did not 
seem to perceive their role as inferior, but as their shared contribution to broader party 
activity’, and that ‘the home was exactly where a large proportion of working-class 
women were located in the early twentieth century’.34 
The suffrage issue attracted new prominence during the war, and also served to 
join women’s movements - including those of Liberal or Conservative disposition - to 
work with the WNC and Labour, if only on this one issue. Writing to Sylvia Pankhurst 
in December 1915, Middleton argued: 
 
Personally, I hold very strongly that no move should be made at present to renew the public aspect 
of the Suffrage agitation. Such action would, I think be very premature, and would have exactly 
the contrary effect that we all desire. I hope it will be possible to have a useful debate on the 
subject at the Labour Party Conference, and I am also anxious that the Workers’ National 
Committee upon a suitable opportunity arising will give a lead to a united movement to forward 
the women’s cause, but I do feel most strongly at the present moment the public mind is far too 
much centred on war matters to concern itself very much about Suffrage. Women have an 
exceedingly strong case which will be recognised by considerable sections of the public as being 
much more convincing than was the case prior to the war, but if by any false move public irritation 
is aroused it will be rendered extraordinarily difficult for us to regain our position.35 
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By 1916 Middleton had grown less circumspect. He sent letters to Ben Turner and John 
Clynes on 7 June 1916 calling for a resolution on women’s suffrage to be adopted at the 
TUC in September, and received a reply from Clynes informing him that the 
Gasworkers’ and General Labourers’ Union had already prepared resolutions ahead of 
the Congress.
36
 As Joint Secretary – along with K.D. Courtney - of the National Council 
for Adult Suffrage, he dispatched the following circular in October of that year: 
 
The men prevented from enlisting and retained in the munition shops, in the mines, on the 
railways, in the fields and in other branches of industry, are serving their country as truly as those 
who fight, while the help of women – apart from their first service to the State as mothers – has 
been called for, and thousands have answered the call...Even many of the foremost opponents of 
women’s suffrage now admit that the services rendered by women during the war have won them 
the right, so long denied, to exercise a voice in national affairs… 
In a word, the war has revealed to many what some sections of society recognised in peace time: 
that the strength of the nation lies in its men and women and not in the material property they may 
or may not possess – that full-grown life itself, not inanimate bricks and mortar, is the only basis 
for the Government of a great nation.37 
 
As with other issues, the voluminous correspondence between Middleton and 
various women’s and suffrage groups across the country had their own significance in 
binding these groups to each other and the labour movement. Information passed from 
peripheries to the centre and vice-versa about possible speakers and supporters, mooted 
policies, and local grandees, such as in the following letter from Pankhurst in March 
1915: ‘The Wimbledon WSPU Secretary, Mrs R. Lamartine Yates…is very anxious to 
be summoned to the Conference. Mrs Lamartine Yates is a great power in her district 
and on the Mayor’s Committee, and the Union has many good working members. I 
think you will be well advised to invite them; they are practically an independent 
society.’38 
Perhaps the most significant congress for joining female pressure groups and 
different labour organisations together was the grand Women’s Conference held at 
Caxton Hall on 16 April 1915. This asked for safeguards that women’s war service be 
recognised by the government: ‘In the event of the Board of Trade making difficulties 
about guaranteeing these safeguards, may we hear what steps the WNC and the trades 
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unions whom it represents will take to secure effective protection for women workers 
from sweating and underpayment, without penalising their entry into the various trades 
for which their war service is required?’39 The extensive list of representatives 
demonstrates just how varied and inclusive the conference was, suggesting that the war 
brought closer association between disparate groups. George Lansbury represented 
Poplar trades council; Leslie Boyne the Gasworkers and General Labourers; Sylvia 
Pankhurst the East London Federation of Suffragettes; Barbara Ayrton Gould, Mary 
Neal, John Scurr and Therese Muir Mackenzie, the United Suffragists; Marion Holmes 
the Women Writers Suffragists; Susan Lawrence of the London County Council; Lillian 
Harris from the Women’s Co-operative Guild; Ethel Weaver of the National Federation 
of Women Workers; L.A. Dawson from the Fabian Women’s Group; A.M. Florence, 
the Association of Women Clerks and Secretaries; Mary Macarthur of the Women’s 
Trade Union League; Margaret Hicks of the National Women’s Council; Grace Neal 
from the Domestic Workers Union; Winfred Mayo of the Actress Franchise League; 
and Middleton himself.
40
 
 Ultimately the war brought women’s groups closer towards and further 
integrated into the labour movement. Although specifically female concern were forced 
to take a subservient position to class issues, and, in the words of Worley, ‘What Labour 
often failed to do – along with other political parties and organisations – was to 
appreciate that women comprised multiple identities: housewives, workers, mothers, 
consumers, wives, lovers, Catholics, and so on’.41 Issues over birth control, maternal 
healthcare and welfare benefits were to cause tensions within the movement in the inter-
war period, yet overall alliances forged in the war held during the inter-war period, and 
were vital in channelling newly-enfranchised women towards Labour.  
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Fig. 6.1 ‘Not the Time and Place’, Railway Review, 21 August 1917. 
Fig. 6.2 ‘Will He Now?’, Railway Review, 29 September 
1916. 
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Fig. 6.3 ‘Our Little Inconsistencies’, Railway Review, 
11 May 1917. 
Fig. 6.4 ‘The Question of the Day’, Railway 
Review, 13 October 1916. 
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The Co-operative Movement and Labour 
 
Of all the various trade unions, socialist societies, women’s groups and sundry 
organisations which could loosely be said to compose the ‘Edwardian Left’, the Co-
operative movement had the most ambiguous relationship with the Labour party. With a 
membership of around three million at the start of the war – which grew by more than 
one million during the conflict, reaching 4,131,000 in 1919 - the group was a potentially 
mighty ally, if it could be persuaded to seek political representation and fight with 
Labour in Parliament.
42
 Yet the prospects for a political alliance did not look promising. 
Although the 1907 Co-operative Congress voted in favour of direct political 
representation, apathy and opposition amongst the local societies killed the initiative. 
Subsequently, the Congress at Aberdeen in 1913 decided for neutrality, and on 4 August 
1914 Secretary Whitehead of the Co-operative Union wrote to Arthur Henderson, 
explaining his refusal to send a representative to the meeting of the Peace Emergency 
Committee (soon to be the WNC): ‘I regret to say that owing to a resolution passed by 
our last Congress, the Union cannot accede to your wishes in sending a delegate to the 
meeting.’43 The war was to change all this. Firstly, the Co-operative movement soon 
overcame its previous neutrality and joined with the WNC; secondly the movement was 
persuaded it was in need of political representation; and finally bonds were formed 
during the war which ensured that in the post-war world the Co-operative movement 
and Labour would be closely allied. 
 The main issue which drew the WNC and the Co-operative together concerned 
the supply of food. Middleton wrote again to Whitehead on 6 August 1914, calling for 
two nominees to the WNC: ‘In addition to the accounts of the Government’s proposals 
respecting the national food supply, the work in which we are to be engaged will be of 
immense importance to all working-class households’.44 This time the response was 
favourable: ‘We have a Congress Resolution debarring us from taking certain steps; but 
I am of opinion that this resolution should not debar us at the time of this national 
crisis’.45 At the start of 1917 a deputation was sent to the food controller Lord 
Devonport, featuring, from the Parliamentary Committee of the Co-operative Congress: 
S. Galbraith, A. Varley (CWS), W.T, Charter (Co-operative Union), J. Bardner, 
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(Scottish CWS), W. Openshaw (CWS), E. Ross (SCWS) and H.J. May (Secretary), 
along with several representatives of the WNC.
46
 Arguing that the Co-operative’s 
experience of equitably distributing food made their principles ideal for the war, H.M. 
Hyndman wrote to the Morning Post in June 1917:  
 
There can be no more important post in the country, at the present moment and for at least two or 
three years to come, than that of Food Controller; I do not wonder that the Government finds very 
great difficulty in filling it…The great Co-operative Societies, with their 3,000,000 members and 
11,000,000 customers, can, as I believe, furnish a thoroughly-experienced man possessing all these 
qualifications. 
 
Specifically, he suggested Bob Williams, secretary of the CWS.
47
  
In addition to stimulating collaboration at the highest levels of organisations 
through the WNC, the food supply issue brought together different groups at a regional 
level. There was a highly successful North East food conference at Newcastle with 610 
delegates representing 265 different organisations. These included 158 trade unions, 
forty-five co-operatives, nine women’s co-operative guilds, eighteen branches of the 
ILP, thirteen workmen’s clubs, nine local Labour parties, six trade and labour councils, 
four branches of the Women’s Labour League, four friendly societies, and the Church 
Labour Committee.
48
A West of Scotland conference of Co-operative, trade union, 
women’s, and socialist organisations was held at the Co-operative Hall, Glasgow, under 
the auspices of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society on 20 February 1915, ‘for 
purposes of reduction of Food and Fuel Prices, as recommended by the Workers’ 
National Committee’. Robert Stewart of the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society 
presided, with miner’s leader Robert Smillie also on the platform.49 Similarly, Rachael 
Vorberg-Rugh has highlighted the significance of the 1916 Bolton Food Protest 
Meeting. The Co-operative, British Socialist party, trade council and Labour party were 
all represented, and were addressed by Bob Williams, who had been sent by the WNC. 
Vorberg-Rugh has noted that the meeting did not address the national Co-operative 
programme, but instead concentrated on Bolton and relevant local issues.
50
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These food conferences show in microcosm how the Independent Labour party, 
trade unions, and the Co-operative started to coalesce at a local level. An important role 
of the WNC and Middleton in particular was co-ordinating speakers for these various 
events. Certain rhetoricians such as Smillie, Barnes and Tillett were highly sought after, 
but so were female lecturers such as Margaret Bondfield, Mary Macarthur and Susan 
Lawrence; in fact roughly half of the scores of local food conferences requested female 
speakers.
51
 In addition to the connections, motivation and goodwill engendered by these 
conferences, they were a useful source of income: by February 1915 thirty-five pounds 
had been raised and conferences were contributing four or five pounds on average to the 
WNC coffers.
52
 The regional food conferences thus had a similar significance to closer 
organisational and ideological co-operation at the centre; in terms of organisation, 
camaraderie, fundraising, and even recruitment. Amongst the dozens of letters of 
feedback hailing these councils as a resounding success came an enquiry from J.W. 
Blenkey of the Stockton Trades Council as to the fees and process involved in 
affiliating to Labour, with which Middleton was happy to supply him.
53
  
 The labour and Co-operative movements also found a great deal of common 
ground on the issue of direct/indirect taxation. In November 1914 Henderson appealed 
to Lloyd George to lessen indirect taxes on the working classes and lower the threshold 
on income tax;
54
 and the budget of 1916 was particularly infuriating for both parties due 
to the amount of tax that was to be levelled on expenditure, rather than income.
55
 Already by October 1914 the editor of The Co-operative News was praising 
Clynes and advancing the prudence of political representation: ‘In his address at 
Warrington on Saturday last, Mr. J. R. Clynes, M.P., was right in reminding us that if 
co-operators decide to stay out of Parliament, they will not find private traders ready to 
follow their example.’ The editorial continued by predicting that a ‘democratic fusion’ 
of trade unionists and co-operators would be even more important after the war, and that 
the movement should co-operate with Labour in fielding candidates.
56
 Similarly at the 
Northern Sectional conference of the Women’s Co-operative Guild held at the Co-
operative hall in Hartlepool on 17 April 1915 there was a great deal of praise for the 
Labour party and talk of the need for unity and parliamentary agitation; one woman 
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claimed that if Labour had been around in the time of Robert Owen, they would all have 
been members of the party.
57
 
There was particular praise for the WNC after the government relented to its 
pressure on pension rates: ‘the announcement that the Government has decided to make 
a grant to increase the scale of old age pensions to those who are suffering special 
hardships on account of the high prices of food and other oppressive economic 
conditions caused by the war, will be especially gratifying to the members of the 
Workers’ War Emergency Committee’.58  Describing an interview with Hyndman in 
March 1915, The Co-operative News editor declared that:  
 
His sympathetic attitude towards the Co-operative Movement…surprised some of us who had 
been prone to regard him as wholly devoted to Democratic Socialism of the political 
variety…“The War”, he declares, “is galvanising the whole of the working classes, and 
particularly their leaders, into an activity which did not exist before. Even the co-operators, so long 
holding aloof from other advanced movements, are moving forward. The various forms of the 
great Labour movement will tend to coalesce so that they may work together after the Declaration 
of Peace for the future of the country.”59  
 
There was corresponding praise from the WNC and Labour party for the Co-
operative movement: William Brown of the WNC wrote an article in The Co-operative 
News of January 1915 entitled: ‘Co-Operation As the Only Hope. Endorsement by 
Representatives of Working and Middle-Class People.’ Brown argued that the WNC 
‘has shown how co-operators and trade unionists have much in common. The latter 
have helped the former in getting rid of anti-co-operative methods on relief committees; 
the former have assisted the latter in showing standard rates of employment’.60 Links 
between the two movements were also strengthened by the number of unions using the 
CWS Bank; trade union branch CWS bank accounts grew from nine hundred in 1918 to 
over eight thousand by 1922, while CWS member societies declared in 1919 that all 
CWS employees had to me a member of a trade union recognised by the TUC.
61
  
 ‘Do It Now!’ urged the editorial of the 9 June 1917 The Co-operative News; 
reporting how the Swansea Congress had decided that the time had arrived to secure 
direct Co-operative representation in Parliament and on local authorities; and the 
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correspondence columns of the newspaper were full of readers calling for direct 
representation. Two months later the newspaper claimed that attempts to hamper co-
operatives by legislation had led to the Swansea conference and the call for direct 
representation: ‘The blasts of war had blown the sheep’s clothing off the profiteering 
wolves, and they stood revealed, with all their fangs, to the open gaze of the people 
who, forthwith, began to flock to the co-operative stores.’62 Five months after the 
Swansea Congress, an emergency Conference was held in October 1917, at which 
Arthur Henderson spoke: 
 
I would not insult the Co-operative Movement as a whole by suggesting that it should affiliate 
even with the Party whose secretary I have the honour to be. What we want is to have you properly 
organised; and until experience provides us with better means, to have you working with us for the 
same common cause…Under the terms of your proposed scheme it permits friendly relations 
between us. We of the Labour Party have begun to work with the Co-operative Movement.63 
 
Needless to say, the war did not witness an entirely amicable fraternity between 
the labour and Co-operative movements. In June 1916 The Co-operative News asked: 
‘Why is it that the Labour party in Parliament remain so remarkably silent respecting 
the wholesale exploitation of the wage-earners they were elected to represent?’64 The 
Co-operative Congress of May 1915 still did not have a majority for political fusion, 
and as late as April 1917, while there were demands for direct Co-operative 
representation in Parliament, there was still a majority against a formal alliance with 
Labour.
65
 The close organisational and ideological interaction of Labour and the Co-
operative movement did not yet mean that there would be any political understanding 
between Labour and the proposed new Co-operative party. Indeed after it became 
apparent that co-operators would seek separate political representation independent of 
Labour, press coverage of the party became more circumspect. In the editorial ‘Partyism 
or Co-operation?’ The Co-operative News advocated supporting candidates because 
they were ‘good co-operators’, not because they were good Labourists, and the June 
1918 edition carried rumours of discord in the Labour party ranks, claiming that the ILP 
was not happy with the direction of Labour, the British Workers’ League was at odds 
over many issues, and there was talk of the formation of a separate trade union party.
66
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As Tony Adams has argued, far from being resolved, ‘the battle to bring co-operation 
into closer political alliance with Labour had only entered a new and particularly 
difficult phase as a result of the 1917 Congress decision’.67  
In fact, given the decision to found a Co-operative party to complete for 
parliamentary seats, in September 1917 the Parliamentary Committee of Co-operative 
Congress elected to end its affiliation with WNC. Whilst the movement had been 
persuaded of the value of political representation, the neutralist sentiment still remained 
strong. Therefore, paradoxically, while the war had brought labour and the Co-operative 
closer together, and brought the latter into the political arena, it was felt important to put 
some distance between the two groups. The move came as a great shock and 
disappointment to Middleton, yet the bounds formed in the war were not so easily 
dissolved:
68
 ‘I need not assure you’, wrote Henry May as he informed Middleton of the 
development, ‘that this decision was arrived at reluctantly as the Committee are in 
sympathy with the work with which they have been connected for the past 3 years.’69 
M.A. Gasson of the Co-operative Union also wrote of her regret: ‘Personally, I am 
extremely sorry, because I am certain this Committee has had a greater influence upon 
the Government, and the country, in calling attention to, and suggesting remedies for 
many of the evils brought into existence through war conditions than any Committee I 
know.’70 CWS Secretary Bob Williams was particularly saddened by the schism, yet 
felt optimistic for the future: 
 
However great my regret as regards the personal issue, it is completely eclipsed by that which I 
feel respecting the severance of the link between our Co-operative movement and the other 
organisations comprehended in the representation upon your Committee. It is nothing short of 
disastrous that, at a time when all working-class movements should be more closely related in 
order to face the grave situation created by the war crisis…this sudden severance should have 
taken place. I desire to thank very heartily your colleagues for the kindness and courtesy they have 
always shown to me; to wish them all success in their future labours; and to express the belief that 
the work they have already accomplished will be found, in future days, to have been of epoch-
making importance.71 
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Middleton was of a similar mind, and agreed with Williams that the war had created an 
indelible bond between Labour and the Co-operative movement: 
 
Our three years work on the National Committee has been a great endeavour, and has really helped 
to keep us sane in these mad times. I believe that we have done much more permanent work than 
we quite realise. The keeping together of our local forces in the constituencies, which after all, 
from a political point-of-view, has been a great success, will make our task of re-organising the 
Labour Party much easier than I fear otherwise would have been the case… 
I am hoping that the severance will be only temporary, and that in any case, before many months 
are over, the three great Movements – Industrial – Political – and Co-operative – will be linked up 
so as to become the greatest Democratic Force that ever British politics have known.72 
 
 This analysis of the effects of the war on the relationship between the Co-
operative movement and the political and industrial branches of the labour movement 
argued that, pace Sidney Pollard, it was the specific circumstances engendered by the 
war which led to closer co-operation between the two groups. In the words of Tony 
Adams: ‘Long–established and firmly held views [on political neutrality] were 
undermined by the practical experiences of active co-operators during the war rather 
than any mass conversion to Labour consequent upon a re-defined ideology’.73 
Although Mary Hilson stressed the importance of the war, she counselled that ‘whilst 
there is evidence from Plymouth to support such a reading, I argue that calls for 
independent political representation may be read another way, which suggests a 
developing analysis of society in terms of opposing economic systems and class 
conflict, and that furthermore this reading indicates a shift in attitudes during this 
period’.74 However the evidence of friendship and camaraderie between leaders of 
Labour and the Co-operative and desire for closer integration despite official policy 
supports Adams’ argument that ‘far from being a conservative force, the national 
leadership of the Co-operative Union made repeated attempts to drag a largely 
indifferent and often hostile membership into closer alliance with Labour and the trade 
unions’.75  
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The Socialist Societies and the Labour Party 
 
In 1914 the Independent Labour party, British Socialist party and the Fabian Society 
accounted for only 33,000 out of the 1.6 million membership of the Labour 
Representation Committee, but though far less numerically significant than the trade 
unions, they provided many of the MPs, leaders, and intellectual and ideological basis 
of the movement.
76
 The Fabians generally supported the war, the BSP split over the 
conflict, with its right-wing joining with other ultra-patriots to form the Socialist 
National Defence Committee, while the ILP – though internally divided – remained 
within Labour, albeit a source of criticism and occasional division. The early days of the 
war saw much greater hostility towards the supposedly pacifistic ILP than 1917 and 
1918: describing ILP criticism of the Labour party’s support for the war, an editorial in 
the Railway Review of November 1914 complained: ‘I find the tone of superiority and 
pity for the straying Labour party much more difficult to stand than any other aspect of 
the case’.77 By June of 1916 the exasperation with the ILP had hardened: ‘The ILP is 
totally out a touch with the main currents of Trade Union opinion…It may be, of course, 
that the Labour party as present formed can weather the storm, but I confess the 
prospect is not alluring.’78  
In a broadside against the war which appeared in the Bradford Pioneer of 
October 1915, the ILP’s T. Russell Williams lambasted the labour leaders for failing in 
their first duty to protect the working classes. He further claimed that a week earlier he 
had sent a letter to the Labour Leader, only to have a key paragraph excised ‘for no 
apparent reason, unless it was fear of misunderstanding with our trade union colleagues. 
We seem to be unable to measure the value of anything except by material standards. 
The unholy influence of the voter colours our thoughts and makes us false to every god-
like instinct within us. We are almost as much afraid of a Labour party rout as we might 
be of a German invasion’.79 Writing in the Pioneer of February 1917, the doctrinaire 
socialist and pacifist Philip Frankford criticised the ‘so-called’ Labour party, and 
claimed that the ILP, ‘to be successful must STAND ALONE. If it makes temporary 
alliances with non-Socialist bodies, such as we might do here, with radical anti-
militarists to overthrow militarism, it MUST BE OF A TEMPORARY NATURE 
ONLY, AND THIS SOLELY TO OBTAIN ONE OF THE VITAL PRINCIPLES OF 
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SOCIALISM’.80 Of course, the Labour party itself did the exact opposite, and made 
alliances with right-wing trade unionists as well as radical, Liberal pacifists. 
Discussing the proposed new Labour party constitution in November 1917, Fred 
Jowett of the ILP claimed that:  
 
In the first place… there is nothing contained in the proposed constitution that commits the party 
to Socialism. It is true that in the statement concerning the objects of the party “common 
ownership of the means of production” is mentioned as the basis for securing the full fruits of their 
industry “for producers by hand or by brain”. There is nothing, however, to prevent Co-operators, 
for instance, who look rather to the gradual extension of voluntary Co-operative activities until the 
whole field of industry and commerce has been brought within the scope of its operations, from 
subscribing to this form of declaration… The proposed new constitution treats Socialist 
organisations exactly on the same footing as Trade Unions, as if all members of Trade Unions 
were active supporters of the Labour Party, whereas probably not more than fifty per cent support 
the Labour Party at public elections, and as if, on the other hand, the political strength of Socialist 
organisations could be exactly measured by the number of their members.81  
 
Yet the ILP did not split with Labour over the war. This was partly due to 
internal divisions over the conflict and to the federalised nature of Labour at the time, 
but also because there was clearly room in the labour movement for dissent and 
pacifism. It also helped that the ILP found much to agree with in the type of socialism 
adopted by the Labour party in 1918. In the words of Jay Winter, ‘to make of the 
Labour party a moderate alternative to extra-Parliamentary action or even revolution 
itself was all the more important, Henderson argued, because so many men “have 
become habituated to thoughts of violence” during the war’.82 The Railway Review 
concurred with this in July 1918 when it described the Labour conference that had just 
been held in London: ‘Whatever taint of misplaced Bolshevism existed was shriven in 
shreds when Mr Henderson had read the translation of Kerensky’s oration. His picture 
of Russia bleeding white under the dual autocracy of anarchism and Prussianism 
conveyed a moral not to be forgotten by those hearing who desired the truth’.83 
Similarly, Guild socialists such as G.D.H. Cole became, in the words of Beatrice Webb, 
‘willing to work with the Labour Party in order to get in touch with the Trade Unions’, 
and this was reciprocated by the party; before the war there had been a certain ‘disdain’ 
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of intellectuals, but in the post-war atmosphere Cole, Tawney and the Webbs were 
increasingly prominent.
84
 
 
The Rise and Decline of the Ultra-Patriots 
 
Joseph Burgess, one of the founders of the ILP and editor of the Bradford Pioneer until 
his break with the pacifistic Left over the war, had argued in his book Homeland or 
Empire? that ‘capitalism is national…socialism is international’.85 Yet the motivations 
of much of the British Left at this time were national, and very often parochial; this led 
to labour support for the war and an electoral boost for Labour after 1918. There was a 
very real risk, however, that an ultra-nationalistic socialism could develop, and Joseph 
Burgess was one of many on the Left who abandoned previous internationalist and 
pacifistic positions with alacrity for an altogether different ideology. 
The correspondence column of The Clarion of the 22
 
October 1915 contained a 
missive from an author with the pen name ‘British Nationalist’: 
 
I agree with Mr Blatchford that “Socialism now covers so many ideas which I hate that I wince 
when I call myself a Socialist. After the war we shall have to find a new name.” I suggest the 
words “Nationalism” and “Nationalist.”…“Nationalism” can easily cover “Nationalisation”, which 
is Socialism, and the corrupted word “Socialism” can be left to the discredited rump…All respect 
to Messrs. Will Thorne, Will Crooks, Ben Tillett, G.H. Roberts, John Hodge, and their like, who 
are men of big brains as well as loyalty of heart and sense. But the time has come to repudiate 
slackers and shockers, and leave them to their own rubbish-heaps. 
 
The column ‘Our Point of View’ – usually written by The Clarion deputy editor Alex 
Thompson – took as its title ‘The Nation’s Re-Birth’: 
 
There is so much that we might do after the war. We shall then be able to show that in the time of 
danger our nationalistic principles were embraced by all parties as the only means of saving the 
nation. We can show that in the reorganisation of labour, in the revival of industry on an essential 
basis of production for use, in the scientific distribution of wealth for the avoidance of wholesale 
bankruptcy, our principles must necessarily hold the field. If we oppose the nation, we shall be 
shamed and execrated as much as the Germans. If we prove ourselves nationalists now, if we help 
loyally to ensure the enemy’s defeat, the future is ours…That is why we venture to claim-perhaps 
with excessive conceit of its capabilities-that the survival of the Clarion, the steadfast champion of 
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Socialistic Nationalism expressed in the phrase “Britain for the British”, may be of some use after 
the war to save some Socialist influence from the threatened debacle.86 
 
These ideas reached their logical linguistic conclusion in a call by Burgess at the end of 
1915 for ‘A National Socialist Party’. In this declaration he stated how he had finally 
resigned his membership of the ILP – despite his being a founding member - and felt 
that:  
 
The time is right for a new departure. All existing British Socialist papers have been paralysed by 
a futile Internationalism. For another generation at least the Socialist of all nations would be well-
advised to concentrate on achieving Socialism in their own boundaries. I would be delighted to co-
operate with Socialists who accept that view in an attempt to establish a National Socialist Party 
with the emphasis on the “National”.87 
 
 Jay Winter has written how ‘It may not have been a complete accident…that 
Oswald Mosley, the Fascist leader, emerged not from the Conservative, but rather from 
the Labour Party’, but this reflects a rather sanitised view of the early labour 
movement.
88
 If Britons at the time of the First World War had an entirely different 
conception of ‘race’, ethnicity, nations and nationalism than we do today, then labour 
people – intellectuals as much as workers – were little different. Biological racism, 
eugenics and Social Darwinism undermined any true internationalism as we would 
understand it today and there was a commonplace anti-Semitic sentiment across the 
political spectrum. A letter to Arthur Henderson in late 1916 conveyed a resolution 
unanimously adopted at meeting of the WNC on 30 November 1916, ‘that this War 
Emergency: Workers’ National Committee, having regard to the serious moral, social, 
industrial, and economic considerations in any introduction of coloured labour into this 
country, supports the Labour Party in its emphatic protest against such introduction’.89 
Towards the end of the war The Co-operative News complained of ‘A catering 
company, largely controlled by Jewish financiers, with depots in London and the 
provinces, return[ing] a profit of 25 per cent on its year’s working.’90 Given that there 
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was momentum for a nationalistic, statist, patriotic, and economically populist doctrine 
amongst both Left and Right towards the end of the war, why was the advent of a 
popular British fascist movement delayed until over a decade after the conflict? Why, 
given the popularity of prominent labour patriots and the expulsion of labour 
peacemakers from the Parliamentary Labour party in the immediate post-war period, 
was the ultra-patriotic Labour right unable to either take control of the party, or 
establish themselves an as independent force in politics? 
 In The Clerk of September 1916, Mr O. Prevost outlined what he saw as the 
folly of the British Left: ‘Thousands of workers in this country have declined to support 
the movement because of its shortsighted policy in permitting…unpatriotic sentiments 
to be expressed. Such workers have rightly argued thus: “What is the use of Socialists 
telling us to socialise the means whereby we live, if the Socialists want to cut down the 
Navy and Army, and thus leave us inadequately protected against foreign aggression?”.’ 
The British Workers League, he continued: 
 
Has been formed to combat this sort of thing and to create a sane, practical organisation to 
stimulate real patriotism (not Jingoism, or Chauvinism, or Pan-Germanism) among all sections of 
the community, thus compelling the State to guarantee every citizen the right to live (not merely 
exist), to protect the British workers from the unfair competition of cheap labour and cheap 
markets, whether at home or abroad, and to establish on a democratic basis defences adequate to 
the Empire’s safety.  
 
He concluded by lampooning the ILP and Herald pacifists’ ‘Tolstoyan ethics of 
passive-resistance, meekness, humility, and brotherly love’, and proclaiming: ‘I believe 
in Internationalism in so far as I would like to see the workers of the world unite in 
order to free themselves from exploitation by the ruling classes; but such an 
Internationalism is only possible by the proper organisation of its constituent nations, 
and that organisation is only possible through nationalism’.91 
 The ‘Manifesto’ of the BWL appeared in The Clarion in the same year. Signed 
by the Council of the BWL, including Vice Presidents Charles Duncan, John Hodge, 
James O’Grady, Charles Stanton, Stephen Walsh and H.G. Wells, Chairman Alex 
Thompson, and Honorary Secretary Victor Fisher, it outlined the following: 
‘Competition and private profiteering have led to waste, inefficiency, and fraud. The 
nation has only been saved from destruction in so far as it has depended on patriotic 
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national solidarity.’ The BWL did not at first show any great hostility towards the 
Labour party, due to the cross-over in personnel and cross-fertilisation of ideas, 
particularly with the sizeable patriotic labour strand within the mainstream of the 
movement. The BWL was imperially-minded and supported free trade within the 
Empire, yet was still strongly socialist, anti-laissez-faire, and opposed any return to free 
importation, particularly of German goods.
92
 The first BWL conference was held in 
London on 28 March 1917, and resolutions passed included calls for a standardised 
living wage, the exploitation of Empire resources for all, financial support for 
motherhood, nationalisation of the railways and welcoming the fall of the Tsar.
93
  
The Conservative Lord Alfred Milner certainly saw the potential value of the 
secession of patriotic trade unionists from the main body of the labour movement. ‘I 
need not point out’, he wrote to Lord Willoughby de Broke in October 1915, ‘what an 
advantage it would be if any considerable section of the working class could, without 
giving up their special class aspirations, nevertheless be induced to look at national 
questions in a broader and less exclusively class spirit’.94 Milner, along with fellow 
Tory Arthur Steel-Maitland, met with labour patriots Victor Fisher and Charles Stanton 
on at least one occasion, and Alex Thompson claimed of Milner that he had ‘never read 
so much of any man’s writing that I agree with so whole heartedly’.95 J.A. Seddon of 
the BWL wrote in The Co-operative News of the ‘New Spirit’ that would develop in 
post-war Britain, with greater co-operation between labour and capital.
96
 With the 
advent of the National Alliance of Employers and Employed in 1917, it seemed possible 
that a break-away faction of right-wing trade unionists could result in a serious schism 
within the labour movement, yet although the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC 
twice considered involvement with the NAEE, it was twice rejected.
97
 Division in the 
Parliamentary Labour party, however, proved unavoidable. Despite the party deciding 
to leave the Coalition Government in November 1918 in order to present itself to the 
electorate as an independent, serious contender for power, several politicians refused to 
cut their ties with the Lloyd George-led ministry, and stood as ‘Coalition Labour’ 
candidates in December 1918. The five returned were James Parker at Cannock, George 
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Barnes for Glasgow Gorbals, John Hodge in Manchester Gorton, George Roberts for 
Norwich and George Wardle for Stockport.  
By the time of the December 1918 general election, the BWL had renamed itself 
the National Democratic Party, and had nine successes at that poll: Charles Stanton in 
Aberdare, Eldred Hallas at Birmingham Duddeston, Charles Loseby at Bradford East 
(defeating anti-war Fred Jowett of the ILP), James Watson in the Don Valley, Clem 
Edwards at East Ham South, Joseph Green in Leicester East (defeating Ramsay 
MacDonald), J.A. Seddon in Hanley, Matthew Simm in Wallsend, and Charles Jesson 
in Walthamstow West. At the same election, Jack Jones was returned in Silvertown as a 
National Socialist. Yet while this may seem quite impressive for a newly-formed party, 
it should be noted that only one of the successful NDP MPs – Clem Edwards, who also 
defeated Arthur Henderson - had Conservative opposition. Furthermore, Jack Jones 
almost immediately took the Labour party whip, and stood for re-election in 1922 as a 
Labour candidate, while all the MPs elected under the auspices of the NDP four years 
earlier were defeated.
98
 
Clearly this populist mixture of imperialism, protection, public works, mass 
employment, patriotism and the expansion of the state could be attractive to some 
workers. Why then did these seeds of far-Right sentiment meet with so little success 
within the labour movement? Perhaps one reason is that Labour was able to absorb, 
rather than expel this sentiment, until Mosley left over what he saw as the fiscal timidity 
of the second MacDonald ministry. Yet another important factor is that it did seem as 
though the post-war Labour movement - whilst able to accommodate all manner of 
former Liberals and radicals and present a decidedly pacifistic, internationalist face over 
Ireland and India – was still able to honestly reflect and represent the sensible, patriotic, 
socially conservative values of most working-class Britons. In this respect we can see 
the significance of labour support for the war in averting the possible development of a 
very sinister type of politics in Britain after 1918. 
 We have seen how the WNC utilised issues such as food supply, the cost of 
living, women’s suffrage and other issues as a means of binding the movement closer 
together, and how various leftist groups appreciated the importance of the Committee to 
ensuring labour cohesion. In 1917 the party changed the method of election to its 
Executive; whereas under the previous federal structure this had been delegated to local 
organisations, now it would be decided at annual conferences. Furthermore, no 
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organisation was able to nominate more than one candidate unless its membership was 
over half a million; the marginalised ILP tried to reverse this in 1918 but failed.
99
 Yet as 
ILP influence declined, Fabian influence grew, and while the trade unions had their 
position further augmented, the establishment of local parties and the future fielding of 
candidates across the country prevented excessive union dominance. As National Union 
of Railwaymen chairman George Wardle told the party conference in Manchester on 23 
January 1917: 
 
From the very first the ties which bound the party together were of the loosest possible kind. It has 
steadily, and, in my opinion, wisely, refused to be bound by any programme, to subscribe to any 
dogma, or to lay down any creed. It has refused to adopt any mechanical formulas or to submit to 
any regimentation either of ideas or of policy. It has not, like the German Socialist Party, been 
drilled into an army or regimented into a bureaucracy based upon Marxist dogma. On the contrary, 
its strength has been its catholicity, its tolerance, its welcoming of all shades of political and even 
revolutionary thought, providing that its chief object – the unifying of the workers’ political power 
– was not damaged or hindered thereby.100  
 
There has been a great deal of scholarship on the disintegration of the Liberal 
party after 1916, while not enough work has concentrated on precisely why the labour 
movement was able to stay united across the war years and beyond. In their essay, ‘A 
safe and sane labourism’, Bill Schwarz and Martin Durham held that the Labour party 
which emerged after 1918 represented both a missed opportunity and a reactive move 
against Lloyd George and the Coalition. They argued that the expansion of the franchise 
furthered the division between the constitutional and direct action wings of the labour 
movement, and that ‘out of this double movement – the recomposition of the power 
bloc and the divide within the labour movement – emerged, in its fully formed state, 
modern Labour socialism’. Labour wanted to extend into Parliament ‘in the exact same 
terms as before, creating Labour in the image of the Liberals before them’; failed to link 
democracy with direct action for fear of accusations of Bolshevism; and ‘spurned a 
strategy which could [have] construct[ed] a mass popular democratic movement’.101  
Furthermore they held that it was ‘the prospect of…cashing in on the growing 
opposition to the Lloyd George coalition [which] healed the breech between the pro and 
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anti-war factions inside the party’,102 and that ‘the constitutionalists in the Labour Party 
were right in their assessment that to break to the caesarism of the Lloyd George 
coalition required the rotation of parliamentary parties with the Labour Party itself 
integrated into the dominant structure’.103 This analysis makes it sound as though labour 
abandoned a combined Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary strategy not for reasons 
of feasibility and desirability, but due to a myopic desire to depose Lloyd George. This 
suggests that the Labour party which emerged after 1918 was formed not so much by 
the ideological and institutional upheaval of the war, but rather as a reaction against the 
dominance of Lloyd George.  
Schwarz and Durham felt that the most profound divisions within the movement 
were between syndicalists like Tom Mann and Ben Tillett and statists such as 
MacDonald and Philip Snowden, but the reconstituting effects of the war made that 
dichotomy anachronous by 1918. This chapter has argued that the war also brought the 
unions, women’s groups and socialist societies closer towards the Labour party. In this 
sense it was crucial that support for and opposition to the war was not organised along 
traditional divisions, but instead cut across them. Tony Adams has argued that the war 
brought the labour and Co-operative movements closer together, and this is also true for 
elements of the labour movement. Stuart Ball, Andrew Thorpe and Matthew Worley 
concluded that from their study of constituency political parties, ‘over the inter-war 
period as a whole, Labour undoubtedly emerged as the most centralised and disciplined 
of the three parties’.104 For this Labour could be grateful to the war; labour patriotism 
provided an issue on which different strands of the Left could agree; the WNC provided 
the institutional framework for co-operation between different groups; and the war 
created an environment where a remoulding of the labour movement was possible.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has argued that the British Left’s reaction to the First World War was 
characterised by support for Britain during the conflict, and that this patriotism was by 
no means incompatible with their leftist beliefs. Further, this support for the war effort 
was instrumental to the growth in support for Labour, the statist development of the 
labour movement after the war, and the enhanced cohesion of the Left after 1918. The 
first set of research questions of this thesis has concerned the nature and extent of left-
wing patriotism during the First World War. In Chapter 1, there is little to challenge 
Douglas Newton’s argument that the commitment of the British Left to internationalism 
before 1914 was rather artificial. Further, while the chapter did not take issue with most 
of the arguments outlined in Paul Ward’s Red Flag and Union Jack, perhaps Professor 
Ward underestimated the extent to which socialism and patriotism sat together. To 
quote from Stefan Berger’s review, Ward’s book is ‘still informed by a clear sense of 
binary opposition between the two concepts’.1 Chapter 1 has aimed to show how the 
Red Flag and the Union Jack could be one and the same banner. By providing pre-1914 
context, Chapter 1 argued that the events of August 1914 did not represent a great 
turning point for the Left, but rather demonstrated continuity with pre-war values. There 
was, nonetheless, an easing of some of the various contradictions of the Left’s attitude 
towards nationalism in this period. No longer did they have to espouse pacifistic 
internationalism whilst campaigning for the voters of a working class that did not share 
these instincts; in the climate of 1914-1918 they could be unapologetically patriotic, and 
use that patriotism to indict the government. 
Chapter 2 argued that, far from being a minority strand, labour patriotism – 
whilst equivocal and conditional - defined the Left’s response to the First World War. 
Whilst most on the Left looked to prevent the coming conflict in the final days of July 
and early August, after war was declared most promptly reversed their position. John 
Horne was correct to write of the ‘choice of 1914’ – the belief that Britain, however 
imperfect, was preferable to Germany – but Professor Horne understated the extent to 
which this choice was forced upon labour elites by a patriotic working class. 
Scholarship that has sought to downplay left-wing commitment to the war effort, such 
as Catriona Pennell’s A Kingdom United, simply cannot be sustained by the evidence of 
labour patriotism at both an elite and subaltern level. Significantly, support for Britain 
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in the war did not imply support for the government of the day. Rather, support for the 
war seems to have radicalised many on the Left; to have increased their resentment of 
the people empowered to run the country, and further committed them to changing 
Britain after the conflict. 
Chapter 3 discussed conscription, wartime strikes and opposition to the conflict, 
and found that while the agitation against conscription, shopfloor strikes and the anti-
war movement may not have characterised the Left’s response to the war, these 
experiences were an important part of left-wing wartime experience. Furthermore, the 
anti-war agitation made a crucial contribution to the type of labour movement which 
emerged after 1918. While work on opposition to the war from Cyril Pearce to Karen 
Hunt is to be commended, these portraits of minority movements at a grassroots level 
should not be allowed to obscure the overall picture of left-wing support for Britain 
during the war. Indeed, very often these studies, particularly those of Dai Egan and 
Alison Ronan, actually confirm the minority status of such movements, and their 
alienation from the wider population.  
Chapter 4 argued that support for the war was vital to securing Labour’s 
patriotic credentials, allowing the post-war party to offer a radical face over Ireland, 
Empire and disarmament, whilst picking up conservative working-class votes. The 
experience of the war shocked the Labour leaders into a fresh internationalism, but the 
patriotism displayed during the war allowed them to win in new places. Keith Laybourn 
and John Shepherd, amongst others, have showed how accusations of pacifism, 
Bolshevism and anti-nationalism were used against Labour in the early 1920s; their war 
record provided a riposte to these attacks. Similarly, Martin Pugh has spoken of the 
need for Labour to pick up working-class Tory votes, and in this respect too the war was 
significant, particularly in areas such as the East End of London and West Lancashire. 
To be sure, by the time of the first minority Labour government of 1924, a great deal 
remained to be done, and as the record of Labour from 1924 to 1939 shows, the party 
was never simply one general election away from a Parliamentary majority during the 
inter-war years. However, several obstacles which had hampered the pre-war Left had 
been overcome; Labour had its foot in the door, and now needed to build on the 
progress made from 1914 to 1924; the failures of the inter-war years, particularly 1929 
to 1931, meant that this progress was slower than it might have been. 
Chapter 5 discussed the growth of the state during the war and its retreat after 
1918. It concurred with Chris Wrigley in arguing that this expansion broke many 
existing taboos and free market shibboleths. It has also claimed, pace John Turner, that 
   
 
216 
 
the war allowed for a warming of relations between the labour movement and the state. 
Prior to the war there was often a great deal of suspicion of the state, not just of national 
but also of local government. During the conflict the Left was drawn into the running of 
the state and, through the auspices of the WNC, did a great deal to prevent the worst 
effects of the war from impacting on the most vulnerable. The growth of the wartime 
state and labour’s role assuaged many of the fears felt by some on the Left about the 
state.  Furthermore, the war made the statist, redistributive policies of Sidney Webb and 
the Fabians more palatable. It increased the desire of the Left to change their country 
and demonstrated how, through the mechanism of the state, it might be done.  
Finally, Chapter 6 claimed that labour patriotism served to unite, rather than 
divide the labour movement. Tony Adams has rightly argued that the war was crucial to 
drawing together the labour and Co-operative movements, and this was also true of the 
various groups within the labour movement. The Parliamentary Labour party, trade 
unions, socialist societies and some women’s suffrage societies were all brought closer 
together through the experience of 1914-1918. The WNC in particular ensured the war 
was to have a centripetal effect of the Left, uniting its different components rather than 
further dividing them. It allowed for the blending of the social conservatism of the 
working class with the technocratic thinking of the Fabians and provided room for 
everyone within the reformist, constitutional approach to politics espoused after 1918. 
While certain interests – such as women’s issues – became subservient to the dominant 
culture, the structural and ideological agreements of the war years were to remain intact 
until 1945. A certain kind of labourism emerged in 1918 and was finally crowned in 
1945, and dominated the next generation of British politics until the 1970s. 
This thesis has many implications for how we understand the relationship 
between Leftist politics, ‘patriotism’ and ‘nationalism’. As Linda Colley has argued, 
‘we need to stop confusing patriotism with simple conservatism, or smothering it with 
damning and dismissive references to chauvinism and jingoism’.2 William Gillman, a 
trade unionist and labour activist for almost fifty years, noted in his interview in the 
Imperial War Museum’s collection that he remained a ‘Proud Britisher, [who] would 
take up a rifle now at eighty-six and fight; can’t stand people always shouting peace, 
peace, peace’.3 The lives and careers of most of the labour patriots feature consistency 
in their critique of militarism and bloodshed from the pre-war to the post-war world. 
Following the 1922 general election, only six Labour MPs had retained their seats 
                                               
2 L. Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, 372. 
3 Imperial War Museum, Catalogue No. 9420, William Gillman, interviewed 1986. 
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consistently since 1906: Charles Bowerman, John Hodge, John Clynes, Stephen Walsh, 
Will Thorne and James O’Grady.4 Of course, that list would be longer and more diverse 
if not for the deposition of many critics of the war at the 1918 election, but that these 
men – all of whom played a prominent role in the war effort - were returned at five 
different elections over sixteen years suggests that their blend of radical patriotism was 
well-received by their electors.  
While Jack Jones may have been elected as a ‘National Socialist’ in Silvertown 
in 1918, utilising a virulently anti-German language and calls for continued military 
spending, this did not prevent his being a principled and conscientious constituency MP. 
When the government introduced a new Aliens Restrictions Bill in April 1919, Jack 
Jones and Will Thorne were amongst the Labour members who spoke up against the 
blatant anti-Semitism of the bill.
5
 Furthermore, in a debate at the 1923 Conference, on a 
motion to commit the Parliamentary Labour party to oppose all military and naval 
estimates , G. Buchanan, MP and Patternmakers’ Union official – who supported the 
motion – paid tribute to Jones – one of the few who spoke in opposition – claiming ‘he 
was sorry he had a difference of opinion on this matter with Mr. Jack Jones, because he 
wished to say quite frankly that it would be a good thing if every member of the Labour 
Party would fight as strenuously on behalf of the working class as Mr. Jack Jones did in 
the  House of Commons’.6  
Bill Nasson has spoken of how the War in South Africa brought the world 
forward in time rapidly; it was good for black Africans in terms of confidence and 
solidarity, as it was for industrial workers in Europe.
7
 The war was significant, not for 
crude mechanical reasons relating to decreased waged differentials or economic 
homogeneity, but rather for the experience of the war itself: the camaraderie, confidence 
and communalism it engendered and the structural and ideology changes it brought 
about. Speaking of women workers, Krisztina Robert has claimed that pre-1914, women 
were associated with negative aspects of modernity (sexually transmitted disease; 
promiscuity; louche-ness and ill-discipline) but that this all changed with the war.
8
 
Deborah Thom concurred with this: after the war women were associated with new 
                                               
4 Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the Labour Party: National Agent’s Report. 
5 J. Bush, Behind the Lines. East London Labour 1914-1919, London: Merlin Press, 1984. 
6 Report of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the Labour Party 
7 B. Nasson, ‘British Imperial Africa’, paper given at the Institute for Historical Research’s Anglo-
American Conference, ‘The Great War’, 3 July 2014. 
8 K. Robert, ‘“Neither Nursing, nor Philanthropy”: a Reassessment of Women’s Military Employment 
during the First World War in Britain and on the Western Front’, paper given at ‘Labour and the First 
World War’ Conference, Anglia Ruskin University, 3 May 2014. 
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technologies such as electricity, telegraphy, aeronautics, and so on.
9
 This change 
instituted by the war, the acceptance of modernity, was not confined to gender rules but 
occurred in many aspects of life. The war acted as a midwife for modern Britain and the 
modern labour movement, and the ‘Merrie England’ strand within populist socialism 
came to terms with it. In the words of Peter Mandler: ‘A nation that had come to terms 
with its urbanity had less need to justify its condition, less need of the origin-myth of 
Merrie England that the culture industry had peddled to successfully in the early 
nineteenth century.’10 
According to Alistair Bonnett:  
 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, those forms of radicalism that claimed to be rooted in 
the history and the natural rights of the people were being displaced by modernist radicalisms that 
viewed nostalgia with intense suspicion. It was an awkward moment. But the power of the 
modernist imagination was, if not overwhelming, the stronger force. Before long the radical 
nostalgia of William Morris would be treated as a charming contradiction in terms and the 
convivial socialism of the Clarion movement a whimsical footnote in the story of mainstream 
socialism.11 
 
Yet Bonnett overstated the extent to which nostalgic socialism was banished; rather the 
Merrie England strain was transferred into patriotism, community spirit and leisure 
culture. Frank Trentmann has spoken of ‘a general redefinition of fights linking the 
radical culture of the nineteenth century to that of social democracy in the twentieth, 
emphasizing rights rooted in work and social membership’, and a ‘growing emphasis on 
the social role of the state against the background of ideas stressing the reciprocal 
ethnical relationship between community and individual’, and it seems that this 
compromise between the different trends within the labour movement was brought about 
by the war.
12
  
George Orwell wrote in the context of the Second World War that ‘the 
Bloomsbury high-brow, with his mechanical snigger, is as out of date as the cavalry 
colonel’.13 Yet across Britain in the 1920s, despite the influx of Liberals into the Labour 
party, the pacifism and anti-militarism of the period, and the so-called ‘aristocratic 
                                               
9 D. Thom, ‘Women, War, Socialism and Public Memory’, paper given at ‘Labour and the First World 
War’ Conference, Anglia Ruskin University, 3 May 2014. 
10 P. Mandler, ‘Against “Englishness”: English Culture and the Limits to Rural Nostalgia, 1850-1940’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 7 (1997):160. 
11 A. Bonnett, Left in the Past. Radicalism and the Politics of Nostalgia, London: Continuum, 2010, 77. 
12 F. Trentmann, ‘Wealth versus Welfare: the British Left between Free Trade and National Political 
Economy before the First World War’, Historical Research 70 (1997): 97. 
13 G. Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius, London: Penguin, 1982, 64. 
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embrace’, there was a Labour party at the grassroots which welcomed neither high-brow 
abstraction nor passive, stoic acceptance of the existing social order. This meant that 
when Labour’s foreign policy turned towards the threat from fascism and began to 
advocate rearmament it could do so with credibility, and the war-time fusion of 
radicalism with patriotism that Orwell described merely needed to be resurrected, rather 
than built afresh. The Left which emerged after 1918 was broad-based, catholic, happy 
with new world, ‘patriotic’, reformist and labourist. 
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